

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
DAIRY MARKETING BRANCH

CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC HEARING TO CONSIDER
TEMPORARY AMENDMENTS TO THE STABILIZATION
AND MARKETING PLANS FOR MARKET MILK FOR THE
NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA MARKETING AREAS

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FOOD & AGRICULTURE
DEPARTMENT AUDITORIUM
1220 N STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2013

8:00 A.M.

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A P P E A R A N C E SCDFA Panel

Kevin Masuhara, Director
Division of Marketing Services

Candace Gates, Branch Chief
Dairy Marketing Branch

Hyrum Eastman, Dairy Economic Advisor
Division of Marketing Services

CDFA Staff

John Suther, Hearing Officer
Senior Special Investigator

Erica Sanko, Senior Agricultural Economist
Dairy Marketing Branch

Karen Dapper, Research Manager
Dairy Marketing Branch

Michele Dias, Deputy Secretary, Chief Counsel
California Department of Food and Agriculture

Petitioners

Eric Erba, PhD
California Dairies, Inc.

John Moffatt
Milk Producers Council

Lynne McBride
California Dairy Campaign

Tom Barcellos
Western United Dairyemen

California State Legislators

The Honorable Anthony Cannella
California State Senate

The Honorable Tom Berryhill
California State Senate

The Honorable Adam Gray
California State Assembly

The Honorable Kristin Olsen
California State Assembly

The Honorable Edward Hernandez
California State Senate

The Honorable Richard Pan, MD
California State Assembly

The Honorable Cathleen Galgiani
California State Senate
Chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee

Also Present

Tom Barcellos
T-Bar Dairy

Richard Sexton, PhD
University of California, Davis
Agricultural & Resource Economics

Greg Dryer
Saputo Cheese USA Inc.

Lantz Adams

Rick Adams

Renee Peets
Kraft Foods North America

Joe E. Paris
Joseph Gallo Farms

Adolfo Sanchez
Los Altos Foods

Also Present

Antoinette Duarte
Duarte Dairy, Inc.

Scott Hofferber
Farmdale Creamery, Inc.

David Ahlem
Hilmar Cheese Company, Inc.

William Schiek, PhD
Dairy Institute of California

John Lemmon
Dairy Institute of California

Pete Garbani
Land O'Lakes, Inc.

Rob Vandenheuvel
Milk Producers Council

Sue Taylor
Leprino Foods Company

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P R O C E E D I N G S

8:08 a.m.

1
2
3 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Good morning, may I have
4 your attention, please.

5 Before we start the hearing I'd like to go over
6 some important details that will help ensure that this
7 hearing will be as productive as possible.

8 Please, first, turn off your telephones so they
9 don't disrupt this hearing.

10 Second, anyone planning to testify, other than the
11 petitioners, must sign in on the hearing witness roster
12 located in the back of the room.

13 Each person has one opportunity to come forward
14 and provide testimony for up to 20 minutes. Witnesses will
15 be called in the order that they sign up. The time clock on
16 my right has been established to assist you in testifying.
17 You will be testifying from the chair on my left and on your
18 right.

19 Fourth, it is important if you want to submit an
20 exhibit please bring it up to me before you testify.

21 Fifth, remember the purpose of this hearing is to
22 take testimony and to gather evidence. It is not to make
23 findings or to render a decision. Therefore, be courteous
24 and respect the hearing process, those testifying and those
25 hearing the testimony.

1 And sixth, the restrooms are located outside the
2 doors that you came in. Go to your left and then
3 immediately on your right.

4 We will probably break for lunch around 12:00
5 o'clock, depending on the flow of the testimony. If
6 necessary the hearing will resume tomorrow morning at 8:00
7 a.m. in this room.

8 In case of emergency, exit out the doors there at
9 the rear.

10 This hearing will now come to order. The
11 California Department of Food and Agriculture has called
12 this public hearing at the Department's Auditorium, 1220 N
13 Street, Sacramento, California, on this day, Thursday,
14 September 12th, 2013, at 8:00 a.m.

15 My name is John Suther. I am a Special
16 Investigator for the Department. I have been designated as
17 the Hearing Officer for today's proceedings. I have no
18 personal interest in the outcome of this hearing and I will
19 not be personally involved in any decision that may result
20 from this hearing.

21 On July 22nd, 2013, the Department received a
22 petition requesting a public hearing to consider amendments
23 to the Stabilization and Marketing Plans for Market Milk for
24 the Northern and Southern California Marketing Areas. A
25 group of producer organizations, California Dairies, Inc.,

1 Milk Producers Council, California Dairy Campaign and
2 Western United Dairymen submitted the petition proposing a
3 modification to the sliding scale that determines a dry whey
4 factor in the Class 4b formula and replacing the temporary
5 price adjustment currently in place with another.

6 The Department announced the call of the hearing
7 on August 5th, 2013 to consider the petitioners' proposed
8 changes. This hearing will also consider the factual basis,
9 evidence and legal authority upon which to make any and/or
10 all of the proposed amendments to the plans.

11 The petitioners will have a combined total of 90
12 minutes to submit testimony and relative material to support
13 their proposal, which will then be followed by any questions
14 from the Panel.

15 Anyone who has signed in on the hearing witness
16 roster located in the back of the room will be allowed 20
17 minutes to give testimony and evidence.

18 Please note that only those individuals who have
19 testified under oath during the conduct of the hearing may
20 request a post-hearing brief period to amplify, explain or
21 withdraw their testimony. Only those individuals who have
22 requested a post-hearing brief may file a post-hearing brief
23 with the Department. Any information submitted after the
24 close of the hearing will not be included in the record for
25 consideration by the hearing panel.

1 Testimony will begin with a representative of the
2 Department who will introduce the Department's exhibits.
3 The audience may ask questions of the Department's
4 representative only as it relates to the exhibits. This is
5 the only witness that may be questioned by those other than
6 panel members.

7 As a courtesy to the panel, the Department staff
8 and the public, please speak directly to the issues and
9 avoid personalizing disagreements. Such conduct does not
10 assist the panel and will not be permitted.

11 Questioning of the witnesses other than the
12 Department's representative by anyone other than the members
13 of the panel is not permitted.

14 The hearing panel has been selected by the
15 Department to hear testimony, receive evidence, question
16 witnesses and make recommendations to the Secretary. The
17 panel is composed of members of the Department's Division of
18 Marketing Services and Dairy Marketing Branch and includes
19 Candace Gates, Branch Chief, Hyrum Eastman, Dairy Economic
20 Advisor and Kevin Masuhara, Director of Marketing Services,
21 Again, I am not a member of the panel and will not be taking
22 part in any of the discussions relative to the hearing.

23 The hearing is being recorded by the firm of All
24 American Reporting located in Sacramento. A transcript of
25 today's hearing will be available for review at the

1 Marketing Branch Headquarters located in Sacramento at 2800
2 Gateway Oaks Drive and on the Department's website following
3 the hearing decision announcement.

4 Testimony and evidence pertinent to the call of
5 the hearing will now be received. At this time I would like
6 to have Erica Sanko, Senior Agricultural Economist with the
7 Dairy Marketing Branch, who will introduce the Department's
8 exhibits. The audience may ask questions of Ms. Sanko only
9 as they relate to the exhibits.

10 Ms. Sanko, please state your full name and spell
11 your last name for the record.

12 MS. SANKO: Erica Sanko, S-A-N-K-O.

13 Whereupon,

14 ERICA SANKO

15 Was duly sworn.

16 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed.

17 MS. SANKO: Mr. Hearing Officer, my name is Erica
18 Sanko. I am a Senior Agricultural Economist with the Dairy
19 Marketing Branch of the California Department of Food and
20 Ag. My purpose here this morning is to introduce the
21 Department's Composite Hearing Exhibits numbered 1 through
22 44. Relative to these exhibits, previous issues of Exhibits
23 13 through 44 are also hereby entered by reference.

24 The exhibits entered here today have been
25 available for review at the offices of the Dairy Marketing

1 Branch since the close of business on September 5th, 2013.

2 An abridged copy of the exhibits is available for inspection
3 at the back of the room.

4 I ask at this time that the composite exhibits be
5 received.

6 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you, Ms. Sanko.

7 Are there any questions?

8 Can you please bring me a copy of those.

9 (Exhibits 1-44 were received into evidence.)

10 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Okay, we will now deviate
11 from our normal script --

12 Please continue.

13 MS. SANKO: Mr. Hearing Officer, I request at this
14 time the opportunity to provide a post-hearing brief.

15 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request to file a
16 post-hearing brief is granted.

17 MS. SANKO: Thank you.

18 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you.

19 We have a few legislators here who would like to
20 make statements. They will have three minutes each. We
21 will call them up in the order that they have signed in.
22 Senator Cannella.

23 Senator Cannella, could you please state your full
24 name and spell your last name for the record, please.

25 SENATOR CANNELLA: Sure. Anthony Cannella, C-A-N-

1 N-E-L-L-A.

2 Whereupon,

3 ANTHONY CANNELLA

4 Was duly sworn.

5 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: All right, you may
6 proceed.

7 SENATOR CANNELLA: Okay. Well thank you very much
8 for having us here. I believe it's far overdue. We have
9 lost too many dairy farms over the past six years as pricing
10 has not kept up with the incredible increase in feed costs
11 and other costs associated with dairy farms. Last year
12 alone we lost more than 100 family farms and the trend will
13 continue until action is taken to address milk prices. I am
14 asking you today to find a more equitable pricing formula.
15 We cannot sit by idly as more dairies close.

16 Earlier, a couple of months ago, Senator Berryhill
17 and I were down in San Diego with the Governor and we were
18 asked to fly back because a deal had been reached on a
19 pricing formula for a year. And roughly -- the deal was all
20 sides had agreed, it was my understanding, that there was
21 going to be a share in the whey pricing formula. It was
22 about \$110 million were going to be sent to the dairy farms
23 to help them over this next year until the task force could
24 do their work and hopefully we could adjust those pricing
25 formulas. That was -- all sides had agreed, as I recall,

1 and I think that everybody will testify to that effect. Why
2 that didn't materialize, I don't know, but I know you all
3 have the power to do that.

4 And I just hope that you understand that -- you
5 know -- I know you base it on economics and whatever theory
6 you use. But please understand there is a real impact to
7 real people out there and so it's very important that you
8 act today and adjust those pricing formulas. So thank you
9 very much.

10 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you. Senator
11 Berryhill.

12 SENATOR BERRYHILL: On my way.

13 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Senator Berryhill, could
14 you please state your full name and spell your last name for
15 the record, please.

16 SENATOR BERRYHILL: Yes. Tom Berryhill, B-E-R-R-
17 Y-H-I-L-L.

18 Whereupon,

19 TOM BERRYHILL

20 Was duly sworn.

21 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed.

22 SENATOR BERRYHILL: Okay, folks. Again, like
23 Anthony, I do thank you for having this hearing, it needed
24 to be done.

25 You've got to understand, throughout the state

1 this last year we have lost over 387 dairies that have
2 closed; 105 family dairies just this year. In Stanislaus
3 County we have seen 85 dairies close down just this year
4 because of the high -- the high cost of feed. It's no big
5 secret.

6 And what Anthony was saying was true. We were
7 down with the Governor. All of a sudden we heard there was
8 a special hearing that we were going to come back to. and
9 in that hearing there was a deal that was cut and it was a
10 deal on whey. And that deal was \$110 million this year to
11 get these guys through it and to develop a task force that
12 could study how we might all get along.

13 And so, you know, the dairy industry has always
14 had a pricing formula. And because of the whey situation
15 globally, everything has changed a little bit. And there is
16 plenty of room to keep everybody whole in this thing. I
17 think it's imperative that we come to this deal and get this
18 task force going so that we can study this problem and come
19 out at the end of the pipeline here all together.

20 And that's my goal today, my goal next year when
21 we come back and hopefully we can make this industry whole.
22 Thanks for having us.

23 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you.

24 SENATOR BERRYHILL: Do you have any questions for
25 me?

1 MS. GATES: No.

2 SENATOR BERRYHILL: Okay.

3 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Assembly Member Gray.

4 Assembly Member Gray, could you please state your
5 full name and spell your last name for the record, please.

6 ASSEMBLY MEMBER GRAY: My full name is Adam Jamie
7 Gray, my last name is spelled G-R-A-Y.

8 Whereupon,

9 ADAM GRAY

10 Was duly sworn.

11 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed.

12 ASSEMBLY MEMBER GRAY: Very good. Thank you for
13 allowing me to make a short statement this morning prior to
14 your hearing.

15 As you stated my name is Adam Gray, I am currently
16 the Assembly Member representing the 21st Assembly District,
17 which encompasses all of Merced County and about half of
18 Stanislaus County, primarily the western portion. A great
19 number of dairies in my district. I actually grew up in a
20 family that ran a dairy supply. It was a food supply store
21 and dairy equipment company.

22 When I first ran for office three/four years ago
23 and began to go out to collect support and talk to my
24 community one of the first things I did was go back and
25 visit with many of our former companies from our family

1 business. We had sold the business in the late '90s. I
2 wanted to reconnect with people on the campaign trail. And
3 one of the things that became increasingly evidence was many
4 of our customers, a third, at times maybe close to half that
5 I would contact, were no longer in business.

6 The challenges the dairy industry has faced have
7 been devastating to Merced County, to Stanislaus County and
8 to all of our communities and other small family businesses
9 like the one I grew up working in.

10 Appreciate the opportunity folks have here today
11 to attempt to seek some price relief and I hope you will all
12 take very seriously both the urgency and just the economic
13 devastation this has placed on our community.

14 So I encourage you to take action as you can. I
15 have been an active participant in the legislative process
16 with some of the legislation trying to both establish a task
17 force and trying to establish some price relief there.

18 We have unemployment in our district that exceeds
19 levels of the Great Depression, 17, 20, 25, 30. Some of the
20 small farming communities at 40 percent. And the dairy
21 industry just does so much for our families and I hope that
22 you can take some action today to provide some relief, thank
23 you.

24 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Assembly Member Olsen.

25 ASSEMBLY MEMBER OLSEN: Good morning.

1 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Good morning. Assembly
2 Member Olsen, could you please state your full name and
3 spell your last name for the record, please.

4 ASSEMBLY MEMBER OLSEN: Assembly Member Kristin
5 Olsen, O-L-S-E-N.

6 Whereupon,

7 KRISTIN OLSEN

8 Was duly sworn.

9 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Could you please speak
10 up. With that air conditioner running in the back I
11 understand some people can't hear.

12 ASSEMBLY MEMBER OLSEN: Sure. Is that better?

13 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you.

14 ASSEMBLY MEMBER OLSEN: Okay. I appreciate the
15 time you're giving us this morning. I grew up in dairy
16 country and it is just devastating to see what has been
17 going over the last few years. It's impacting our entire
18 state and it impacts many of my family and friends as well.

19 The financial crisis for our California family
20 dairy farms, as you know, is in a downward spiral. In fact,
21 it was reported just a week or so in the Modesto Bee that
22 dairies dropped from the number one commodity in Stanislaus
23 County to now number three.

24 Families have operated these dairies for decades
25 and their employees and their employees' families have been

1 part of the operations. When we lose a family dairy the
2 loss is felt by many more people than just the dairies
3 themselves. It's felt by hay brokers, grain dealers,
4 choppers, pharmaceutical suppliers, hoof trimmers,
5 veterinarians, bankers, grocers and the list goes on and on.
6 They depend on dairies for their livelihood.

7 We have lost an average of six dairies a month for
8 the last six years and that number will continue to grow
9 this year. For those who say, "Be patient, things will get
10 better, the economy is turning around" they need to talk to
11 my constituents, because it sure doesn't feel that way to
12 us.

13 There is a simple fairness issue in what they
14 should be paid for whey. Yes, there is the unmanageable
15 feed costs that dairies are having to pay, and I am trying
16 to do something about that in Assembly Joint Resolution 21.

17 Yes, there is the unwillingness of banks to
18 provide financing. Yes, there is the drilling of new wells
19 to keep up with rapidly declining aquifers. But there is
20 also a pricing problem. The dairy farmers will do the work.
21 But a fair pricing system depends on us in the Legislature
22 and you in the Department of Food and Ag because of the
23 pooling system that exists in California. Doing nothing is
24 not an answer and doing a tiny bit of something is not an
25 answer either. The time is now for letting dairy families

1 and their work ethic be matched with just a fair price for
2 milk.

3 The California dairy industry creates almost
4 445,000 jobs. That's more than the motion picture industry
5 and the television industry in California. Clearly the loss
6 of a California dairy has a negative rippling effect on our
7 rural communities and it further diminishes California's
8 entire tax base.

9 Dairy producers are not asking for anything
10 outrageous, as the previous speakers have spoken, they
11 simply want a fair price for the milk they produce. It is
12 wrong that milk prices in California continue to be lower
13 than the rest of the nation because of an outdated pooling
14 system.

15 The agreement that was reached in Senate Ag would
16 be a really good first step, that was agreed to by producers
17 and processors alike. And so I respectfully request that
18 the Secretary take substantive action to put the problems to
19 bed that are putting dairies out of business on a daily
20 basis. We need the short-term solution and then we need the
21 task force to work hard together to come up with a long-term
22 solution. Appreciate your time this morning.

23 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you. Senator
24 Hernandez.

25 SENATOR HERNANDEZ: Good morning.

1 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Good morning. Senator
2 Hernandez, could you please state your full name and spell
3 your last name for the record.

4 SENATOR HERNANDEZ: Yes, my name is Edward P.
5 Hernandez, that's H-E-R-N-A-N-D-E-Z.

6 Whereupon,

7 EDWARD P. HERNANDEZ

8 Was duly sworn.

9 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed.

10 SENATOR HERNANDEZ: Thank you very much for having
11 me this morning, Mr. Chair, and members.

12 This is an important hearing. Not only for the
13 dairy farmers but for all of us who live here in California.
14 The problem confronting dairy farmers are a matter of
15 record. I grew up in a California where thousands of family
16 dairy farms were part of this landscape. I grew up in
17 California, where you could see dairy farms from the
18 freeways and get a sense of why milk is our number one
19 agricultural commodity. I grew up in a California that if
20 you drove to the back roads of any county you were in close
21 proximity to the dairy farms that had been in the families
22 for generations.

23 To their credit, the dairy farmers are not asking
24 for a handout. Let me restate that, are not asking for a
25 handout. They are asking to be treated -- not to be treated

1 in any special way.

2 To the contrary, the dairy farmers sat down with
3 stakeholders and negotiated an agreement that has a short-
4 term one year benefit as was stated by previous individuals
5 and the framework for a long-term solution. They made an
6 agreement with representatives of the processors where the
7 price for 4b milk is handled in a more sensible manner.

8 There are others who can speak to the details of
9 the agreement much better than I can, but I am here because
10 I believe once an agreement is made and that agreement is
11 discussed in a special hearing of the Legislature that that
12 agreement becomes a starting point for the long-term
13 solutions.

14 I am adding my voice to those who are saying it is
15 time for the Secretary to act. Yesterday the Senate agreed
16 to free the bill containing the agreement with a suspense
17 file and keep the issue alive. And keep in mind, this is a
18 rare procedural move by the Senate but it reflects our
19 commitment to finding an immediate remedy for the solution,
20 to dairy farmers, that is. This issue matters and it will
21 shape the kind of California in which our children and
22 grandchildren will live.

23 And for that I thank you for allowing me the time
24 to present this morning and I am here available for any
25 questions.

1 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you for your
2 testimony.

3 SENATOR HERNANDEZ: Thank you.

4 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Are there any other
5 legislators that would like to testify?

6 Seeing none we will take a five minute recess and
7 then we'll start back.

8 (Off the record at 8:33 a.m.)

9 (On the record at 8:38 a.m.)

10 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: We will now be back on
11 the record.

12 I will now call the petitioners, beginning with
13 California Dairies, Incorporated. You will have a total of
14 90 minutes to submit your testimony. Again, please notice
15 the time clock on my right. And that will be 90 minutes, a
16 total of 90 minutes for all four petitioners, so about 22.5
17 minutes apiece.

18 Could you please state your full name and spell
19 your last name.

20 DR. ERBA: My name is Eric Erba, E-R-B-A.

21 Whereupon,

22 ERIC ERBA

23 Was duly sworn.

24 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: And I see we have your
25 written statements that you would like into the record. It

1 will be Exhibit number 45.

2 (Exhibit 45 was entered into the record.)

3 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Are you testifying on
4 behalf of an organization or individually?

5 DR. ERBA: I am testifying on behalf of California
6 Dairies, Inc.

7 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed.

8 DR. ERBA: Thank you. Mr. Hearing Officer and
9 Members of the Panel:

10 Good morning. My name is Eric Erba and I hold the
11 position of Senior Vice President and Chief Strategy Officer
12 for California Dairies, Inc., whom I am representing here
13 today. California Dairies is a full-service milk processing
14 cooperative owned by 420 producer-members located throughout
15 California and collectively producing over 17 billion pounds
16 of milk per year, or about 44 percent of the milk produced
17 in California. Our producer-members have invested over \$500
18 million in large processing plants at six locations, which
19 will produce about 400 million pounds of butter and 800
20 million pounds of powdered milk products in 2013. The Board
21 of Directors for California Dairies approved the concepts
22 contained in the testimony that I will be presenting today
23 at their August 27th, 2013 meeting. California Dairies'
24 proposal is consistent with the guidelines given in the Food
25 and Agricultural Code, Division 21, Part 3, Chapter 2,

1 starting with Article 1 and including Article 9 that
2 discusses establishment of minimum prices.

3 We thank the Department for calling this hearing
4 and allowing us the opportunity to reiterate our concern
5 about the manner in which whey is valued by the California
6 milk pricing system. The disparity between the whey
7 valuation in federal milk marketing orders and California
8 remains too large to ignore and continues to have too grave
9 an impact on our member-owners' milk price. The impact on
10 our member-owners of undervaluing whey has been addressed
11 several times over the past two years in hearings similar to
12 today's proceedings but the same old inequities continue to
13 persist. The reason is that the problem with the Class 4b
14 pricing formula has not yet been corrected.

15 Part of the hearing announcement refers to the
16 need of proponents of the petition to provide quantifiable
17 economic data on dry whey such as manufacturing costs,
18 marketing and sales costs and whey stream valuation specific
19 to California plants. If read a certain way, this makes
20 compliance with the hearing notice impossible for most
21 witnesses. Even when the Department published information
22 on whey processing that its staff collected from cheese
23 processing plants, we had access to a limited amount of
24 information specific to those plants. Quite clearly, we
25 have even less information about the operation of those

1 plants since the Department ceased to publish dry whey
2 processing cost information. Consequently, I have chosen to
3 interpret the hearing notice in a different way and will
4 provide you with data and information for this hearing that
5 is both meaningful and obtainable.

6 The hearing notice issued on August 5th set forth
7 the guidelines for a proposal that will be considered at
8 this hearing. The proposal contained in the jointly filed
9 petition that led to the call of the hearing was designed to
10 follow the format found in Article III, Section 300.0 of the
11 Stabilization and Marketing Plans for Market Milk for the
12 Northern California and Southern California Marketing Areas.

13 I have made slight adjustments to the applicable dates in
14 the proposal, which are highlighted below, to allow for some
15 consistency with the hearing time line.

16 I will skip over the proposed language which
17 mirrors that found in the petition. The applicable dates
18 for the temporary price increase are changed from the ones
19 filed in the petition but are consistent with the intent of
20 the petition.

21 The focus of the proposed change is to establish a
22 fair price for milk to which producers are entitled.
23 Specifically, the proposal seeks to shrink the Class 4b and
24 federal Class III price spread. An acceptable level of
25 price difference between California milk prices and federal

1 order milk prices exists for all classes with the exception
2 of Class 4b, which has trailed the federal Class III price
3 by almost \$2.00 per cwt. over the past two years. As
4 proposed, the projected effect of moving to a new sliding
5 scale for dry whey will be to increase the Class 4b price by
6 about \$0.22 pe cwt.; this change would be permanent. The
7 temporary adjustment in the Class 4b solids-not-fat price
8 results in an increase of \$0.46 per cwt. and the combined
9 impact of the proposal would increase the overbase price by
10 \$0.31 per cwt. for the 12 month period commencing on
11 November 1st, 2013.

12 The milk pricing proposal that we are supporting
13 has a foundation based on common sense, economics and
14 forward planning. Following the May 20th hearing in 2013,
15 we continued our discussions and negotiations with processor
16 representatives in hopes of being able to arrive at a
17 resolution on the matter of whey valuation. We made a good-
18 faith effort to develop a proposal that achieved middle
19 ground in the discussions, that is to say, one that
20 recognized and satisfied the positions of both producers and
21 processors, but required concessions from both sides.

22 The proposal that came from this effort has two
23 basic tenets. First, the existing price relief that was
24 implemented as a result of the May 20th, 2013 hearing will
25 be replaced with an amended price relief for up to one year

1 that increases the Class 4b price by up to \$0.46 per cwt.
2 Second, the sliding scale used to value whey in the Class 4b
3 formula is restructured to result in a new ceiling of \$1.00
4 per cwt. contributed to Class 4b, achievable at current
5 market prices. This change to the Class 4b pricing formula
6 will be permanent.

7 These two tenets are captured succinctly in the
8 letter dated July 8th, 2013 to Assemblyman Richard Pan from
9 Joe Lang, representing the Dairy Institute. A copy of the
10 letter is attached to my testimony.

11 Clearly, this proposal represents a significant
12 concession from the position that California Dairies had
13 adopted for the last three hearings on whey valuation.
14 California Dairies and other producer representatives made
15 these concessions in recognition of the larger issue that
16 the collective dairy industry must engage in an immediate
17 and thorough analysis of its current pricing system and
18 develop recommendations for modifications as appropriate.

19 The proposal itself will generate \$110 million in
20 new monies to dairy producers during a 12 month period.
21 Concurrently, the Dairy Industry Task Force will engage in
22 meaningful discussions regarding California's milk pricing
23 system and prepare recommendations for consideration by the
24 Department and Legislature if necessary.

25 Finally, the proposal is meant to address the

1 singular issue of fair compensation to dairy producers for
2 the milk and its components provided to processors. While
3 the numbers represented in the proposal fall short of the
4 federal Class III price, we see it as a step in the right
5 direction.

6 I want to introduce a thought of a new beginning
7 and I will start off talking about it this way.

8 You will recall the decision from the June 30,
9 2011 hearing that replaced the \$0.25 per cwt. fixed factor
10 in the Class 4b formula with a sliding scale. While this
11 decision was directionally correct and provided a more
12 appropriate Class 4b milk price, it did not provide the
13 pricing equity and pricing level that was sought by
14 producers.

15 That decision was made at a different time and
16 under different dairy industry conditions. We have over two
17 additional years of experiences since the date of that
18 hearing. We can draw on some of those experiences, and it
19 seems now that we are in need of a new beginning for the
20 dairy industry. Despite positions taken and testimony
21 offered in previous hearings, it is time to rethink what
22 action is required to prevent a mass exodus of dairy
23 producers, which would place additional stresses on an
24 already fragile industry.

25 We have struggled to find appropriate supporting

1 data for a message that resonates with the Department to the
2 extent that appropriate action is taken. We have heard
3 repeatedly that a change may be made to the minimum pricing
4 formulas "if economic conditions warrant." We submit to you
5 that we are there; the threshold for action has already been
6 met.

7 Let me paint a quick picture of the dairy industry
8 for you. The dairy industry is the leading agricultural
9 industry in California and milk and dairy products have
10 generated the most value of any of the agricultural
11 commodities produced in California, over \$6 billion in sales
12 for each of the last three years. However, as hard as it
13 may be to comprehend given the dairy industry's legendary
14 status in California, there are signs that the industry is
15 not only struggling, but a significant and vital part of the
16 industry is on the verge of collapse. Simply, the billions
17 of dollars cited for milk sales do not translate directly to
18 dairy farm profitability, and the lack of profitability has
19 predictable effects on businesses. Over 400 dairies have
20 exited the dairy industry since 2007. From California
21 Dairies' own perspective, we now have 150 fewer dairies in
22 operation that we did in 2007. The trend has not abated but
23 has continued into 2013. In the last 12 months, California
24 Dairies has lost 35 dairies that were producing a combined
25 2.5 million pounds of milk per day. Some simple math will

1 tell you that these were not small dairies; the average herd
2 size of these 35 dairies was more than 1,000 cows.

3 The direction that the industry has taken for the
4 last two years is not sustainable without widespread
5 consequences. Banks, vendors, suppliers, feed companies,
6 milk hauling companies and milk processing plants are all
7 mindful of the conditions being faced by their dairy
8 customers. They also know the dairy industry well enough to
9 understand what it means when California's milk production
10 in 2013 is down by 3.2 percent compared to last year. Their
11 businesses depend on the health of dairy farming operations,
12 and a collapse on the milk production side of the industry
13 has grave consequences for the survivability of their own
14 operations.

15 The regions of the state where the dairy industry
16 has flourished have also been the leading areas of
17 unemployment. These counties are already reporting high
18 unemployment numbers relative to the state average and
19 further increases in unemployment rates can be expected as
20 dairies continue to exit the business. I've included the
21 table, Table 1, that goes through -- that contains data for
22 the state and seven leading dairy counties. Unemployment
23 ranges from 11 percent to 15 percent for those counties and
24 averages 9 percent for the state.

25 In addition, we submit into the hearing record

1 updates of several more traditional key indicators that
2 collectively describe a disturbing trend in the producer
3 landscape.

4 First, the disparity between California Class 4b
5 prices and federal Class III prices persists. I have a
6 graph called Figure 1 that shows the result of subtracting
7 the Class III from the Class 4b price since 2007. And for
8 comparison and reference, the whey market price for dry whey
9 is overlaid on the graph. And since the Department has
10 moved to a sliding scale approach for valuing whey, the
11 difference between the two class pricing series has
12 increased and averages \$1.91 per cwt.

13 Second, the financial stress on the producer side
14 has not abated. Feed costs have been high since the third
15 quarter of 2012, resulting in high milk production costs and
16 low or even negative margins. I have a graph, Figure 2,
17 that explains that. While feed costs are starting to come
18 down now, milk prices are also forecast to trend downward
19 well into 2014. Consequently, dairy farm margins will
20 remain near historic lows.

21 Third, USDA's milk-feed ratio is widely recognized
22 as a barometer of the health of the production side of the
23 industry. At one time a milk-feed ratio of 3.0 was
24 considered to be favorable to dairy producers. I have a
25 figure called Figure 3 that shows a stark and continued

1 trend away from what would be considered a favorable ratio.

2 These three quantitative measures presented in
3 Figures 1, 2 and 3, combined with the economic conditions
4 described above, are sufficient to warrant action by the
5 Department.

6 We recognize that attempting to establish a milk
7 price high enough to erase the financial losses sustained by
8 producers as a result of inappropriate whey valuation and
9 high feed costs is problematic. As stated earlier in my
10 testimony, the proposal that we support is meant to address
11 the singular issue of fair compensation to dairy producers
12 for the milk and its components provided to processors.
13 Said in another way, producers are entitled to be
14 compensated fairly for the product they produce.

15 There seems to be a common theme underlying past
16 hearing decisions, that is to say, if there is a sufficient
17 milk supply to service milk processing plants then there is
18 no need to increase the milk price. A corollary to this
19 basic notion is that establishing higher minimum prices will
20 only lead to more milk production. It does not take much of
21 an analyst or a historian to conclude that managing the
22 state's milk supply by adjusting minimum pricing formulas
23 once a year is ineffective and inefficient. All of the
24 major cooperatives and some of the proprietary plants
25 arrived at that same conclusion years ago and adopted

1 programs that allocate milk production shares to producers
2 based on milk handling capacity. These programs are
3 actively managed and can adjust with market conditions. As
4 far as I know, the cost of oversupply of milk is borne
5 entirely by the producers and not by any other entity.

6 My concluding remarks, the milk pricing proposal
7 that we are supporting has a foundation based on common
8 sense, economics and forward planning. It was developed in
9 concert with processor representatives with both parties
10 making concessions to arrive at a mutually satisfactory
11 resolution. In discussions there was recognition of the
12 larger issue that a collective dairy industry must engage in
13 an immediate and thorough analysis of its current pricing
14 system and develop recommendations for modifications. Let
15 the proposal that the dairy industry has brought forth be
16 the establishment of a new beginning for the dairy industry.
17 We urge you to adopt the proposal as a means to bridge the
18 financial gap from where California milk prices are today
19 and where they need to be to prevent further attrition on
20 the producer side of the California dairy industry.

21 Thank you for your attention and I request the
22 opportunity to file a post-hearing brief.

23 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request to file a
24 post-hearing brief is granted.

25 Any questions from the panel?

1 MR. EASTMAN: I have a couple of questions.
2 Dr. Erba, obviously the co-petitioners, you have your
3 proposal here set and you list some -- the criteria, I
4 believe, of how you arrived at these numbers. I was
5 wondering if you could describe in terms of the exact level
6 of say the permanent change in the whey table or the actual
7 level of the temporary price increase, was there some target
8 number that you were looking to get at based on analysis of
9 these economic conditions? How did you arrive or how was
10 this, the exact impact, the increase, how was that arrived
11 at, so to speak?

12 DR. ERBA: Well you will recall that at the last
13 hearing we talked about changing the decision on the
14 December hearing so that the entire price increase is borne
15 by Class 4b. So taking the price increases that were
16 assigned to Classes 1, 2, 3 and 4a and moving that all to
17 4b. And, of course, that was not an acceptable solution.

18 We also talked about adjusting the whey scale, and
19 something similar to what was presented a couple of years
20 ago in a hearing, so this sliding scale could move up
21 farther so we were not maxx'd out as we have been for quite
22 some time now.

23 So the combination of those two plus the
24 negotiations of what would be acceptable. And again, these
25 numbers were arrived at in negotiations with processor

1 representatives. The \$0.46 that we have in the petition and
2 in my testimony was part of that negotiated solution. And
3 it is also contained in the letter that is from Joe Lang to
4 Assemblyman Pan, that \$0.46 is specified in that letter.

5 MR. EASTMAN: Okay, good. And then in your
6 testimony you mention a couple of economic factors such as
7 the difference between the California 4b price and the
8 federal order Class III price and also a little bit of the
9 cost of production numbers, sort of the financial outlook or
10 condition of dairy producers. Do you feel that your
11 petition, the impact of your petition gets at an appropriate
12 level of the difference between the 4b and the Class III
13 price? Does it rectify that and get it at the right number?
14 Will the impact of the increase get the financial condition
15 of dairy producers to the point that would be adequate or
16 sustainable?

17 DR. ERBA: I think the point, Mr. Eastman, is that
18 we are trying to establish what we consider to be a fair
19 price and it's a price that producers are entitled to
20 receive for the product that they produce. Now, should it
21 be higher? We have testified in the past that it should be.
22 But we realize that some of these things, that you have to
23 give up, you have to make concessions, you've got to move
24 off your position if you're getting to any kind of
25 agreement.

1 What we have today, what I've presented today and
2 what we petitioned for is an agreement, and it's an
3 agreement that involved both sides of the dairy industry,
4 producers and processors. We think the number should be
5 higher. I'm sure that they will testify that they think the
6 number should be lower. But through the negotiations this
7 is what we arrived at.

8 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. Do you feel that -- so do you
9 feel the negotiations between producers and processor
10 entities, was that the major, sort of factor, the major
11 energy, so to speak, that got to that number? Rather than
12 were there really -- I guess -- let me start over that
13 question.

14 Do you feel that in these negotiations, was it
15 mostly tit for tat rather than move the, sort of the number
16 rather than were these discussions focused on certain data
17 points or certain acceptable conditions on both sides that
18 would provide that stability?

19 DR. ERBA: I think in order to engage in the
20 discussion at all you've got to have both sides recognizing
21 some of the data that's covered in my testimony, and that is
22 covered in Figures 1, 2 and 3. One is a disparity between
23 federal prices and state prices, one is a cost of production
24 issue, one is essentially a survivability index on dairy
25 farms. You have to recognize and agree that those things

1 are meaningful and do have an impact.

2 Now, again, as I pointed out before and I think as
3 you realize, how we arrived at the exact number was more of
4 a negotiated process. But in order to even engage in the
5 discussion you have to agree that those points that are made
6 in those tables, in those charges, are meaningful, otherwise
7 you'd never engage in the discussion.

8 MR. EASTMAN: Gotcha. In your testimony on page
9 four where you're talking about the new beginning you
10 mention that a couple of years ago when the fixed factor for
11 whey values was replaced with the sliding scale that's
12 currently in the formula that conditions were different at
13 that time. So based on your testimony, are the differing
14 conditions from two years ago, is that just a deterioration
15 of the financial condition, the spread between the Class 4b
16 and Class III prices? Is it just a deterioration in your
17 graphs or is there any additional factor that highlights the
18 change in conditions, so to speak, that you talked to?

19 DR. ERBA: I don't want to put too much emphasis
20 on this one particular chart but I will just use it as a
21 springboard, and that's Figure 3, it talks about the milk-
22 feed ratio. I don't think we have ever seen a period of
23 time like we have since 2007 where the milk-feed ratio has
24 been not only below what people consider to be favorable but
25 trending downward. It has always been the case that it may

1 go below for awhile but it's going to move up. And it's
2 that same thing that was mentioned this morning is if you
3 hang around long enough -- the notion has been if you hang
4 round long enough things will turn around and things are
5 going to get better.

6 Well, since 2007 we have been on a track that is
7 really unsustainable and a track that I don't think anybody
8 anticipated in 2007. In 2007 you could make an argument,
9 hey, things are going to turn around, prices are going to
10 come back, profitability will be restored on the farm. That
11 hasn't happened. The dairy farmers are waiting, waiting,
12 waiting for the industry to turn and it hasn't happened,

13 And I think that's what I am trying to get across
14 in this statement of a new beginning. So let's dismiss the
15 positions and the testimony that was submitted back in those
16 days and rethink what it's really going to take to keep this
17 industry going forward. And keeping from the producer side
18 going through some terrible levels of attrition to the point
19 where we don't have a dairy industry that's sustainable
20 anymore.

21 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. Then I just have one more
22 sort of -- well, a slight technical question, I think. On
23 Figure 2 you show production, cost of production on the farm
24 and then you show the overbase price as a measure of income.
25 Historically and if you look at hearings, oftentimes people

1 use different measures of income to show the health of the
2 industry. Was there any particular reason why you chose the
3 overbase price compared to other ones that we may see today
4 or have been presented in the past?

5 DR. ERBA: No reason in particular other than it's
6 the one that most people understand, the one that most
7 people they reference the most, they understand what those
8 numbers mean. You could certainly put other prices in
9 there, a combination of quota and overbase, you could put
10 the quota price in there. There's other ways of putting it
11 in there. But I think for the most part this is the one
12 level of price that people understand.

13 MR. EASTMAN: Gotcha.

14 MS. GATES: Dr. Erba, I have a question for you,
15 kind of in regards to page five where you spoke to the
16 decrease in the number of dairies at CDI. How does that
17 relate to the volume, the decrease in volume? Could you go
18 into that?

19 DR. ERBA: Well, as we recognize, we are cyclical
20 in terms of our production. We actually hit our high point
21 in production as a full year back in 2007 before we had our
22 capacity allocation program put in place. Things have
23 basically been trending downward ever since then.

24 We had an anomaly last year. We had some terrific
25 winter weather, we had an explosion in milk production, and

1 that was very quickly followed by the lowest point in milk
2 production we've hit in five years in September of last
3 year. So we had some of the highest highs last year and
4 some of the lowest lows last year.

5 We have had -- we accepted some new dairies as of
6 January 1st this year and that changes our outlook in terms
7 of what our milk production is today. We have dairies today
8 we didn't have a year ago. But if you look at where we are
9 in terms of the same dairies, discounting those new dairies
10 that were added, we are considerably down in milk
11 production. We are four percent down in milk production
12 year over year if you don't include in the new dairies. The
13 new dairies, they're basically keeping us even over the last
14 year. And I think that's reflected in the state numbers as
15 well, the entire state is down by over three percent year to
16 date in 2013.

17 MS. GATES: So how does that then translate to
18 your customers that you are supplying milk to? Have you had
19 to increase/decrease your contracts or the milk that you are
20 able to supply? I mean, how is that working?

21 DR. ERBA: Well we have a really interesting
22 situation going on today with how we're trying to allocate
23 our milk. We are actually quite a bit higher in our milk
24 production today than we were last year but we are having
25 more difficulty than we've ever had trying to get milk to

1 our customers in the quantities that they are ordering. We
2 simply don't have the milk that we had or expected to have
3 at this time of year and so we are having to go through
4 almost a rationing of our milk allocation.

5 MS. GATES: Are you garnering higher prices
6 because of that?

7 DR. ERBA: No. Most of those sales are under
8 contract so we do not get additional premium for those sales
9 under contract. And we don't have the ability to make spot
10 sales at this point.

11 MS. GATES: Okay, thank you.

12 MR. MASUHARA: I have a couple of questions,
13 Dr. Erba.

14 DR. ERBA: Sure.

15 MR. MASUHARA: And this might seem like it
16 deviates a little bit but you're aware from the hearing
17 announcement we are also evaluating the sufficiency of these
18 formulas. And part of that is to make evaluations of how
19 they are performing relative to how they are structured in
20 terms of what products are being made out there and how
21 those products perform in the marketplace. And to that I
22 have a question about CDI's portfolio on the 4a side,
23 although we are talking about 4b but it helps us to
24 establish comparisons for when we do our analysis.

25 Are all of the products that CDI is making, are

1 they reflected in the current 4a formula?

2 DR. ERBA: Do you mean that everything that we
3 made is captured in the pricing formula?

4 MR. MASUHARA: Yes, basically 4a covers end-
5 product pricing as far as nonfat dry milk powder and butter.
6 Are there other products that are being manufactured that
7 aren't correlated directly to those?

8 DR. ERBA: We would have some powders that are not
9 reportable, if that's what you're getting at. As you well
10 know, the California weighted average price for nonfat dry
11 milk has specific requirements about what shall be reported
12 and not everything we make goes in there. Just as on the
13 cheese side you've got mozzarella that's made in great
14 quantities in the state that are not reported to the -- not
15 reported to the state either in terms of the pricing
16 formula.

17 MR. MASUHARA: And as a trend would it be your
18 estimation that these products over time are evolving more
19 towards some of these products that aren't represented in
20 the formula?

21 DR. ERBA: I would say that it is a very slow
22 evolution. Our plants were designed to produce specific
23 products and you cannot just simply run -- say, today I am
24 going to make a product I have never made before. The
25 equipment is not designed to make it. So that as we are

1 able to modify our equipment or add to our processing
2 capacity we may be able to add some capacity to do some
3 different products. But that evolution is going to be slow,
4 it's going to be over a period of years, perhaps even
5 decades. It is not a, hit the switch and today you're
6 producing product you've never produced before on the same
7 equipment, it doesn't work that way.

8 MR. MASUHARA: And it's driven more or less by the
9 marketplace?

10 DR. ERBA: Well in our case we set -- we have a
11 relatively new plant in Visalia and it was designed to do
12 some different products. That's the only one in the system
13 that was really designed to do that, everything else was
14 designed to do low-heat commodity nonfat dry milk and butter
15 and that's how they operate, basically. So as we are able
16 to add different kinds of equipment or modify the equipment
17 we have, we may be able to do what you're talking about but
18 it will be an evolution over a period of years.

19 MR. MASUHARA: And as a hypothetical, if that
20 formula were to be modified in such a way that wasn't
21 reflective of your current product portfolio how would that
22 impact your operations?

23 DR. ERBA: I guess I'd have to know exactly what
24 the change was going to be. Probably we would have to
25 change, make some changes in the way we run product but not

1 necessarily. We don't always have the opportunity to run
2 the kind of products we want to, we have to be responsive to
3 the milk supply we have. So if we don't have the milk but
4 we have too much to run some of our more specialized
5 products then we don't make those, we can't make those
6 products. So I'd have to know what specific change you're
7 talking about in order to tell you how it might change our
8 operation.

9 MR. MASUHARA: But it would have an impact?

10 DR. ERBA: It's possible it could have an impact.
11 I can't say that it would but it's possible it would.

12 MR. MASUHARA: And generally, are some of these
13 products that you're making that aren't reflected in that
14 formula, do they generally perform in the marketplace at a
15 premium to current nonfat dry milk product powders as far as
16 an index goes?

17 DR. ERBA: It's cyclical, sometimes they do,
18 sometimes they don't. This year those products have
19 actually been in pretty good demand but that is not always
20 the case. We export a large volume, a large percentage of
21 our milk powders. On occasion we have exported a decent
22 percentage of our butter products but that doesn't always
23 happen, it kind of depends on what that year's product
24 planning looks like. It depends on what contracts we have,
25 what sales we're expecting in terms of intermediate

1 products, cream, condensed and so forth. Several things go
2 into that discussion before it gets reset every year.

3 MR. MASUHARA: Okay, thank you.

4 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Okay.

5 MR. EASTMAN: I just have one more quick question
6 to piggyback on the question that Candace asked. You
7 mentioned that to a certain extent you're having problems
8 with supplying milk to your customers. And obviously, as
9 you said, you have contracts, milk supply contracts in
10 place. Have you had any of your customers ask you for more
11 milk at this time?

12 DR. ERBA: Absolutely. Some of the contracts
13 we've got are not fixed, it's not set loads on a daily basis
14 or a weekly basis. It's flexible so they can order within a
15 range of whatever the range is set under the contract. And
16 what we have lately is people moving off of the lower end of
17 the range toward the middle of the range asking for milk and
18 it's milk we simply don't have.

19 MR. EASTMAN: Has anybody approached you with an
20 idea in order to somehow spur that milk production? Paying
21 a premium or paying additional monies or dollars to try and
22 provide an incentive for some of your producers to actually
23 produce more milk so they could get more milk?

24 DR. ERBA: No. And again, this is very
25 situational; it's the here and now. Perhaps over time it

1 might evolve to something like that but right now it's under
2 contract and the contract covers whatever premiums shall be
3 paid. Unless both parties agree that you are going to amend
4 the contract then the contract is a contract, it's
5 enforceable.

6 MR. EASTMAN: Thank you.

7 MR. MASUHARA: Sorry, this is to follow up on some
8 earlier questions Hyrum had too, I was looking over my list
9 of things that we're trying to establish here.

10 You had mentioned that the proposal contains
11 numbers that were part of the negotiated process. With
12 respect to that, I understand that negotiations always start
13 with two sets of numbers, one represents a low side and a
14 high side. But to your knowledge, does there exist any
15 quantitative analysis that might be available to be filed as
16 a post-hearing brief that offers a little bit more detail as
17 to what numbers were involved in that negotiation and what
18 those impacts might have been described from that analysis?

19 DR. ERBA: I am fairly certain I can come up with
20 something that would satisfy that in a post-hearing brief.

21 MR. MASUHARA: Okay, thank you.

22 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you, Dr. Erba.

23 DR. ERBA: You're welcome.

24 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: I would now like to call
25 Milk Producers Council.

1 MR. MOFFATT: Mr. Hearing Officer and members of
2 the Panel, John Moffatt here representing the Milk Producers
3 Council. Milk Producers Council supports the --

4 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Excuse me, John. Could
5 you please state your full name and spell your last name for
6 the record.

7 MR. MOFFATT: John James Moffatt, the last name is
8 spelled M-O-F-F-A-T-T.

9 Whereupon,

10 JOHN JAMES MOFFATT

11 Was duly sworn.

12 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you, you may
13 proceed.

14 MR. MOFFATT: Thank you. Sorry, I got a little
15 ahead of myself there, didn't I?

16 I am here today to express the Milk Producers
17 Council's support for the proposal before the panel today.
18 I will keep my remarks brief.

19 Over the last several months the Milk Producers
20 Council, other members of the producer industry as well as
21 the representatives of the dairy processor industry have
22 worked very hard to come to a solution to find a way forward
23 both in the short-term and the long-term to produce -- to
24 protect the economic viability of both parts of this
25 industry, both the producer and the processor. Those

1 discussions culminated in an agreement that is captured both
2 in the proposal that you see before you today but also a
3 bill that is currently moving its way through the
4 Legislature.

5 I testified in the Senate Agriculture Committee on
6 July 11th, 2013, in support of that bill and I am here
7 testifying today on behalf of Milk Producers Council in
8 support of this petition that is in front of you. We
9 believe that both components are necessary to deal with both
10 the short-term and the long-term issues facing this industry
11 in California and we would like to request that CDFA grant
12 the petition that is before you today.

13 With that I will conclude my remarks and ask that
14 we have the opportunity to file a post-hearing brief.

15 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request for a post-
16 hearing brief is granted.

17 Would you like to enter this as an exhibit?

18 MR. MOFFATT: I believe that's the same -- I am
19 happy to enter this as an exhibit. And if I don't I'm sure
20 the next testifier will, but I am happy to do it now.

21 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: This will be entered as
22 Exhibit number 46. Thank you, Mr. Moffatt.

23 (Exhibit 46 was entered into the record.)

24 MR. MOFFATT: Thank you.

25 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: I would now like to call

1 a representative from California Dairy Campaign.

2 Will you please state your full name and spell
3 your last name for the record, please.

4 MS. McBRIDE: Lynne McBride, M-C, capital B-R-I-D-
5 E.

6 Whereupon,

7 LYNNE McBRIDE

8 Was duly sworn.

9 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Would you like this
10 written statement entered as an exhibit?

11 MS. McBRIDE: I would.

12 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: This will be exhibit
13 number 47.

14 (Exhibit 47 was entered into the record.)

15 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Are you testifying on
16 behalf of yourself or an organization?

17 MS. McBRIDE: I am testifying on behalf of the
18 California Dairy Campaign.

19 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you. You may
20 proceed.

21 MS. McBRIDE: Thank you. Mr. Hearing Officer and
22 Members of the Panel, my name is Lynne McBride. I currently
23 serve as Executive Director of the California Dairy
24 Campaign. The testimony I will present today is based on
25 positions adopted by the CDC Board of Directors.

1 I would like to begin by thanking California
2 Department of Food and Agriculture Secretary Karen Ross for
3 holding this hearing today to consider specific
4 modifications to the California minimum price formulas. We
5 join California Dairies, Inc., Milk Producers Council and
6 Western United Dairymen in calling for an increase in the 4b
7 price in the amount of \$0.46 per hundredweight and an
8 increase in the whey factor value from \$0.75 to \$1.00 per
9 cwt. We consider this increase to be a compromise position
10 due to the fact that it represents a fraction of the
11 equivalent federal order Class III value. However, we
12 strongly support all efforts to increase California minimum
13 prices so that they are at levels that are closer to a
14 reasonable and sound economic relationship with prices paid
15 in other states.

16 California Dairies Continue to Close

17 The California Department of Food and Agriculture
18 Mid-Year Review for 2013 indicated that there are 1509
19 dairies remaining in the state. Last year 105 dairies went
20 out of business in California and in the first six months of
21 this year now more than 50 dairies have closed their doors.
22 We believe that the steep decline in the number of dairies
23 in California is largely due to the fact that dairy
24 producers in our state are paid significantly less than
25 dairy producers in the federal milk marketing order system.

1 We urge that our state dairy pricing system be reformed to
2 close the gap between federal order prices and California
3 prices which has led the average sized dairy in our state to
4 be paid more than \$800,000 less than the same sized dairy in
5 the federal order system since January 2009.

6 Although dairy producer prices have improved since
7 2012, prices on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange have been
8 volatile over the past several weeks and producers in our
9 state continue to struggle to remain in operation. Attached
10 please find a document that shows the accumulated losses for
11 a typical dairy farm in our state over the last 10 years.
12 It is important to recognize that although prices have
13 improved since this time last year, dairy income would have
14 to increase substantially for an extensive period in order
15 to make up for the devastating losses that dairy producers
16 have incurred up until this point. In the last five years,
17 California dairy farmers experienced a net loss in income in
18 all but one year. 2009 was the worst year by far with
19 average income losses of more than \$5 per cwt. Conditions
20 improved in 2011 with dairy farmers earning an average net
21 profit of \$0.71 per cwt, but then the situation deteriorated
22 dramatically in 2012 as dairy farmers lost more than \$2 per
23 cwt on average. The economic conditions faced by dairy
24 farmers in our state have led to the loss of now more than
25 400 dairy farms over the last five years.

1 A number of our members have gone out of business
2 last year and in recent months. It is important to
3 recognize the factors that contributed to their decision to
4 close their dairies and how it relates to the minimum
5 pricing formulas established by CDFA. One dairy that sold
6 that I would like to talk about was a 700 cow dairy in the
7 Central Valley that had been in operation for generations.
8 The owners of the dairy were able to utilize some of their
9 equity in order to withstand the price collapse of 2009 and
10 began to make progress towards positive cash flow in 2011,
11 but then in 2012 when feed prices escalated and the
12 California minimum prices remained more depressed compared
13 to other states, the owners of this dairy started to
14 question how long they would continue.

15 During hearing after hearing before CDFA they
16 along with all the other dairy producers in the state waited
17 for some improvement in milk prices due to the increased
18 value of milk, particularly 4b milk in the marketplace, but
19 in the end the modest increases granted by the Department
20 made them continue to question how long they would remain in
21 operation. The next generation of their family was not
22 interested in continuing to own and operate the dairy given
23 the losses that were incurring each month as dairy producer
24 prices failed to keep up with production costs. Even though
25 conditions improved in 2013 and the margins were better,

1 they decided to sell the dairy because they were not
2 optimistic about the future. They determined the risk and
3 sacrifice required to own and operate a dairy in this state
4 are simply too great given the chronic losses dairies like
5 them have sustained. The dairy I have described is just one
6 example of many, now hundreds in recent years, who have
7 chosen to exit the industry. Many of these dairies who
8 sold, immigrated to this country with nothing, worked to
9 build their dairy through hard work and sacrifice and have
10 seen their businesses dissolve due to the fact that dairy
11 income in our state does not cover costs. Many were forced
12 to sell by the banks and others like the one I described
13 decided to sell because of the grim economic outlook they
14 faced. They simply decided that enough was enough. They
15 couldn't afford to lose any more money and they sold the
16 cows.

17 For those who are not dairy producers it may be
18 hard to understand what the sale of a dairy means to a dairy
19 family. The panel will hear from a number of dairy
20 producers today who can speak to that firsthand, including
21 one young producer who wants to continue into the future in
22 the dairy business. The hard work, sacrifice, commitment
23 and dedication of a typical dairy family are tremendous. It
24 is a challenge to manage the day-to-day operations of a
25 dairy and many consider it a calling because of the

1 sacrifice and commitment it requires. It is an even greater
2 challenge to put forward that type of effort and sacrifice
3 and lose money month after month. The owner I described who
4 sold his dairy still misses his cows to this day. Many
5 other former dairy owners feel the same way. The only
6 reason many of these dairies closed was because they are
7 forced to due to the difficult economic circumstances they
8 faced and the fact that the bank was no longer willing to
9 lend money to enable them to run their operations. Some of
10 the closures that have occurred are by dairy owners who no
11 longer see a future for themselves as a dairy producer in
12 this state due to the fact that California dairy producer
13 prices are so much lower than prices paid in other states.

14 One of our board members currently has his dairy
15 operation up for sale and plans to move to the Northwest
16 where dairy prices are significantly higher than here in
17 California and the future seems more promising. He has been
18 a board member and a leader in our organization since it
19 began. He is able to grow a substantial amount of his own
20 feed for his 1,000 cow dairy so he is more financially
21 secure. To him and many, many other dairy owners, it just
22 doesn't make sense to operate a dairy here due to the fact
23 that our state prices are some of the lowest paid across the
24 nation and the costs to run a dairy in California, including
25 all of the regulatory costs, are some of the highest in the

1 country.

2 The losses would not have been as great if our
3 California pricing system had paid dairy producers a price
4 that was in line with prices paid in the federal milk
5 marketing order system. The greatest disparity exists
6 between our 4b cheese price and the equivalent federal order
7 Class III price amounting to a \$2.11 difference in June of
8 2013. The average difference between the California 4b
9 price and the equivalent federal order Class III price
10 totaled \$1.90 per cwt in 2012 and \$1.98 per cwt the year
11 prior. The gap between the Class III and California 4b is
12 wide and the justifications for maintaining the disparity
13 from CDFA range from concern about disrupting current
14 marketing conditions to improved dairy margins. The end
15 result is our state's minimum prices are not in reasonable
16 sound economic relationship with prices paid for comparable
17 milk sold around the country.

18 The Latest cost of production data available from
19 CDFA is the first quarter of 2013, which indicated the cost
20 to produce milk in the state amounted to \$19.16 per cwt, a
21 5.9 percent increase compared to the first quarter of 2012.
22 The most recent California overbase price for July 2013
23 amounted to just \$16.65 per cwt, which is an increase from
24 the \$14.44 per cwt price one year ago, but not enough to
25 cover the average cost of production in the state.

1 According to Section 62062 of the California Food and Ag
2 Code, the secretary shall, "Consider the cost of management
3 and a reasonable return on necessary capital investment"
4 when establishing prices. The current pricing formulas do
5 not result in a price that is adequate to cover production
6 costs, proving that an increase in the minimum prices is
7 more than justified.

8 The fact that our state system underpays dairy
9 producers compared to other states has caused California
10 dairy farmers to be paid on average \$1 per hundredweight
11 less than dairy farmers in the federal milk marketing order
12 system. As I mentioned before, leading to a more than \$800
13 million loss in income for the average size dairy over the
14 last -- since January 2009. Had our state dairy system paid
15 California dairy producer prices that were in line with
16 prices paid in other states, the losses would not have been
17 as great and more dairies would be in operation today. Many
18 of the dairy operations that closed were in operation for
19 generations, causing irreparable harm to the local and
20 regional economy and the social fabric of the affected
21 communities.

22 California mailbox prices are consistently some of
23 the lowest of any regulated state in the nation. The most
24 significant reason for the lower prices paid here is due to
25 the inequity in the current 4b price formula that fails to

1 reflect the current value of whey in the marketplace.
2 According to the latest Dairy Market News from the United
3 States Department of Agriculture Agricultural Marketing
4 Service, the mailbox price in California was the second
5 lowest in any regulated state in the nation. In May of
6 2013, the California mailbox price was just \$17.95 per cwt
7 while, again, the latest cost of production from CDFA
8 indicates the cost to produce milk is \$19.16 per cwt. In
9 contrast, the federal order mailbox prices averaged \$19.63
10 per cwt. May 2013 prices were a significant improvement
11 from May 2012 prices which were nearly \$3 lower than they
12 are today. So while prices have improved, the losses from
13 2012 were record setting, the number of dairies that exited
14 that year was the highest in memory and it is a constant
15 struggle for the dairy operations that remain, largely due
16 to the fact that our state pays dairy producers prices that
17 are significantly below prices paid in the federal order
18 system.

19 As has been said many times during these hearings,
20 the California Food and Agriculture Code requires the
21 secretary to set prices that are in reasonable sound
22 economic relationship with the national value of
23 manufactured milk products. A nearly \$2.00 average per cwt
24 gap between the California price and the equivalent federal
25 order price in 2011 and 2012 demonstrates that the current

1 4b pricing formula fails to meet the standard set out in the
2 code. We along with other producer organizations have
3 called for an end to this price disparity, however, up until
4 now the department has failed to restore equity to our dairy
5 pricing system. The petition put before CDFA today is a
6 compromise position between producers and processors that
7 falls short of closing the significant gap that has long
8 existed and widened greatly since 2012, but it would move
9 our state 4b price somewhat closer to the national value of
10 cheese milk.

11 California is the nation's leading milk producing
12 state, yet dairy producers are not able to find markets if
13 they want to change to a new buyer. This year and last year
14 some plants were short of milk, however due to complex
15 marketing agreements, producers were not able to access
16 those short markets or benefit from the increased demand in
17 the marketplace through higher prices above the state's
18 minimum prices. Due to the consolidation and concentration
19 that exists and the lack of competition in the marketplace,
20 the minimum prices established by CDFA are more critical
21 than during any other time in our state's history. It is
22 imperative that CDFA adhere to each standard set out in the
23 food and agriculture code so that the minimum price system
24 is fair and equitable to producers.

25 Dairy operations cannot continue to sustain

1 chronic losses while there is considerable profitability
2 experienced further up in the food chain. As we have
3 testified at previous hearings, CDC believes the only way to
4 restore equity to our state dairy pricing system is to
5 increase all class prices so that they are aligned with the
6 federal order prices. Alignment with the federal order is
7 the only way to end the inequity in our state dairy pricing
8 system. It would improve the outlook for dairies across the
9 state and enable the next generation of dairy producers to
10 have a brighter future than the one that exists today.

11 As a compromise for this hearing we are instead
12 focused on changes to the 4b price where the greatest gap
13 between the federal order class price and the California
14 class price continues to exist. It is clear that the
15 increase called for in the petition put before CDFA for
16 consideration today is long overdue. Not only have dairy
17 producers and cooperatives supported the increases called
18 for in the petition put before the Department today but the
19 Dairy Institute put its support for the increase in writing
20 in a letter to CDFA dated July 8th. For the last two
21 months, the Dairy Institute has been on record supporting
22 this increase yet now months have passed before the increase
23 called for has been granted. Dairy producers and processors
24 have been told countless times by lawmakers at both the
25 state and federal level that in order for government to act,

1 it is critical that they get together and agree on a
2 compromise. In this case the compromise has been reached
3 and now it is time for CDFA to respond immediately granting
4 the increase called for in the petition.

5 In order to send a unified message to the
6 department again we have joined with other dairy producer
7 organizations and cooperatives in our state to call for an
8 increase in the 4b price of \$0.46 and an increase in the
9 whey scale from \$0.75 to \$1.00. Adoption of the petition we
10 have jointly submitted to the Department will bring
11 California prices in somewhat closer relationship to prices
12 paid in other states.

13 The increase called for in our petition will
14 provide much needed additional revenue that is well deserved
15 by dairy producers who have continued to lose substantial
16 income over countless months. Our proposal is a compromise
17 position that would increase producer prices, a step that is
18 long overdue. Adoption of the producer price increases that
19 we have called for today will provide, again, much needed
20 and well-deserved revenue to dairy producers across the
21 state who continue to struggle to remain in operation under
22 continued difficult circumstances.

23 On behalf of the California Dairy Campaign I would
24 like to thank the Department for the opportunity to present
25 our testimony today. We look forward to working with CDFA

1 to improve the outlook for California dairy producers now
2 and in the future and we would like to request the
3 opportunity to submit a post-hearing brief.

4 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your post-hearing brief
5 is granted.

6 Any questions?

7 MR. EASTMAN: Yes, I have a few questions
8 regarding some of the -- some of the information that you
9 supplied in your testimony. On the last page of your
10 testimony you have the chart or the graph that you were
11 referring to. I just wanted to make sure I understand how
12 the calculation was done.

13 MS. McBRIDE: Yeah, that was similar to the one we
14 submitted during the last hearing where we tried to reflect
15 the value of quota in the calculation, that's why we took
16 the blend less \$0.20.

17 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. So in essence you're looking
18 -- I assume this is a measurement of some amount of income
19 and you compare that with costs and then you get, you arrive
20 at the figures in the graph, correct?

21 MS. McBRIDE: Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.

22 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. And so the milk price you're
23 using, it says "Blend less \$0.20." So by "blend" did you
24 mean the quota price or is that?

25 MS. McBRIDE: We took the blend less \$0.20 to

1 reflect the fact that a certain percentage of producers
2 don't own quota.

3 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. So by "blend" you mean the
4 quota price then.

5 MS. McBRIDE: Yes.

6 MR. EASTMAN: Or is that not true?

7 MS. McBRIDE: Yeah.

8 MR. EASTMAN: Yes, okay. And then the cost
9 figures you're using are just CDFA's cost of production.

10 MS. McBRIDE: Correct, we study that. It's very
11 helpful, we appreciate the cost of production unit.

12 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. And then -- So on page three
13 of your testimony at the very end you mention that
14 California dairy producers are paid on average \$1 per cwt
15 less than dairy farmers in the federal milk marketing order
16 system. How did you arrive at that dollar difference? What
17 price -- what California price are you using and what price
18 are you using for the federal order comparison?

19 MS. McBRIDE: Yeah, that's a piece I can submit to
20 you for the record and certainly in my post-hearing brief.

21 MR. EASTMAN: Okay.

22 MS. McBRIDE: We just basically did it based on
23 our class utilization and the federal order classes, you
24 know, published.

25 MR. EASTMAN: Okay.

1 MS. McBRIDE: And that, again, runs from January
2 2009 through July 2013. And I would be happy to introduce
3 that as part of the record, it's a pretty extensive series
4 of numbers.

5 MR. EASTMAN: I understand.

6 MS. McBRIDE: I think it would be helpful.

7 MR. EASTMAN: Okay, perfect. So you're going to
8 supply that in post-hearing brief?

9 MS. McBRIDE: Yeah.

10 MR. EASTMAN: Okay, good. And then I -- in your
11 testimony you cite the California Food and Ag Code and you
12 also cite the differences between California minimum class
13 prices and the federal order class prices.

14 MS. McBRIDE: Mm-hmm.

15 MR. EASTMAN: In your opinion, does the proposal
16 of the co-petitioners, does it arrive at the appropriate
17 level in order to make the comparison of the California 4b
18 price to the California 3 price at the acceptable level
19 based on the economic conditions as you see it? Or do you
20 feel that that number is not exactly what you feel the
21 economic conditions would warrant?

22 MS. McBRIDE: We consider it a compromise position
23 and a step forward but we don't think that it would close
24 the gap between the California prices and federal order
25 prices. And I think that's seen clearly in the comparisons

1 that we have made and the information that I'll submit in
2 our post-hearing brief. But the gap continues to be
3 significantly larger than that.

4 But again, we consider this a compromise position
5 and we think it's important to act on the compromise that
6 was struck and so we are supportive of, again, this step, At
7 least to get us somewhat closer.

8 MR. EASTMAN: Gotcha. What do you think would be
9 the appropriate comparison or does that figure in your mind
10 exist?

11 MS. McBRIDE: Well, I think, again, and you know,
12 I'll submit this, but just that producers are aware, looking
13 at the numbers, that the difference on average has been
14 about \$1, a \$1 per cwt between the federal order and the
15 California prices. And so what we would see as fair would
16 be alignment with those federal order prices.

17 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. And what would that alignment
18 be, though?

19 MS. McBRIDE: For our prices to increase at that
20 level.

21 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. So does that mean that you
22 would feel the California minimum prices would be the same
23 as federal order prices?

24 MS. McBRIDE: Ideally, yes.

25 MR. EASTMAN: Okay.

1 MR. MASUHARA: On the first page of your
2 testimony, Lynne, you make a statement that you believe that
3 the steep decline in the number of dairies in California is
4 largely due to the fact that dairy producers in our state
5 are paid significantly less than dairy producers in the
6 federal milk marketing orders. Have you done any analysis
7 to make those comparisons and seen on a comparable basis, is
8 that a true statement? Has there been an exit in other
9 federal milk marketing orders of the same magnitude or on a
10 percentage basis compared to their overall industry in terms
11 of size, number of cows, milk production? Has CDC done that
12 type of an analysis?

13 MS. McBRIDE: Yeah, we definitely monitor what's
14 occurred in other states, certainly, and I know there has
15 been declines. For example, Wisconsin and other states.
16 But if you look at their mailbox price, it's the second-
17 highest in the country, indicates that they have better
18 prices than here in California. And in terms of the
19 statement that we think it's largely the reason for the
20 steep drop. I mean, again, looking at the difference
21 between our price and the federal order price over the
22 period of time that I mentioned, since January 2009, an over
23 \$800,000 difference. I think many of the dairies that we
24 represent that we have seen go out of business and continue
25 to struggle see that figure and realize that if that had

1 been income that they were able to have, their situation
2 financially would be a lot different than it is today. And
3 certainly the dairies that have exited have indicated that
4 that certainly would have enabled them to continue longer
5 than they did.

6 MR. MASUHARA: So in your monitoring that
7 situation and you're saying that you guys have actually come
8 up with some results of other FMMO areas of exiting dairies,
9 say, over the last five years. Can you quantify that to see
10 how many dairies in, say, the Pacific Northwest or the Upper
11 Midwest order that left?

12 MS. McBRIDE: Well basically we looked at --

13 MR. MASUHARA: And for a comparable period that
14 we're talking about in California.

15 MS. McBRIDE: Yeah, the numbers and the costs in
16 those states compared to the numbers and the costs in
17 California. And again, it's well-known both here and across
18 the country, working with dairy organizations in other
19 states, that our prices here are, you know, they're they
20 second-lowest of any mailbox price in the nation. But I
21 would be happy to submit more specific information about
22 what we've understood that has occurred in other regions of
23 the country in a post-hearing brief.

24 MR. MASUHARA: Yeah, I'd be curious to know how
25 many dairies in a comparable period that you make comparison

1 here of exited in those orders that have, what you have
2 characterized as, a better pricing structure.

3 MS. McBRIDE: We'd be happy to do that.

4 MR. MASUHARA: Okay. And then also on page five
5 you reference the letter from the Dairy Institute to CDFA.
6 I am not aware that Dairy Institute sent CDFA a letter on
7 July 8th about the contents of the petition; my
8 understanding is that was a letter that circulated to a
9 legislator but not CDFA. Do you have another letter that
10 you could submit to us?

11 MS. McBRIDE: You're correct, it was submitted to
12 Assembly Member Pan on July 8th. So that's the letter that
13 I'm mentioning.

14 MR. MASUHARA: That's the one you're referencing.

15 MS. McBRIDE: It's incorrect, my statement there.

16 MR. MASUHARA: Okay, thank you.

17 MS. GATES: Just one quick question. You kind of
18 reference going back and forth between the overbase price,
19 the blend price and the mailbox prices. So I am trying to
20 figure out what do you see as a true reflection of what
21 dairy producers receive?

22 MS. McBRIDE: Well, I think we need to look at all
23 those indicators to get information about the situation that
24 dairy producers are facing. I would say an important
25 indicator that we look at probably most closely would be the

1 mailbox price, but the minimum price pays such a critical
2 role in that we look at those closely as well. So I
3 wouldn't -- I wouldn't necessarily pick one or the other, I
4 think they are all important indicators.

5 MS. GATES: Okay, thank you.

6 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you, Ms. McBride.

7 I would like to now call the representative from
8 Western United Dairymen.

9 Would you please state your full name and spell
10 your last name.

11 MR. BARCELLOS: Yes. Tom Barcellos, B-A-R-C-E-L-
12 L-O-S.

13 Whereupon,

14 TOM BARCELLOS

15 Was duly sworn.

16 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Would you like this
17 written statement entered in as an exhibit?

18 MR. BARCELLOS: Yes, please.

19 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: It will be exhibit number
20 48.

21 (Exhibit 48 was entered into the record.)

22 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: And your testimony is as
23 an individual or as a organization?

24 MR. BARCELLOS: I am testifying in my capacity as
25 President of Western United Dairymen.

1 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you. You may
2 proceed.

3 MR. BARCELLOS: My name is Tom Barcellos. I am
4 the President of Western United Dairymen. Our association
5 is the largest dairy producer trade association in
6 California, representing approximately 900 of the state's
7 dairy families. We are a grassroots organization
8 headquartered in Modesto, California. An elected board of
9 directors governs our policy. The board of directors
10 approved the position I will present here today at the July
11 19, 2013 board meeting.

12 We would like to thank Secretary Ross for the call
13 of this hearing on our petition. Western United advocates
14 for price relief at the last two emergency hearings held on
15 December 20th, 2012 and May 20th, 2013 and continued to
16 believe that price relief is necessary. Dairy families in
17 the state have struggled in 2012, especially in the second
18 half of the year. 2013 certainly has not been easier, with
19 months of milk prices remaining under the cost of
20 production. While we appreciate the Secretary's goal of
21 finding a long-term solution with the implementation of the
22 Dairy Futures Task Force, we need dairy families to make it
23 through these difficult financial times.

24 Beyond emergency price relief is the need to fix
25 the whey portion of the Class 4b formula. Producer groups

1 have advocated for the last few years that the Department
2 needs to modify the Class 4b formula to better track the
3 whey value generated in the Federal Order Class III formula
4 and the market price for cheese. The Class 4b formula was
5 slightly modified over recent years, but we still believe it
6 falls far short of generating a fair value from whey.

7 To expand on both of those issues, WUD
8 respectfully submits a proposal to consider amendments to
9 the Stabilization and Marketing Plans for the Northern and
10 Southern California Marketing Areas. Specifically, WUD
11 proposes a temporary price increase on the Class 4b formula;
12 for Class 4b milk solids-not-fat, \$0.0528 per pound. The
13 appropriate changes to the Plan are presented in Appendix A.

14 The second request for change is to increase the current
15 whey scale's cap from \$0.75 to \$1 per cwt.

16 Background on this:

17 Arriving at this position was a lengthy process
18 that did not begin with this petition. With the whey factor
19 implemented on December 1st, 2007, it was only a matter of
20 time before prices would fall significantly out of alignment
21 with federal order pricing and the market price for cheese.
22 The issue became particularly apparent in 2011 as the value
23 of dry whey started to rise. The producer community,
24 concerned with the inequity, overwhelmingly supported
25 change.

1 Agreeing the issue should be revisited, the
2 Department called for a hearing on June 30th, 2011. Support
3 from dairy producer organizations and cooperatives was
4 unparalleled. All sought changes that would bring the
5 California 4b price in closer alignment with the federal
6 order price and the market price for cheese. Western United
7 specifically submitted an alternative proposal requesting
8 changes that would have allowed the whey value in California
9 to track very closely with the whey value generated by the
10 federal Class III price formula. As a result of the
11 hearing, the Department decided to implement changes,
12 eliminating the fixed whey factor and replacing it with a
13 sliding scale.

14 The changes resulting from the June 30, 2011
15 hearing were implemented on September 1st of 2011 and were a
16 slight improvement for producers; the whey value was now
17 allowed to fluctuate. However, while WUD appreciated the
18 modifications, it still fell far short of a fair method to
19 determine the whey value in the Class 4b formula. Hence,
20 WUD submitted a petition to the Department on December 2nd,
21 2011. In that petition, WUD proposed modifying the current
22 sliding scale in the Class 4b formula to allow the whey
23 factor to more closely reflect the whey value generated by
24 the current Class III formula and the market value. At that
25 time, the difference between California's whey value and the

1 federal orders since the new sliding scale's implementation
2 averaged a staggering \$1.75 per cwt. California dairy
3 families clearly needed a better way to capture whey value.
4 Unfortunately, the Department decided not to act on the
5 matter and denied the hearing request.

6 After the Department's denial, the issue remained
7 and producer discontent intensified. Our board discussed
8 asking for reconsideration or immediately filing another
9 petition. We stressed the imperative of resolving the issue
10 sooner rather than later. Our Board was not going to give
11 up on lost producer revenue and decided to petition again.
12 Industry-wide support on the producer side was evident.
13 Lengthy discussions took place and producer groups agreed on
14 the requested changes that were argued for at the May 31st-
15 June 1st, 2012 hearing. The Secretary agreed to raise the
16 top end of the whey scale by an unfortunately very small
17 \$0.10.

18 Following ever increasing producer discontent, WUD
19 decided to petition the Department again in August of 2012.
20 The objective, once again, was the hearing that whey value
21 on the 4b formula more in line with the whey value generated
22 in the Class III formula and the market price for cheese.
23 That petition also included a dry whey credit concept. The
24 Department denied that petition on the grounds that the
25 Secretary lacks the authority to implement such a credit.

1 This moved Dr. Pan to introduce a bill in the
2 California Legislature in December of 2012. The producer
3 community has rallied behind this bill and fought for its
4 passage since. The price relief needed from a fair
5 adjustment to the Class 4b formula is crucial to the
6 producer community. While we appreciate the Secretary's
7 willingness to act by calling this emergency hearing, we
8 continue to believe relief needs to come from the
9 significant discrepancy that exists in the pricing of whey
10 in the Class 4b formula. In short, the inflexibility of the
11 Panel to recommend bringing pricing of whey in closer
12 alignment with Federal Orders and the market price has been
13 a source of frustration for the producer community since
14 producer prices were disconnected from the market by CDFA in
15 2007.

16 Not only does the producer side of the industry
17 believes a change is warranted, but the processor side also
18 agrees. After many disagreements over potential
19 legislation, the proposed changes in our petition were
20 agreed upon by the processor side of the industry as being
21 reasonable. The agreement is outlined in the attachment
22 letter from Joe Lang, representing the Dairy Institute of
23 California. See Appendix B.

24 The need for emergency price relief is real.

25 Given current conditions in the industry, the

1 years ahead will undeniably be more challenging for
2 California dairy families. Economic and regulatory
3 pressures are escalating in the state. Current and proposed
4 environmental regulations have led and will continue to lead
5 to additional costs, something farmers in other states do
6 not have to deal with. Aside from this regulatory burden,
7 costs of production on the dairy have increased
8 significantly. The Secretary, with the appointment of the
9 task force, understands the challenges ahead and the need
10 for a long-term solution. In the meantime, dairy producers
11 are facing tough economic times. If producers are to make
12 it through these difficult times, price relief is needed.

13 To understand why dairy families are in such a
14 precarious situation, a little historical perspective is
15 helpful. As everyone well remembers, producer milk prices
16 fell significantly through most of 2009, posting an overbase
17 price of \$9.60 per hundredweight in July of 2009. For the
18 second half of 2009, prices slowly increased, but by the
19 beginning of 2010, prices dropped again to the \$12-\$13
20 range. With a statewide average cost of production of
21 \$15.02 per hundredweight for the first quarter of 2010, the
22 financial situation for the dairy producers was unbearable.
23 Prices eventually showed some signs of improvement and the
24 overbase made it all the way to \$15.94 per hundredweight in
25 October. With the statewide average cost of production at

1 \$15.13 per hundredweight at the time, some producers were
2 likely experiencing positive margins again.

3 While milk prices were improving, the cost of
4 production was also increasing. Improving dairy prices is
5 good news, but it will take prolonged periods of improved
6 margins for a dairy producer to recover the immense losses
7 and eroded equity that arose from the economic disaster of
8 2009 through 2010. Revenues per cow in 2010 did not come
9 close to the losses per cow incurred in 2008 through 2009.
10 And 2011 was an improvement but 2012 has proved to be
11 financially challenging for a lot of dairymen. After all
12 the aforementioned losses, another downturn proved
13 unbearable for many.

14 According to CDFA data, 105 dairies went out of
15 business in 2012 alone. Just in our association membership,
16 16 additional dairy sellouts have occurred since the
17 beginning of 2013. In addition to these disturbing figures,
18 reports of family dairies having filed for bankruptcy in the
19 last 12 months are abundant. Conversations with a few dairy
20 producers seeking bankruptcy protection revealed that
21 attorneys have had a hard time keeping up with the dairy
22 demand.

23 As environmental regulations related to California
24 dairies have multiplied, Western United Dairymen has worked
25 very closely with USDA and NRCS on strategies to conserve

1 and protect California's air and water qualities. We have
2 written and administered many grants in advance of this
3 noble work. The number of USDA/EQIP contracts cancelled in
4 this state is striking evidence of the impact dairies going
5 out of business have. The values of cancelled contracts per
6 year for are staggering, over \$2,700,000, \$2,500,000,
7 \$1,700,000, \$650,000 for 2009 through 2012, respectively.
8 These cost share cancellations are grim environmental
9 consequences of the Department's decision to disconnect the
10 farmer's milk price from the marketplace in 2007. The
11 number of dairy families in distress is not surprising if
12 you take a look at financial data compiled by the accounting
13 firm Frazer. According to their latest available data,
14 which is 2012, dairies in Southern California, the San
15 Joaquin Valley and Kern County have lost a significant
16 amount of money with average net incomes of -\$3.41/cwt,
17 -\$2.87/cwt and -\$2.83/cwt, respectively. Those numbers were
18 not available at the last hearing, and those alone should
19 strike the Department as clear evidence dairies are
20 financially struggling and orderly marketing of milk on the
21 producer side is not happening.

22 If the Frazer numbers are not sufficient enough, a
23 comparison of California overbase price to the average cost
24 of production in California since 2001 reveals the challenge
25 faced by producers. Production costs were on a steady upward

1 trend until the beginning of 2009. The difference between
2 the cost of production and overbase prices in 2009 is
3 striking evidence of the catastrophe that occurred for
4 California dairy families. See Table 1. The years
5 following 2009 were unfortunately plagued by more volatility
6 and negative margins. It is hard to imagine how dairy
7 producers were able to recoup these staggering financial
8 losses.

9 A disturbing fact about this picture is the trend
10 that stands out. Clearly, margins have been deteriorating.

11 According to CDFA data, feed costs rose from just
12 over 51 percent of the total cost of production in 2003 to
13 60 percent of the total cost by the third quarter of 2008.
14 Feed costs dropped to an average of 56.5 percent of the cost
15 of production for the second quarter of 2010; which was
16 lower but still historically high. The slow decline in feed
17 costs were short lived; since fall of 2010, feed prices have
18 skyrocketed and reached a record high in the third quarter
19 of 2012 at \$12.09/cwt. This caused a record high cost of
20 production of \$19.94/cwt. These records were soon broken
21 with the fourth quarter of 2012 data, with feed costs at
22 \$12.24 and cost of production above \$20. Figure 2 shows the
23 dramatic increase in feed costs experienced at the dairy.

24 While feed costs appear to have softened some for
25 the first quarter of 2013, they still represent nearly 67

1 percent of the total cost of production, the highest
2 percentage on record. And despite the small drop, one can
3 clearly see by looking at Figure 2 that they remain clearly
4 above historical norms.

5 The significant declines in overbase prices
6 combined with fairly steady record high feed prices struck
7 California dairy families in ways no one could see coming.
8 The drought that plagued most of the US during summer of
9 2012, created a never-before-seen feed price escalation, it
10 is an unusual situation. While the latest USDA World Ag
11 Supply and Demand Estimate Report came out somewhat bearish
12 for corn prices, the forecasted range is \$4.50 to \$5.30 per
13 bushel for the 2013/14 season, we have to keep in mind that
14 this is an estimate. After three straight adverse growing
15 seasons we are not out of the woods. And even if that range
16 looks good compared to last year's prices, compared to
17 historical averages, it is still representative of expensive
18 grain.

19 We review the cost of production information
20 because the Department must take it into account: "In
21 establishing the price, the director shall take into
22 consideration any relevant economic factors, including but
23 not limited to, the following: (a) the reasonableness and
24 economic soundness of market milk for all classes, giving
25 consideration to the combined income from those class

1 prices, in relation to the cost of producing and marketing
2 milk for all purposes, including manufacturing purposes. In
3 determining the costs, the director shall consider the cost
4 of management and a reasonable return on necessary capital
5 investment."

6 At previous hearings we have testified that milk
7 production is not necessarily a measure of the industry's
8 health and that base programs have been put in place in the
9 state to take care of potential plant capacity issues.
10 Keeping a lower milk price in our state, we argued, would
11 only contribute to the financial plight of dairy producers.
12 This is exactly what happened. Unfortunately, looking at
13 past hearing decisions, the Department does not seem overly
14 concerned with the losses of dairy farms in the state of
15 California so long as processors can procure enough milk.
16 Looking at the Dairy Marketing Branch legislative charge,
17 "It is the policy of the state to promote, foster and
18 encourage the intelligent production and orderly marketing
19 of milk necessary to its citizens in relation to demand" one
20 could conclude milk production in the state is currently
21 growing. After all, the population of California is not
22 shrinking. However, a look at milk production data shows a
23 completely different story. In fact, milk production in
24 California has been declining for over a year now. Indeed,
25 year-over-year production has been experiencing negative

1 growth since 2012. July 2013 milk production, the latest
2 month of data available, was the lowest July production
3 since July 2009. And Figure 4 illustrates the trend.

4 Comparing the milk production trend experienced in
5 California with that experienced in other parts of the
6 country shows disturbing results. More specifically,
7 comparing the milk production in California to that of
8 Wisconsin, where the Federal Order Class III price is in
9 effect and the farmer's milk price is connected to the
10 market, is striking. While milk production in the number
11 one dairy state has been declining, the number two dairy
12 state's production has been thriving.

13 The temporary increase proposed for Class 4b is to
14 get to what the producer side of the industry has been
15 advocating for almost three years; a more fair pool value
16 from cheese making revenues.

17 The change resulting from the May 31st-June 1st,
18 2012 hearing and implemented on August 1st of 2012 were a
19 minimal improvement for producers: the whey value was now
20 allowed to reach \$0.75 instead of the previous \$0.65.
21 However, while WUD appreciated the modification, we believe
22 it still fell far short of a fair value for whey in the
23 Class 4b formula. While we understand the Secretary
24 believes the dry whey issue shouldn't be the only factor to
25 look at when providing price relief, WUD continues to

1 believe that the whey factor should more closely reflect the
2 whey value generated by the current Class III formula and
3 the market price for cheese. The difference between
4 California's whey value and the federal orders in 2012
5 averaged a staggering \$1.69/cwt. California dairy families
6 clearly need a better means to capture whey value.

7 We stressed the imperative of resolving this issue
8 sooner rather than later and impressed upon the Secretary
9 that waiting would not work. Our board was not going to
10 give up on lost producer revenues and as you are aware
11 decided to support legislation to fix that issue. In the
12 meantime, we propose two separate changes as mentioned
13 above. Those changes were agreed upon by the processor side
14 of the industry as being reasonable. The agreement is
15 outlined in the attached letter from Joe Lang, representing
16 the Dairy Institute of California. Also in Appendix B. The
17 impact of our proposed change would result in approximately
18 a \$0.35 increase in the overbase price.

19 While this is not enough to recoup the immense
20 losses incurred in the recent past, it will not only help
21 bridge the gap between cost of production and milk revenues;
22 it will provide a much-needed closer relationship between
23 Class III and Class 4b prices. We would rather have asked
24 for a lot more than this, but rarely does the processor and
25 producer side of the industry come to an agreement. If

1 processors feel it is a viable alternative, we hope the
2 Secretary will realize this is a workable and reasonable
3 solution to the financial plight of dairy families.

4 When looking at 2012 data, the Federal Class III
5 price has averaged \$1.91/cwt higher than 4b. The deviation
6 between Class III and 4b prices were caused by several
7 factors. Notably, formula differences such as different
8 price series, CME versus NASS, make allowances, yield and
9 formula construct all contribute to the divergence. But the
10 whey value is what creates the most variance between the two
11 class prices and it is a significant concern to the members
12 of WUD. According to our analysis, since April 2007, over
13 80 percent of the difference between Class 4b and Class III
14 was attributed to the whey value.

15 More specifically, the average difference between
16 the whey value in Class III and Class 4b since the beginning
17 of the year has been \$1.65/cwt. With whey values that
18 follow market involvements in Class III and a sliding scale
19 value in Class 4b capped at \$0.75/cwt, such a discrepancy is
20 not surprising.

21 The concept of pooling was created to allow
22 sharing of revenues among producers. This is what allowed
23 producers shipping to different plants to get the same price
24 for the same commodity, regardless of where they ship their
25 milk. In any given month, depending on where class prices

1 settle, some plants need to pay more into the pool than the
2 average overbase price, whereas some other months they have
3 to pay less. To give an example, the first month of 2012, a
4 producer shipping to a cheese plant got an overbase price of
5 \$15.55. The cheese plant had to contribute \$13.42 to the
6 pool. Without the pool, the plant would have been required
7 to pay the producer at least the minimum price of \$13.42/
8 cwt. In 2012, the 4b price was lower than the overbase
9 price in seven months. By not including a fair whey value
10 in the Class 4b formula, Class 4b plants are not sharing
11 into the pool like other classes are. Producers shipping to
12 the cheese plants benefit from higher blended prices from
13 Class 1, 2, 3 and 4a when the Class 4b price is lower than
14 the overbase, but the Class 4b plant does not share in the
15 full value of what it produces into the pool. In 2013, the
16 overbase price has been higher than the Class 4b price every
17 single month, it is the cheese processors -- it is time the
18 cheese processors start sharing a fair value with the pool.

19 As mentioned above, margins at the dairy are still
20 very fragile. The memory of the 2009 dairy crisis is still
21 fresh in the producers' minds. Waiting for good times does
22 not suffice. Volatility has been a buzzword in the last few
23 years for a reason: it is here to stay. As you know,
24 dairymen have no way of passing along added costs. To avoid
25 a repeat of the economic catastrophe, many producers have

1 turned to risk management tools to protect their operations.
2 More specifically, hedging has become an increasing part of
3 dairy operation management.

4 Hedging allows parties to secure prices months in
5 advance. But it's not as simple as that. The effectiveness
6 of hedging relies on many things, but especially on the
7 relationship between the futures prices and cash prices.

8 The futures contract most commonly used by
9 California dairymen is tied to Class III. The differences
10 between futures and cash prices is called the basis. A
11 hedge will never be perfect due to changes on the basis,
12 which can be negative or positive. But over time, with
13 similar formulas, dairymen can assess their basis risk more
14 effectively. As illustrated earlier, the spread between
15 Class III and our milk price has gotten much larger due to
16 the higher whey values being reflected in Class III and the
17 market, but not in the California milk price. Effectively,
18 the issue of lower milk prices in California is exacerbated
19 by the fact that the fixed whey factor in the California
20 formula makes Class III futures contracts a less-effective
21 hedge than it otherwise would be. As a result, the very
22 insurance dairymen attempt to buy to insure some operating
23 margin, does not perform as they expected nor intended.
24 Ironically, cheesemakers can use such a tool but the farmers
25 cannot since the farmer's price was disconnected from the

1 market by CDFA in 2007.

2 The unpredictability of the spread, due to the
3 completely different structure of the whey value, makes it
4 riskier for dairymen to hedge by preventing them from being
5 able to determine their basis effectively. Looking back at
6 historical relationships between prices received at the
7 dairy and Class III, which is how one can determine the
8 basis, is certainly not a good predictor of basis because of
9 this disparity.

10 If the crisis is fresh in a dairymen's minds, it
11 is not very far from the lenders' minds either. Risk
12 management tools could be very useful for dairymen to show
13 strong business plans to their bankers, reassuring them of
14 less volatile margins. Lending standards have tightened and
15 banks like to know where the borrower's bottom line would
16 be. With all the dairy families being forced out of
17 business, it is becoming less and less of an option.

18 Even processors recognize the importance of these
19 tools and want producers to be able to use them effectively.
20 Adjusting the whey factor to allow fluctuation with market
21 prices would better enable California dairymen to utilize
22 these risk management tools.

23 The Secretary has the legal authority to implement
24 a temporary price increase according to the following
25 additional code sections.

1 Section 61805, especially paragraphs b) and d),
2 give the Secretary authority to determine minimum prices to
3 be paid to producers by handlers for market milk, which is
4 necessary due to varying factors of costs of production,
5 health regulations, transportation and other factors in the
6 marketing areas of the state.

7 And I will dispense with reading the code section.

8 Without a price increase, as outlined previously,
9 the milk production in the state is jeopardized. According
10 to Section 61802, it is the policy of the state to foster
11 intelligent milk production, therefore a price increase is
12 not only recommended, it is warranted.

13 And again I'll dispense with the reading of that
14 section.

15 This concludes our testimony. The members of
16 Western United Dairymen thank CDFA staff for their effort in
17 preparing for this hearing. And I would be pleased to
18 answer any questions if possible and would like to ask for a
19 post-hearing brief.

20 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Mr. Barcellos, your
21 request for a post-hearing brief is granted.

22 MR. EASTMAN: I do have a couple of questions for
23 you, Tom. On about page three or four you kind of mention
24 some cost of production figures by the firm of Frazer LLP.
25 I was wondering, I don't see any information other than that

1 citation. Is it possible in your post-hearing brief to
2 submit an idea of kind of how those numbers were arrived at
3 or what type of dairies in those areas would have been
4 included in that survey that came up with that number? Just
5 some an additional information to get a sense of the makeup
6 of that number.

7 MR. BARCELLOS: Absolutely, I'd be happy to do
8 that. And also let me say that this testimony was supposed
9 to be presented by Annie. Of course, prior to this hearing
10 date being set she had a previous commitment to deliver a
11 little girl three days ago.

12 MR. EASTMAN: That's right.

13 MR. BARCELLOS: A healthy baby girl.

14 MR. EASTMAN: So you're putting the blame on her
15 then.

16 MR. BARCELLOS: Absolutely.

17 (Laughter.)

18 MR. EASTMAN: That's understandable. Well, I have
19 a couple of other questions. If you are not able to answer
20 those, obviously, we'll throw those in the post-hearing
21 brief as well.

22 MR. BARCELLOS: Yeah.

23 MR. EASTMAN: The second thing, the second
24 question I had is a question that I also asked of the CDI
25 witness. And that is, on that same sort of page you mention

1 -- you have Table 1 that shows dairy production margins or
2 margins of dairy producers, which show the cost of
3 production base on, I believe, the CDFA cost of production
4 survey and then you use the overbase price. And I'm
5 curious. Over time sometimes different entities will use
6 different price series as a representative measure of
7 income. And so I'm curious if the overbase price was chosen
8 for a particular reason over others, if it has a certain
9 significance? Why that was chosen?

10 MR. BARCELLOS: I'll have to defer that also to
11 Annie for post-hearing.

12 MR. EASTMAN: Sure. And then the other question I
13 had is in your testimony you cite in various locations where
14 you are making citations to the California Food and Ag Code
15 that stipulates the different relevant economic factors that
16 the Secretary of the Department would consider when making
17 milk pricing decisions. And you listed a number of things
18 like milk production or combined income from the various
19 classes, cost of production, things of that nature. I
20 assume that later on in this hearing when some witnesses
21 from processor organizations get up they'll probably mention
22 other relevant economic factors, things like product prices
23 or yields or manufacturing cost allowances, things of that
24 nature. Do you have a sense of which factors you believe
25 would be the most pertinent at this time? Do you feel that

1 the Secretary should heed certain relevant economic factors
2 with more weight than others?

3 MR. BARCELLOS: Well, I believe that the system
4 that is in place is what built this industry. And all of
5 the aligning prices are somewhat similar, surrounding areas,
6 with the exception of the whey factor. And, you know, all
7 factors are to be considered but also not limiting to -- you
8 know, the Secretary has broad discretion, you know, as has
9 been pointed out before and will continue to be pointed out.
10 The call of the hearing is broad and I think all things need
11 to be considered. But as to the weight of each
12 consideration, you know, I can't speculate.

13 MR. EASTMAN: Got you. And then the other
14 question I had was, in terms of the price impact of the co-
15 petitioners' proposal, do you think that that impact will
16 have a significant effect on dairy producers where that will
17 turn the tide or allow them to function with some sort of
18 stability going into the future?

19 MR. BARCELLOS: I believe stability is a key word.
20 Yes, it would give stability. Right now there is none.

21 MR. EASTMAN: Okay.

22 MR. MASUHARA: I have a question, Tom. You
23 mentioned several times in your testimony referencing 2007
24 when CDFA disconnected the price from the marketplace. Is
25 that in specific reference to the action that was taken on

1 the fixed whey factor that moved into the sliding scale.

2 MR. BARCELLOS: That is correct.

3 MR. MASUHARA: Okay. And so when you say
4 "disconnected from the marketplace" what specifically are
5 you referring to? Are you talking about the marketplace in
6 California for dry whey?

7 MR. BARCELLOS: Yes.

8 MR. MASUHARA: Okay. Thank you.

9 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: With no further
10 questions, thank you, Mr. Barcellos.

11 MR. BARCELLOS: Thank you.

12 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: We are again going to
13 deviate a little bit from our normal script. Assembly
14 Member Pan.

15 ASSEMBLY MEMBER PAN: Thank you.

16 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you. Assembly
17 Member Pan, could you please state your full name and spell
18 your last name for the record, please.

19 ASSEMBLY MEMBER PAN: Sure. Dr. Richard Pan, P-A-
20 N, Assembly Member 9th District.

21 Whereupon,

22 RICHARD PAN, MD

23 Was duly sworn.

24 ASSEMBLY MEMBER PAN: Thank you so very much for
25 allowing me to speak to you today.

1 There is a crisis in California agriculture and it
2 is not just an immediate crisis but also a long-term crisis.
3 We are at a crossroads and must make decisions quickly if
4 the historic California family dairy industry is to survive.

5 I know you have been spending this morning looking
6 at the numbers and I think they speak for themselves. And I
7 know many others have been talking about the loss column
8 statewide but I want to say that when I drive through my own
9 district it is not unusual to see an empty family dairy that
10 is now out of -- out of production. The economic conditions
11 for family dairies warrant the Legislature and the Secretary
12 working together to guarantee short-term relief by providing
13 a fair price for milk and long-term sustainability developed
14 through a stakeholder task force.

15 The answer is certainly not a handout. The answer
16 begins with an agreed \$110 million of new money being paid
17 by processors to producers and the appropriate calculation
18 for the price of whey so that California dairies can earn a
19 fair and competitive price for the milk that they produce.

20 The answer includes the California Dairy Futures
21 Task Force, which will hold mandated workshops and solicit
22 timely input from the dairy industry and related businesses.
23 The California Dairy Futures Task Force will make real
24 recommendations to the Legislature and the Secretary of
25 Agriculture in 2014 that must lead to long-term

1 sustainability of the industry.

2 Now as a physician I remember the long hours of
3 medical training, and I have learned that the long hours of
4 dairy farmers are also constant. I too -- I have visited a
5 dairy farm in my district at 4:30 in the morning, a farm
6 that has been in the family for generations as not only a
7 labor of love but a constant source of labor. The cows,
8 unfortunately, don't wait for a political compromise.
9 Unfortunately, the reward for working 365 days a year in
10 rain or shine, a recent recession, skyrocketing feed prices
11 and an outdated milk pricing system puts our California
12 family dairies at a competitive disadvantage to other
13 states.

14 I have authorized legislation this year which
15 would have empowered the Secretary to stabilize the dairy
16 cost structure that allows companies making cheese to pay
17 our dairy farmers much less than is paid in other states.
18 My legislation prompted stakeholders from both sides to
19 forge a reasonable compromise as we move forward. And now
20 I'm asking the Secretary to use that compromise as a
21 starting point for finding solutions.

22 Let me be clear, the idea of doing nothing is not
23 an option. The setting of this hearing delayed legislative
24 response but we will not remain silent; the Legislature will
25 not be complacent. I look forward to working with the

1 Secretary and my colleagues in the Legislature as we put
2 together a reasonable plan to guarantee both the long-term
3 success of producers and processors in California.

4 If you have any questions I invite you to call me
5 or my staff at any time. Thank you.

6 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you, Assembly
7 Member Pan.

8 ASSEMBLY MEMBER PAN: Thank you.

9 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: We will now take a short,
10 ten minute recess.

11 (Off the record at 10:19 a.m.)

12 (On the record at 10:29 a.m.)

13 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: May I have your
14 attention. We would now like to go back on the record.

15 And again we will be calling witnesses that have
16 signed up for up to 20 minutes and the first witness will be
17 Mr. Barcellos.

18 Mr. Barcellos, will you again state your full name
19 and spell your last name for the record, please.

20 MR. BARCELLOS: Tom Barcellos, B-A-R-C-E-L-L-O-S.

21 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: And are you testifying --

22 MR. BARCELLOS: I'm still under oath.

23 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Still under oath, yes.

24 And are you testifying individually?

25 MR. BARCELLOS: I am testifying individually.

1 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Okay. These written
2 statements, would you like them marked as an exhibit?

3 MR. BARCELLOS: Please. And the attachment that I
4 gave you with the flyers that will be referred to in my
5 testimony.

6 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you. That will be
7 Exhibit number 49.

8 (Exhibit 49 was entered into the record.)

9 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed.

10 MR. BARCELLOS: Mr. Hearing Officer and Panel,
11 thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Tom
12 Barcellos, owner of T-Bar Dairy, an 800 cow dairy facility
13 in Porterville, California. I also own Barcellos Farms, a
14 diversified farming operation providing feed and services to
15 local dairies. My testimony and supporting documents will
16 not be technical in nature, but the documents will
17 represent the position of the industry.

18 Reasons why changes are needed:

19 Cheese manufacturers in California are facing an
20 economic crisis due to the detrimental effect of the current
21 dry whey cost factor in the Class 4b milk pricing formula.
22 Cheese manufacturers do not realize the full revenue that is
23 attributed to them by the current 4b formulas and are
24 incurring losses that threaten their financial viability.
25 In order for California cheese manufacturers to continue

1 production the whey cost factor should be removed from the
2 Class 4b formula immediately.

3 The Department must act immediately and on an
4 emergency basis to change the Class 4b milk formula to
5 protect the long term viability of cheese manufacturers and
6 the dairy farmers in the state of California.

7 This is taken directly from the petition submitted
8 on August 14th, 2007 by F&A Cheese to then-Secretary
9 Kawamura. At that time a hearing was called for due to the
10 plight of the cheese processors. The testimony given at
11 that time by all parties agreed that something needed to be
12 done in various degrees and ultimately a determination was
13 reached. That same urgency exists today. The difference is
14 that it is the producer community that is no longer viable
15 in its present state.

16 "Pursuant to Food and Ag Code Sections 62031
17 through 62079, the Secretary has broad discretion in
18 deciding these issues. By custom and practice, the
19 Secretary's decision is based on the hearing record and on
20 the Panel Report to the Secretary of Food and Agriculture.
21 The Secretary may adopt, deny, or alter the Panel's
22 recommendations based upon the Secretary's independent
23 assessment of the testimony and documentation entered into
24 the record."

25 This is quoted from the Secretary's determination

1 of that 2007 hearing which clearly states the Secretary's
2 "broad Discretion" in providing solutions to protect the
3 viability of the industry. It allows the Secretary the
4 ability to assess independently the testimony presented.

5 Determinations.

6 "CDFA remains committed to the long-term viability
7 of the producer, producer-cooperatives and the processor
8 sectors of the California dairy industry and to the
9 consumption of healthy dairy products by California
10 consumers at reasonable prices. The Department invests
11 considerable resources in conducting annual cost studies to
12 use as a guide in determining reasonable dairy manufactured
13 cost allowances."

14 This is also taken from the 2007 Determination and
15 states some of the duties of CDFCA and one aspect such as the
16 "make allowance" used to protect the viability of the
17 industry as a whole by providing funds for plant capacity.
18 Now the Department has challenges to determine a proper
19 manufacturing cost allowance due to the privatization of the
20 cheese processors, but that in itself does not discharge the
21 Department from establishing a reasonable cost allowance for
22 those same processors. Should a whey manufacturing
23 allowance calculation be included?

24 The viability of the dairy producers began to
25 unravel following the determination in 2009 due largely to

1 extremely low milk prices. The dairy producer did at that
2 time what he has always done and that is to use equity to
3 pay his bills and continue in business. This was business
4 as usual as prices have always been cyclical and on the
5 rebound side equity would be replenished. That did not
6 occur due to the high feed costs brought on by the ethanol
7 policy and the dairy equity no longer exists today, causing
8 the collapse you have seen over the last several years and
9 continue as we sit here today.

10 "The Department Cost Survey data and hearing
11 record testimony provided significant evidence that
12 amendments are necessary to the Class 4 formulas."

13 Again this is from the 2007 determination
14 indicating changes going forward were needed. CDFA's own
15 current cost study showed the losses suffered by the
16 producers, yet the Department's commitment to the entire
17 industry as stated earlier has failed miserably as the
18 necessary amendments to whey factors and manufacturing
19 allowances have been ignored.

20 In an analysis I requested from Ms. Annie AcMoody,
21 a highly respected economist and former CDFA employee, the
22 following was determined:

23 If the 2007 formula had stayed in place, the
24 average cow would have generated in each of the following
25 years: -\$20.20 in 2009, a +\$45.10 for '10, a +\$117.02 for

1 '11 and a +\$109.93 for 2012. In the first half of 2013,
2 \$52.95.

3 I doubt that any other reputable economist would
4 have a different conclusion. The calculation would then
5 conclude that dairy producers gave up \$304.80 per cow in the
6 whey factor alone from 2009 through June 30, 2013. A 500
7 cow herd gave the cheese processing sector \$152,400 in
8 concessions over that period of time. One 1100 cow dairy
9 herd, selling at the end of this month, which has been
10 operating in bankruptcy, would have had a chance to pay me
11 and other creditors had they had the \$335,280 due from
12 previous true whey prices. So there goes 45 years of work
13 for that dairyman and his family and 8 employees with
14 families who are now looking for work. Let's not forget all
15 the providers of supplies and products who lost their
16 customer. That facility will be demolished, which is a
17 crime as the freestall barns and manure handling system is
18 as modern as many newer dairies.

19 The documents attached, the flyers which are in
20 the record, from sales no different than the one I just
21 described. You have heard testimony in previous hearings,
22 and I expect other testimony at this one, about the millions
23 of dollars that have been and continue to be tied up and/or
24 lost in bankruptcy. You will see that no dairy is immune
25 based on its size as the entire spectrum is covered from 250

1 cow herds to 6,000 cow herds. These are just a sample that
2 cover over 50,000 cows and over 20,000 heifers. While many
3 of these animals may have gone to other herds, keep in mind
4 that they were for the most part replacing other lower
5 producing cows which were sent to slaughter. These numbers
6 also reflect the top end of the herds being sold as beef got
7 sent off prior to the sale. They also do not reflect the
8 loss of support industry businesses that have been forced to
9 lay off employees, or in some cases, close completely.

10 And here are some additional conclusions from the
11 2007 Determination:

12 "The Secretary agrees and adopts the following
13 Hearing Panel recommendation for amendment to the
14 Stabilization Plans."

15 "Changing the 4a f.o.b. Adjuster for butter" won't
16 cover the numbers.

17 "However, the Secretary modifies the Hearing Panel
18 recommendations for amendment to the Stabilization Plans as
19 follows:" And it goes on to some technical numbers there.

20 This, to me, clearly points out the Secretary's
21 ability to make a decision based on current facts. The
22 current fact is that whey is no longer a salvage product.
23 It has been possible to process in some form since 1965 when
24 Frank Thomas used membrane technology to isolate whey
25 protein concentrate in Wisconsin. Current uses include

1 sports nutrition drinks, protein shakes and many dietary
2 supplements. It is no longer a salvage product and
3 producers are entitled to receive a fair price for a
4 component derived from their milk as they are compensated
5 fairly for all other components of their milk. We gave the
6 incentive and the money for processors to develop the
7 product, yet we are condemned for wanting the value of that
8 component.

9 Many processors have seen the value of whey in
10 marketing whey protein concentrate or other forms and have
11 done so with profits by not having to compensate producers.
12 Others have not made the investment and treated it as wasted
13 since there was no need to pay for it. Processors have had
14 ample time using producer money to capture higher value uses
15 for whey or finding companies who can convert perceived
16 waste to profit. It is no longer the responsibility of the
17 producer to carry the burden. The processor could and has
18 found ways to capture value of whey and it is the producer
19 who has paid the price for the market to develop. It is
20 time the return comes back to stabilize the dairy producer
21 community.

22 In closing, I submitted the evidence, the flyers
23 that I spoke of, and please take time to review these and
24 consider this. Most of these dairymen, as you see 15, 20 or
25 50 years of service and more, worked for another dairyman

1 before going into business for himself. That means a
2 lifetime of taking care of cows and grasping an opportunity.
3 Hard work would yield rewards of your own business. Today
4 they are broke, out of options and that hard work can't fix.
5 Just the fact that you can fix this and have not done so
6 have led some to suicide. That is real. And the following
7 chart is very telling of the direction of the producer side
8 of the industry. Please correct the inequity.

9 Respectfully, thank you.

10 MR. EASTMAN: I have a question. On the second or
11 third page of your testimony you talk about some of the
12 additional conclusions from the 2007 determinations from
13 that hearing held that summer. And it lists a number of
14 modifications, things like make allowance changes, f.o.b.
15 adjuster changes, things of that nature. And you state that
16 you believe that the Secretary does have the ability to make
17 changes based on current facts. At that time there was data
18 that was transparent and releasable. Some of the data used
19 to make some of those decisions are now proprietary in
20 nature and no longer releasable to the public, so to speak.
21 Do you think the Secretary still has the ability to make
22 certain changes to the formulas, the pricing decisions, even
23 if some of the data that has historically been used for such
24 decisions is no longer public or publishable?

25 MR. BARCELLOS: I believe so because I don't

1 believe that that data is unavailable. I think it would be
2 available. I believe the Department has the right to
3 collect that data, even though they cannot make it public.
4 And if there is not data out there, there are people who are
5 able to conclude within a fraction an educated guess. And I
6 believe that that's something that needs to be considered.

7 MR. EASTMAN: So in essence you would believe that
8 the Secretary would have the discretion to make some calls,
9 so to speak, to make adjustments if such data were limited
10 or not available?

11 MR. BARCELLOS: I believe it's clearly stated that
12 the Secretary has broad discretion and it has been proven
13 that the Secretary has also made decisions outside of
14 hearing record. And again, I believe there is data
15 available that the Department would have access to that
16 could be used in consideration that would have to be held
17 privately.

18 MR. EASTMAN: So in essence you would be okay with
19 the Secretary making decisions with data that is not
20 publishable or apparent to the industry as a whole. That
21 she could use whatever data available to make such decisions
22 then.

23 MR. BARCELLOS: I believe it is her responsibility
24 and duty.

25 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: No further questions,

1 thank you for your testimony, Mr. Barcellos.

2 MR. BARCELLOS: Thank you.

3 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Dr. Sexton. Dr. Sexton,
4 could you say your first name and last name and spell your
5 last name.

6 DR. SEXTON: Richard Sexton, S-E-X-T-O-N.

7 Whereupon,

8 RICHARD SEXTON

9 Was duly sworn.

10 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Do you have any written
11 statements or other things you would like for the record at
12 this time?

13 DR. SEXTON: I don't have a written statement. I
14 have a video presentation, if I have your permission to
15 present it.

16 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Yes, you have my
17 permission.

18 DR. SEXTON: I am a professor and the Department
19 Chair in the Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics
20 at UC Davis. I was requested by Western United Dairymen to
21 take an independent look at the situation with our
22 California dairy today and to -- specifically with respect
23 to the petition that is before you now.

24 A lot of the previous testimony has pertained to
25 fairness of the pricing situation and so forth and I want to

1 focus my testimony more, if I can, on the economic
2 implications of the current situation.

3 I am trying to make this go full screen but I
4 really can't read it sufficiently well to do it.

5 MR. EASTMAN: I think you're in the right toolbar.
6 Go down a little bit further. One more. One more. Try
7 that one.

8 DR. SEXTON: Perfect, thank you.

9 MR. EASTMAN: Young eyes, younger eyes.

10 (Laughter.)

11 DR. SEXTON: I knew I was there, it was just
12 trying to find the right, the right row.

13 So let me begin with -- let me begin with just a
14 bit of background. And certainly there has been testimony
15 to this effect already.

16 But when I began looking at this I saw that the
17 action that the Secretary took at the end of 2007 really
18 disconnected our California prices from the marketplace. So
19 we replaced a whey value allowance that tracked the market
20 value fairly closely with this flat \$0.25 allowance.

21 The subsequent change made in 2011 to introduce
22 the sliding \$0.25 to \$0.75 scale helped somewhat but
23 certainly didn't solve the problem.

24 We're dealing with a situation where the 4b milk,
25 the cheese milk is 43 percent of the milk production now

1 and so the pricing disparities caused by failing to value
2 the whey at a market value are large and creating some
3 considerable distortions that I'll talk about.

4 I'd like to just introduce a few of what I see as
5 the implications of the current situation and then I have a
6 few slides that I will, that I will present that will
7 document some of this. And I apologize to the Committee for
8 not having made written copies of the slides for you. And
9 while I'm thinking about I would request permission to
10 present at least the written slides to you all as a post-
11 hearing brief.

12 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: We will accept those.

13 DR. SEXTON: Thank you.

14 Certainly, as other testimony has indicated, one
15 consequence is that now California is paid a considerably
16 lower price than their peers in almost every other state.
17 Those that are producing under the federal orders, the
18 federal orders are a regulated pricing system but the prices
19 are set based upon the market values of the products that
20 are produced from the raw milk. And so even though it's a
21 regulated price it is intended to approximate what a market
22 price would be under competition. Of course, those
23 operating outside the orders, it is a pure market price.

24 The low prices that California has had have been
25 exacerbated by this run-up in feed costs that the testimony

1 has pertained to as well. I want to make the additional
2 point that it is -- the run-up in feed costs is, of course,
3 affecting producers across the country but
4 disproportionately affecting our California producers
5 because most of our feed is imported. And that during the
6 same period, all of it tied to ethanol and those
7 relationships to the petroleum market, energy prices have
8 risen dramatically, which of course is the main driver of
9 transportation costs. So not only have the feed costs
10 themselves increased but the cost of transporting it into
11 California to the dairies has increased as well, so
12 California dairies have been disproportionately impacted by
13 the run-up in feed costs.

14 As Tom Barcellos indicated, a key consequence in
15 terms of risk management, and I'll show you the slide on
16 this momentarily, is that because our price is disconnected
17 from the market it is basically impossible now to use the
18 CME for our dairy farmers to hedge price risks and lock in
19 prices because the basis is just too widely fluctuating.

20 Consequences. There are several ways to look at
21 the consequences. People have talked about dairy farms
22 exiting, which has certainly been a significant phenomenon
23 and I'll show a slide on that in a moment.

24 The feature I want to emphasize here is that since
25 this change was put into place through 2012, California has

1 lost one percentage point of it's national market share. We
2 are still, of course, by a long stretch the national market
3 leader but we have lost one percentage point of our market
4 share during this period.

5 And the evidence as I have seen it, and there has
6 been testimony to this effect already this morning, is that
7 the reduction in production and loss of our market share is
8 probably accelerating as we are moving into 2013 and our
9 share is going to be falling as we continue to move forward.

10 We have lost 300 dairy farms.

11 I think a very important point -- I think
12 Mr. Barcellos' testimony to this was quite eloquent. If you
13 are incurring losses you hang in there in the short run.
14 It's the difference between the short run and the long run
15 in economics. You endure those losses in the short run.
16 But if they persist into the long run you go out of
17 business. And I think that's the situation that we are
18 facing unless something is done to improve the pricing
19 situation for our California dairy farms, that the losses
20 have been relatively unabated since the 2008-2009 period.
21 There was a brief respite for one year but the losses have
22 been persisting. And of course they can't be sustained and
23 the rational decision eventually then is to go out of
24 business. I think we are seeing that that's what a number
25 of farms are facing increasingly.

1 I estimate that to date, based upon the loss of
2 our dairy herd, not just loss of farms but I'm looking at it
3 in terms of the reduction in the number of cows in our
4 state, that we have lost about 15,000 California jobs. And
5 most of these jobs have been lost in areas of high
6 unemployment where we can little afford to lose jobs. These
7 are areas where farming, and dairy in particular, is a key
8 primary industry. So this 15,000 number that I am giving
9 you is the direct, the primary impacts plus the secondary
10 impacts on suppliers, the communities where these dairies
11 are operating and so forth.

12 And the final implication I want to make before
13 giving you some documentation of these effects is that we
14 really have a distortion now. We have created a distortion
15 in the mix of dairy products that we -- that we produce. We
16 are subsidizing, basically, the production of one product,
17 namely cheese, relative to all the other products that can
18 be produced from raw milk. I think over time that
19 distortion, unless it's rectified, will have increasingly
20 negative consequences.

21 One observation I make in this regard is that --
22 is that even though we are subsidizing the cheese
23 production, most of it is exported out of the state so that
24 there is not a commensurate benefit to California because of
25 our ability, you know, frankly, to produce cheese cheaply

1 because the whey value is not reflected in the price that
2 the cheese manufacturers are making.

3 Here is the graph that a number of other speakers
4 have alluded to where up until 2008 -- so the whey value is
5 the blue line and the value that is assigned to California
6 is the red line. They track very, very closely up until
7 about 2008. And then we see the decision by the Secretary
8 to fix the whey value at \$0.25.

9 And meanwhile, this is a reflection of the
10 technology of dairy processing and even changing consumer
11 preferences. Whey has become a very, very valuable product,
12 as you can see from the blue line, but the value that the
13 California farmer has gotten has been drastically below
14 that. And even with the sliding \$0.25 to \$0.75 scale it
15 hasn't really addressed that problem at all so the disparity
16 remains to this day.

17 This slide plots the uniform price in Wisconsin,
18 the gray line, and California, the red line, versus the
19 Class III price, the federal Class III price, which is
20 pegged off of the CME value for a cheese block. So this is
21 a good representation of the basis as a farmer in California
22 would see it versus a farmer in Wisconsin.

23 Again, the first thing to note is obviously the
24 prices are much higher for all but one or two time periods
25 on that slide in Wisconsin than in California. But then the

1 dramatic feature, the feature to my point is that the basis
2 is just wildly fluctuating. Why? Well, it's because the
3 price that our California producers are receiving is not
4 tied to the marketplace. And that, I submit to you, is a
5 bad thing in many dimensions and this is just indicating
6 that it's basically rendering that risk management tool
7 inoperable now for our California farmers.

8 Here is really the essential slide, this is 2012
9 operating margins. Again, this just includes revenues and
10 variable costs, it doesn't include the fixed costs of a
11 dairy. And I plotted here for the ten largest dairy states.
12 The top bar is Washington, which obviously is not doing well
13 either but it's a very minor dairy state compared to
14 California.

15 But as you can see for 2012, California dairy
16 farms were earning -- this is USDA data, incidently.
17 California dairy farms were earning substantially negative
18 margins, whereas all of the other leading dairy states, save
19 Washington, were earning positive margins. And notice the
20 gap is -- we are not talking a few cents per hundredweight
21 here, we're talking dollars per hundredweight. So not only
22 is it indicating that, you know, for 2012 the situation for
23 California dairies which is not sustainable, but the thing I
24 see as an economist is, is the situation relatively?

25 And there was already testimony where about one

1 California dairy closing up shop and basically moving to the
2 Northwest. We weren't told where in the Northwest. I'm
3 guessing it's not Washington, it's probably Idaho based upon
4 those, those bars. We are going to see, you know, we are
5 going to continue to lose production and market share as a
6 state relative to other states as long as this disparity
7 remains in place. And it's a big disparity as these bars
8 indicate.

9 Here is just the loss over time in the last
10 several years of the California dairies. There has been
11 testimony to that effect already so I won't dwell on it.

12 Here is the most recent data, which is plotting
13 year-over-year percentage changes in production for
14 California, the blue line, versus Wisconsin, the second
15 largest producing state, the red line. And here you can see
16 that just relative -- for about the past 12 or so months,
17 just relative to the 12 months preceding this, our
18 California production is down relatively dramatically,
19 whereas the main competing state, Wisconsin, has had higher
20 production relative to a year ago in every one of these
21 months. And again, that's reflecting a situation that I
22 think is going to become only more pronounced if there isn't
23 some relief put into place.

24 Here is the chart that gives my calculations in
25 the job losses that we had from the reduction in our

1 California dairy herds since 2008. I am basing this on the
2 -- on the number of employment -- the amount of employment
3 for California from the CMAB study that was done in 2008 so
4 it's 440,000 jobs. And so I am just computing that on a
5 jobs per cow basis; it works out to about a quarter of a job
6 per dairy cow.

7 And again, this is employment not just on the
8 farms but throughout the whole economy that is tied to dairy
9 production, the primary impacts and what we call the
10 secondary or multiplier impacts. So I can then go in and
11 use that .24 factor, look at the decrease in the number of
12 cows we have had in the state over these past several years
13 and that's where I come up with the almost 15,000 jobs lost.
14 That's through 2012. There has been testimony, of course,
15 as to the number of farms going out of business in 2013 so
16 those job losses will be tacked on to the 15,000 that I am
17 estimating have occurred so far.

18 Just to reaffirm the point I made a little bit.
19 These are the unemployment rates in some of our largest
20 dairy states relative to the state average. And you can see
21 those counties are well above the state's average
22 unemployment rate in each instance. So not only are these
23 job losses important, they're coming in parts of our state
24 where we can ill afford to lose these jobs.

25 So in summing up, certainly the adjustment that

1 has been proposed doesn't reconnect the state's milk pricing
2 to the marketplace but it is a step in the right direction.
3 I hope that the Panel that the Secretary is putting into
4 place will look -- will look further at these issues and the
5 need to reconnect California to the marketplace. Because I
6 think unless and until that is done we are going to continue
7 to have problems as a state in terms of the pricing for milk
8 and the relationships between the California farms and the
9 processing entities downstream.

10 So I do think implementing these changes will be
11 helpful stemming the loss of dairies and the loss of
12 employment associated with dairy production in the state.

13 And certainly the changes being implemented, in my
14 view, will not unduly disadvantage the cheese plants. And
15 certainly we're talking about transferring some revenue from
16 the cheese plants to the -- to the farmers. But the change
17 that is being requested is still going to undervalue the
18 whey production relative to its market value. The
19 compensation to the farmer, even under these adjustments,
20 will be below the market value. So cheese producing plants
21 in California should still have a cost advantage relative to
22 their competitors in other states.

23 That concludes my testimony and I thank you.

24 MR. EASTMAN: I have a few questions for you,
25 Dr. Sexton. Earlier in your testimony you mentioned that you

1 didn't feel that -- what did I write here? I thought you
2 stated that California's share of the market is being lost.

3 DR. SEXTON: Yes.

4 MR. EASTMAN: What do you mean by that? Which
5 market are you referring to, specifically?

6 DR. SEXTON: Our market share of milk production
7 nationally has fallen by one percentage point. I don't
8 remember the exact, exact numbers but we went from -- I'll
9 throw a hypothetical number out that's not exactly right,
10 21.9 to 20.9. That's my best recollection of what the --
11 what the loss in share over this period since 2008 has been.
12 But it has been one percentage point in market share.

13 MR. EASTMAN: Gotcha. And then on the slide that
14 you showed up you had a slide that showed dairy margins by
15 the different states and it showed Washington and California
16 in the negative and other states in the positive.

17 DR. SEXTON: Yes.

18 MR. EASTMAN: And that was based on UCDA data. Do
19 you have any sense of, besides just the outcome of the data
20 or the actual data point, any reasons or explanations about
21 why you would expect, say, the state of Washington to have a
22 negative margin?

23 DR. SEXTON: Candidly, I didn't look into what was
24 going on in the state of Washington. I'd be happy to follow
25 up on that and I will do so and I'll provide that in the

1 post-hearing brief that I'll submit.

2 MR. EASTMAN: And then one of the recommendations
3 you make, the last one there is you feel that California
4 cheese plants wouldn't be disadvantaged by the petition that
5 has been submitted by the co-petitioners. Is that just
6 based on the idea that you believe that if that petition
7 were implemented that there would still be sufficient margin
8 there for cheese manufacturers thereafter in order to sell
9 their market to, say, distant US domestic markets say on the
10 East Coast?

11 DR. SEXTON: Well, right. One thing to bear in
12 mind is that whereas, you know, raw milk is difficult and
13 expensive to transport, as is feed because it's a very bulky
14 product. You know, once we process milk into the form of
15 cheese it becomes a much more compact product and much more
16 readily transportable. So, you know, the advantage
17 obviously of processing on-site and shipping the finished
18 products across the country or across the world, literally,
19 is that the processed products are much cheaper to ship.

20 My point was specifically with respect to the cost
21 of the raw milk input for the -- for the cheese plants. It
22 will continue even if this -- even if this petition is
23 granted by the Secretary. California milk prices will
24 continue to be low relative to prices in most of the rest of
25 the country. So that as it pertains to that facet of the

1 cheese plant's cost, they will have a comparative advantage.
2 I can't speak to the cheese plant's costs for the other
3 aspects of their processing operation because we don't, we
4 don't have those data, as you well know.

5 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. So you just -- so in essence
6 you believe that there would still be some sort of margin
7 that would account for the transportation cost of shipping
8 the cheese to the appropriate market where it's being sold.

9 DR. SEXTON: I do think that but, you know, we're
10 -- I guess I would have to echo Mr. Barcellos' testimony in
11 that respect. When I don't have the hard data in my hands,
12 as I don't in this case, I have to make inferences based
13 upon things I know professionally and so forth.

14 And as I said to you, cheese is not -- cheese
15 transportation costs are going to be certainly less relative
16 to heavier and bulkier products. Obviously there is a
17 cooling or refrigeration element that, that plays into
18 account here so the transportation costs are just one facet
19 of the cheese plant's cost, you have labor costs and energy
20 costs in their own right.

21 And so, you know, all we can do in those -- in
22 those cases since we don't have the actual data is, you
23 know, is ask ourselves, you know, should labor costs be
24 higher for our plants than plants in other states? Should
25 energy costs be higher and so forth? You know, there may be

1 testimony to the contrary in the afternoon, but I don't see
2 from where I'm sitting that there should be those
3 significant kinds of cost disparities for other inputs into
4 cheese production that would obviate the advantage that will
5 still remain in terms of being able to acquire relatively
6 cheaply.

7 MR. EASTMAN: Great. And then you mentioned that
8 -- were you going to submit all the slides that you
9 presented here today in your post-hearing brief?

10 DR. SEXTON: Yes, I will do that.

11 MR. EASTMAN: Okay.

12 MR. MASUHARA: Similar to Hyrum's question I had a
13 question on if your study showed or did you examine whether
14 or not some of this California cheese that you characterized
15 as being subsidized or having an extreme cost advantage, has
16 it displaced or cannibalized any of the domestic markets and
17 displaced cheese production, say, from other states due to
18 this cost advantage?

19 DR. SEXTON: Well, the share of -- the share of
20 cheese production for California has remained pretty stable
21 over this period. I think we're probably dealing with plant
22 capacity limitations and the difficulties of siting new
23 plants as a reason why the cheese share of California milk
24 production hasn't, hasn't risen considerably.

25 I did not do a study of the cheese marketplace as

1 part of preparation for this testimony, but the fact that
2 California's cheese share has remained very stable, very
3 near to the 43 percent it is now over this whole period, and
4 California's milk production has declined as a share
5 relative to other states, then I think we can safely
6 conclude that it has not displaced cheese production from
7 Wisconsin or any other state. The arithmetic doesn't add up
8 so I would have to say that it is has not.

9 MR. MASUHARA: And my other question is, you
10 mentioned the disconnect from the market back in '07 with
11 that decision. Did the scope of your study look at
12 specifically the dry whey market conditions in California
13 over the last five years?

14 DR. SEXTON: I did not examine California versus
15 the market broadly. I mean, it is a misnomer or a mistake
16 to say that there is -- that there is a California market
17 isolated from the rest of the market. Again, dry whey is
18 going to be a product that is transportable and shippable,
19 you know, across regions so that -- that the different
20 regions, to put the term in economics parlance, the
21 different regions are going to be integrated, they're going
22 to be, they're going to be connected.

23 That's not to say that the value is exactly the
24 same in -- of whey in California as it is in other states
25 but those values are all going to be interconnected due to

1 the ability to arbitrage across geographic regions so those
2 prices are all going to be connected, so I was looking at
3 the broader whey value nationally. But the California
4 value, it may not be the same but there is not going to be a
5 significant disconnect just due to that integration of the
6 markets.

7 MR. MASUHARA: That's all I had.

8 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: No further questions.

9 Thank you for your testimony, Dr. Sexton.

10 DR. SEXTON: Thank you.

11 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: I would now like to call
12 up Mr. Dryer.

13 Mr. Dryer, will you please state your full name
14 and spell your last name for the record, please.

15 MR. DRYER: My name is Greg Dryer, D-R-Y-E-R.

16 Whereupon,

17 GREG DRYER

18 Was duly sworn.

19 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Do you have any written
20 statements or things you would like entered into the record
21 at this time?

22 MR. DRYER: Yes, my testimony that I passed out.

23 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Okay. It will be Exhibit
24 number 50.

25 (Exhibit 50 was entered into the record.)

1 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed.

2 MR. DRYER: Mr. Hearing Officer and Members of the
3 Hearing Panel:

4 My name is Greg Dryer. I am Senior Vice President
5 of Industry and Government Relations for Saputo Cheese USA
6 Inc. Our company, Saputo, operates seven facilities in the
7 state of California. We employ nearly 1,500 people here and
8 purchase a substantial portion of the state's milk
9 production both directly from farmers and from farmer
10 cooperatives. We are very familiar with conditions in other
11 regions from our experience with the 16 facilities that we
12 operate in 10 other states.

13 I am here to testify in opposition to any further
14 changes to California's regulated milk prices until a viable
15 long-term alternative can be developed by the Department in
16 cooperation with the Secretary's Dairy Future Task Force.
17 We acknowledge that producers' economic challenges have been
18 real and believe that a national policy that would provide
19 them a margin insurance option is desirable. Simply
20 shifting a problem from one interdependent constituency onto
21 another is not a solution. In fact, the continual threat of
22 such an outcome creates uncertainty which inhibits decision-
23 making and therefore potential growth to the detriment of
24 all industry participants. Regarding the petition,
25 conditions that led to the request for emergency relief have

1 been steadily improving and are projected to continue to
2 improve. In the Department's "California Dairy Landscape"
3 document from the most recent hearing, California mailbox
4 prices for the first two months of 2013 were reported to be
5 \$2.41 per cwt higher than the previous year. Updating that
6 number with available data through May 2013 reveals that it
7 has further increased to \$2.62 per cwt over the same period
8 in 2012. The 4b price through August is \$1.70 higher than
9 last year. Production costs according to CDFA for Q1 2013
10 are \$1.06 higher than Q1 last year but did decline by \$0.86
11 from Q4 of 2012. Most of the cost increase occurred between
12 Q2 and Q3 2012 when feed costs spiked. Following is a quote
13 from the Michigan State Dairy Market Update for August 2013:
14 "Dairy producer margins are much better than this time last
15 year, 27.8 percent higher Income-Over-Feed-Cost, encouraging
16 dairy producers across the country to increase milk output.
17 This upward trend in milk output may gain even more steam
18 this fall as feed prices in December, using the USDA
19 formula, are forecasted to drop 16 percent, or \$2.02/cwt of
20 16 percent protein dairy feed, as compared with December
21 2012." On balance, conditions have improved since the last
22 hearing and will likely continue to improve.

23 Further alterations to the 4b whey factor cannot
24 be justified given the scarcity of relevant California data
25 and the inherent unfairness of such a factor given the

1 myriad of practices employed across the industry. Whey
2 processing requires huge scale to be economic. Enormous
3 capital is required, and once a specific plant configuration
4 is chosen, it faces the risk of technological obsolescence,
5 fickle markets and potential adverse environmental and
6 energy cost impacts.

7 Relatively few industry participants are in a
8 position to make that investment and take that risk. Many
9 cheese plants in California receive no value or incur a cost
10 to dispose of their whey.

11 Why cheese milk prices in California are lower
12 than in many other regions around the country.

13 California dairy farms are big. On average, they
14 produce over 25 million pounds of milk a year, 10 times the
15 size of an average Wisconsin dairy farm and 8 times the
16 national average outside of California. Why are they so
17 big? Logic would suggest that there must be a cost
18 advantage arising from the economy of scale. While the
19 information substantiating that conclusion is somewhat
20 limited, USDA conducted a cost survey by size of operation
21 on 2005 data, which was subsequently updated each year
22 through 2009. In it, they pegged the cost advantage of a
23 farm with over 1,000 cows at approximately \$7.50 over a farm
24 of 100 to 199 cows. In 2012, California farms average 1,080
25 cows while Wisconsin averaged 111. USDA also publishes

1 estimated monthly and annual costs of milk production by
2 state. In that report, from 2005 through 2012, California
3 has an average cost advantage over Wisconsin of \$4.73/cwt.
4 Milk prices in the long run tend to maintain a relationship
5 to the cost of production for that region. Supply and
6 demand will respond eventually to prices that land too far
7 one way or the other from that benchmark.

8 How California's Dairy industry grew.

9 In the past 20 years, California nearly doubled
10 its milk production. Farm sizes, in terms of output,
11 increased nearly fivefold. The extra production over that
12 time vastly exceeded local demand for milk. In 1992,
13 California produced 15.4 billion pounds above Class 1 needs
14 and Class 1 utilization was 30.3 percent.

15 By 2012, the surplus over Class 1 ballooned by 136
16 percent to 36.3 billion pounds. Class 1 utilization fell to
17 13.1 percent. That impacted average milk prices. Most of
18 the surplus found its way into cheese. Much of California's
19 exploding growth came at the expense of the Upper Midwest.
20 High volume, bulk commodity customers were attracted to the
21 California highly efficient cost model and largely abandoned
22 the Upper Midwest en masse. Wisconsin lost over 60 percent
23 of its farms over the last 20 years and 34 percent over the
24 last 10. Twenty years ago, 14 Wisconsin butter plants
25 produced 29 million pounds more butter than the state of

1 California. By 2012, less than 3 have survived and no
2 longer meet USDA's criteria for reporting. California. on
3 the other hand, doubled its production and now supplies more
4 than a third of the national total. In 1992, Wisconsin
5 produced 285 million pounds more mozzarella than California.
6 In 2012, California produced 354 million pounds more than
7 Wisconsin. The Midwest industry, to survive, had no choice
8 but to develop specialty products and to build a market for
9 specialty cheese. That was the only option that could
10 afford them to pay the higher milk prices required to
11 sustain their higher cost milk production infrastructure.
12 California, on the other hand, largely pursued mega, bulk
13 commodity-oriented plants better suited to handle the
14 volumes of milk generated by their mega dairy farms.
15 California: big efficient farms, big efficient plants.
16 Wisconsin: small, inefficient farms, small inefficient
17 plants. Apples and oranges. These are generalities, of
18 course, with no shortage of exceptions. On balance,
19 however, the facts are the facts. California farms continue
20 to grow. Average cow numbers per farm were up 5.8 percent
21 from 2011 to 2012.

22 The real source of California producer economic
23 challenges.

24 They are not the result of a failed pricing
25 system. They are the result of skyrocketing feed prices

1 that challenged dairy producers all over the world. If the
2 problems were attributable to the California system, would
3 Wisconsin have lost 610 farms last year? Or would
4 California rank 30th among the 50 states in percentage
5 reduction in average dairy farm numbers from 2011 to 2012?
6 An important fact to consider is that California prices have
7 not fallen relative to USDA prices. Instead, USDA prices
8 have risen relative to California because of recent high dry
9 whey commodity prices.

10 California milk production has been relatively
11 steady.

12 Year to year variations are likely more weather
13 than economic related, and current local supply and demand
14 conditions are relatively in balance. 2013 production
15 through July is actually the second-highest of the past six
16 years.

17 A federal order state that is comparable to
18 California.

19 New Mexico is a far western state with a
20 significant, large herd dairy industry. It enjoys a much
21 higher Class 1 utilization percentage than California, which
22 helps bolster its milk price, but for 2013 through May,
23 California's average mailbox price is \$0.14/cwt higher than
24 that of New Mexico. Over the last twelve years -- twelve-
25 plus years, the two states have averaged within \$0.03/cwt of

1 one another.

2 If California cheese milk were underpriced, there
3 would be a surge in cheese processing investment in the
4 state.

5 Instead, several in-state cheese processors have
6 recently chosen to locate new facilities in other states.
7 Cooperatives have, for the most part, elected to abandon the
8 cheese business in the state and there have been a number of
9 failures and closures in the cheese business in recent
10 years.

11 The long term pool impact of Class 4b pricing.

12 If you look at just the past three years and half
13 of this year, Class 4a has contributed more to the pool than
14 Class 4b. Over the last ten and a half years, however,
15 Class 4b has actually contributed 17.5 cents more per cwt to
16 the pool than Class 4a has.

17 The most recent 4b price increases have already
18 made a major impact on the state's cheese manufacturers.

19 To illustrate the point, assume that a
20 hypothetical cheesemaker earns a 5 percent net profit on
21 \$1.70 cheese. That is \$0.085/lb of cheese. The whey factor
22 increased by as much as \$0.40/cwt in September in 2011 and
23 another \$0.10 in August 2012. That, coupled with the
24 temporary relief of \$0.30 that ran from February through May
25 of this year, amounted to about \$0.80/cwt of milk or

1 \$0.008/lb of cheese.

2 By raising the milk price by \$0.80/cwt, 94 percent
3 of this hypothetical cheesemaker's profit has been
4 eliminated. Even at the current \$0.15 relief the number
5 falls but still eliminates 76 percent. While you may argue
6 about a few pennies one way or another, the recent price
7 increases granted may not seem significant to dairy farmers,
8 but they are definitely significant to the state's
9 cheesemakers.

10 The "overbase price" is not a fair barometer of
11 dairy farm profitability.

12 The oft quoted overbase price is the price for
13 milk containing 3.5 percent butterfat and 8.7 percent
14 solids-not-fat. It contains no measure of milk premiums
15 paid nor the average value of quota held. In reality,
16 California milk averaged 3.73 percent butterfat and 8.87
17 solids-not-fat in 2012. Mailbox milk prices reflect actual
18 total receipts less marketing costs and assessments and
19 typically average \$0.60 to \$0.80 above the overbase price.

20 The mailbox price is a more appropriate measure of
21 milk's value when evaluating producer profitability.

22 The California 4b price did not always contain a
23 whey factor.

24 There was no whey factor in California prior to
25 April 2003. The USDA Class III has had a whey factor since

1 the inception of component pricing in April 1999. For four
2 years, the two systems operated independently with full
3 knowledge of that difference and without controversy.

4 The last CDFA Manufacturing Cost Exhibit that
5 contained a dry whey manufacturing cost was published in
6 September 2007 for 2006 data. The whey cost published in
7 that report was \$0.3099 per pound. The federal whey factor
8 has a cost make allowance of just \$0.1991 per pound. At
9 \$0.60 whey, if the California cost were applied to the
10 federal whey factor it would reduce the Class III price by
11 \$0.65/cwt.

12 After the fixed whey value of \$0.25 was introduced
13 in California in December 2007, it resulted in a higher
14 price for farmers than the previous factor for 17 of its
15 first 19 months of existence.

16 End product pricing is no longer viable in
17 California.

18 Not only are there insufficient whey manufacturers
19 for surveying and publishing cost data, consolidation and
20 closures have led to a scarcity of cheddar manufacturers as
21 well. Dry whey is not the only product presenting
22 challenges to this end product pricing system. For example,
23 if one of the four cheddar manufacturers in the state were
24 large enough to have a significant influence over cost data
25 and that manufacturer were fortunate to have a substantial

1 portion of its volume directed to one of a very limited
2 number of large cheese buyers residing here, that would go a
3 long way to explain an FOB adjuster of just 2.52 cents.

4 Unfortunately, many of the other cheese
5 manufacturers in the state do not enjoy the luxury of a
6 large in-state customer and are forced to export the
7 majority of their production back across the country at
8 costs ranging from 10 to 20 cents per pound of cheese. That
9 transportation cost versus a 2.52 cent FOB adjuster
10 represents \$0.75 to \$1.75/cwt of milk. End product pricing
11 has outlived its usefulness and needs to be replaced. No
12 further fiddling or fine tuning can be justified.

13 That concludes my testimony. Thank you for your
14 attention and I appreciate the opportunity of filing a post-
15 hearing brief if warranted.

16 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request to file a
17 post-hearing brief is granted.

18 MR. DRYER: Thank you.

19 MR. EASTMAN: I have a few questions for you,
20 Mr. Dryer. On page two of your testimony you cite a quote
21 from the Michigan State Dairy market Update for August and
22 they mention that dairy margins are improving. Is that some
23 sort of national average, were they dealing with just
24 Michigan? What exactly were they referring to?

25 MR. DRYER: It was in a published article and my

1 presumption was it was a national number that they were
2 referring to.

3 MR. EASTMAN: So they didn't necessarily refer to
4 California specifically, I assume.

5 MR. DRYER: No, it definitely wasn't California
6 specifically.

7 MR. EASTMAN: And then on page three you mentioned
8 that many cheese plants in California don't receive any
9 value for whey because they don't process it, however,
10 Saputo does have whey processing capacities in California.

11 MR. DRYER: Correct.

12 MR. EASTMAN: So were you just referring to the
13 other parts of the cheese industry here in California?

14 MR. DRYER: Yeah, my --

15 MR. EASTMAN: Is there a --

16 MR. DRYER: My understanding is the majority of
17 plants do not enjoy the opportunity to have whey processing.
18 You need a pretty significantly sized plant to be able to
19 justify the investment.

20 MR. EASTMAN: Once that investment is made would
21 that not then allow, though, a cheese plant to leverage
22 whatever margin or the income versus positive, the whey
23 stream products with the cheese manufacturing in order to
24 use them?

25 MR. DRYER: My point here was that the investment

1 is so large that the investment in whey processing is
2 typically higher than the investment in the cheese
3 processing facility itself. It's inherently risky because
4 you're investing in a single product or narrow range of
5 products that may fall out of favor in a relatively short
6 period of time, so therefore you're taking an inordinate
7 amount of risk. And so for one year or another you may make
8 a significant profit but there's a lot of vagaries in those
9 markets that go up and down.

10 MR. EASTMAN: On the page of your testimony after
11 the one chart on milk production you mention that one thing
12 that I think is fairly accepted is that there is not a lot
13 of new cheese plants that's been constructed or have been
14 built here in the state of California. You mentioned that
15 if cheese milk were under-priced we would expect to see more
16 cheese plants. But aren't there other factors also that
17 sort of inhibit establishing cheese plants in the state,
18 things like -- I think in the past there's been mention of
19 frequent regulatory hearings, business climate, permitting,
20 things of that nature. Wouldn't those things also
21 contribute?

22 MR. DRYER: Absolutely.

23 MR. EASTMAN: Is there any way to disentangle the
24 in-fact pricing as an impediment or a motivation to build a
25 plant, compared to the other things that might impede it?

1 MR. DRYER: I don't know of a means of doing that.
2 I just know that on balance, when you weigh all the factors
3 combined, we are not seeing investment. And if the price,
4 you know, if the price discount is purported to be
5 significant enough you'd think that there would be an influx
6 of investment in the state that would overcome those other
7 factors.

8 MR. EASTMAN: I may have another question, I need
9 to look here for a second.

10 MR. MASUHARA: Greg, I have a quick question. We
11 have taken testimony today that referenced a deal or
12 negotiation that happened between processors and producers
13 that came up with the specific numbers that were put forth
14 in the petition. Were you a part of that negotiation?

15 MR. DRYER: I was not a direct party. We're
16 members of the Dairy Institute of California and therefore
17 we were involved in the communications back and forth as to
18 what was ongoing. What I was told was that the negotiations
19 -- the offer that was presented was rejected by the producer
20 community so it wasn't all agreed.

21 MR. MASUHARA: Okay. And then I am making the
22 assumption that since you are in opposition to the petition
23 then you are in opposition to the specific numbers that were
24 contained in that petition.

25 MR. DRYER: Yeah, I think the offer that was made

1 and the letter that has been presented talked about "if
2 conditions warranted" which was an important element of the
3 offer. And it is our opinion that conditions don't warrant
4 the change.

5 MR. MASUHARA: Okay, thanks.

6 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: With no further
7 questions, thank you for your testimony, Mr. Dryer.

8 Mr. Lantz Adams. Mr. Adams, would you please
9 state your full name and spell your last name for the
10 record, please.

11 MR. L. ADAMS: Lantz Adams, A-D-A-M-S.

12 Whereupon,

13 LANTZ ADAMS

14 Was duly sworn.

15 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: And do you have any
16 written statements or other things you would like to add
17 into the record at this time?

18 MR. L. ADAMS: Yes, but I'd like to give them to
19 you after I've given you my testimony.

20 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: That would be fine. You
21 may proceed.

22 MR. L. ADAMS: First of all, thank you for
23 allowing me to present my testimony to you today.

24 My name is Lantz Adams. I am 13 years old and I
25 am in the 8th grade and I attend Woodrow Wilson Junior High

1 School in Hanford, California. My father is a third
2 generation dairy farmer. I am writing to you because our
3 dairy farm, like many others, is in dire financial straits
4 and may not continue into a fourth generation. That thought
5 makes me sick. As I think of my family's situation and
6 understanding that you have the ability to raise the
7 producer's pay price, I have thought of several issues that
8 you may consider.

9 1. Dairymen are going out of business due to the
10 low milk prices.

11 Many multi-generational family dairies are going
12 out of business.

13 Over 90 percent of them are family owned.

14 All of the earlier generations' work is being
15 sacrificed when a dairy exits the industry.

16 Please understand that losing dairies leads to a
17 loss of many jobs.

18 2. Dairies going out of business cause a negative
19 impact on society.

20 Unemployed become dependant on social programs.

21 And when dairies go out of business it negatively
22 affects allied industries.

23 After a loss of a dairy it can cause catastrophic
24 casualties to the family structure.

25 Please understand that the loss of dairies affects

1 society in many ways.

2 Additional items regarding milk.

3 Dairy products from other countries could be of
4 questionable quality if imported.

5 If less dairy are being produced -- if less dairy
6 products are being produced, prices may go up. This could
7 result in a less-healthy diet.

8 Please understand that the loss of dairies could
9 result in an unhealthy diet.

10 Finally, I understand the importance of having
11 milk processors in the state of California, but I also
12 understand that the necessity of having dairy families
13 willing to be able to profitably produce the milk to fill
14 those plants. I know I'm only a kid but what I see in this
15 industry is not good and is only getting worse. Thank you.

16 MR. EASTMAN: That was very articulately well-
17 spoken. Normally we don't have people come and testify, I
18 think your age is slightly below the average of some of our
19 more distinguished witnesses, we'll say.

20 (Laughter.)

21 MR. EASTMAN: I do have a couple of questions for
22 you. Since you're on the farm do you actually fulfill some
23 of the duties or some of the work that is done on your farm?

24 MR. L. ADAMS: Yes. On our worker's day off I
25 feed calves and I help milk. And whenever it's needed I

1 milk with my dad or whenever he has to do something I milk
2 the cows.

3 MR. EASTMAN: Great. One day do you hope to
4 possibly take over your parents' dairy? Do you hope to be a
5 dairyman yourself?

6 MR. L. ADAMS: Yes, possibly. If we can have a
7 fourth generation I do want to take over the dairy.

8 MR. EASTMAN: What would be some of the reasons
9 why you would want to be a dairyman?

10 MR. L. ADAMS: I think it's important that kids
11 know what actual work is, because some don't. And it's
12 important to keep the fourth generation going. I think it
13 would be good to have a fourth generation continue on.

14 MR. EASTMAN: That sounds good. I just have one
15 more question. I've noticed you've been here for quite a
16 while, right? Were you here since the beginning?

17 MR. L. ADAMS: Pretty close, yes.

18 MR. EASTMAN: Pretty close. And so you mentioned
19 that -- obviously you attend middle school so you're not in
20 school today. Normally it would be a school day, right?

21 MR. L. ADAMS: Yes.

22 MR. EASTMAN: So the question I have is, based on
23 what you've heard would you have rather have been in school
24 or would you have rather been here listening to what we have
25 been talking about?

1 (Laughter.)

2 MR. L. ADAMS: I think either way it's a learning
3 experience and I enjoy it here.

4 MR. EASTMAN: Well said, very good.

5 MS. GATES: I just wanted to say thank you very
6 much for coming up and testifying, we really appreciate it.

7 MR. L. ADAMS: Thank you.

8 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Well thank you for your
9 testimony, Mr. Adams. And you're going to bring that
10 exhibit up?

11 MR. L. ADAMS: Yes.

12 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Okay, please bring that
13 forward. It will be Exhibit 51.

14 (Exhibit 51 was entered into the record.)

15 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Mr. Rick Adams.

16 MR. R. ADAMS: Good morning.

17 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Good morning. Mr. Adams,
18 will you state your full name and spell your last name for
19 the record, please.

20 MR. R. ADAMS: My name is Rick Adams, the last
21 name is A-D-A-M-S.

22 Whereupon,

23 RICK ADAMS

24 Was duly sworn.

25 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Do you have any written

1 statements you would like to enter into the record at this
2 time?

3 MR. R. ADAMS: No, but I can give you what I wrote
4 at a later date after you hear what I have to say, you want
5 a copy.

6 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: So are you -- you want to
7 submit a post-hearing brief?

8 MR. R. ADAMS: Yeah, I can send this to you if you
9 want me to, yeah.

10 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Okay, all right, thank
11 you.

12 MR. R. ADAMS: Are you ready?

13 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed, yes.

14 MR. R. ADAMS: Okay, thank you. First of all,
15 that was my son and I am very proud of him. He understated
16 his contributions on the farm. We are a very old farm, we
17 are very family-oriented. We actually, typically would
18 probably belong in Wisconsin and not California. But he has
19 many jobs other than the ones he just stated, he was just
20 trying to be smug about it.

21 Actually I did not come here originally intending
22 to testify but on the way here I decided it was probably a
23 good idea and I started thinking about things. So I'm going
24 to read you what I wrote and sorry if it's less than, less
25 than perfect.

1 Thank you for your time and for holding this
2 hearing. I originally was just going to bring my son Lantz
3 to testify but on the ride here I thought maybe I should
4 testify myself and now here I am. Please excuse me if my
5 testimony is a bit choppy, I typed it here on my iPhone
6 today.

7 What changed my mind about testifying was the
8 recognition that three co-ops handling over 70 percent of
9 California's milk not only recognize our plight as an
10 industry but they are actively testifying on behalf of their
11 member-owners. They recognize that the demise of additional
12 member dairy farms is not in their interest as processors,
13 nor in the best interest of the industry as a whole.

14 About us and our farm. We are a small dairy
15 milking 65 cows with many inefficiencies but operate as a
16 small family farm that produces all of our forages with
17 family labor, doing most of the milking, feeding and farming
18 operations.

19 I understand and agree that the California model
20 of dairying, which is having a large dairy and buying all or
21 most of your feeds, is no longer as effective as it used to
22 be. Though we recognize the inefficiencies of our older,
23 small dairy farm we do everything we can to cut expenses,
24 including eliminating all custom operating as possible. In
25 fact, when we chop our stillage my son Lantz drives his own

1 stillage truck.

2 We struggle to survive without bank loans because
3 we as a family dairy farm refuse to lose what my grandfather
4 and my father himself worked so hard for. So my wife's
5 teaching income is, in the short-run, continually being used
6 to keep our dairy in operation. That is not a planned
7 business strategy and one we cannot maintain long term.

8 I also understand the Department's desire to
9 ensure that the small cheese operators can continue to
10 operate without the efficiencies that come with the ability
11 to further process whey into a higher value whey product.
12 Those efficiencies are similar to the ones that our small
13 family dairy operates under.

14 Having said that, I am not asking you today to
15 raise your milk price to reflect -- okay, I'm going to start
16 over. Having said that, I am not asking you today to raise
17 our milk price to reflect the full value of whey to
18 selfishly protect me and my inefficiencies, but rather to
19 support all of my fellow dairy farmers. By paying us full
20 whey value, it will not save all of us. Some of our dairies
21 are already beyond being saved, their fate is already
22 sealed.

23 I guess one of my biggest frustrations is the fact
24 that the Department's own cost of production studies
25 correctly illustrate our reality. Realizing that the

1 Department recognizes our milk income does not cover our
2 cost of production and then continuing to drag its feet
3 instead of rectifying the situation that's a problem -- the
4 Department has been tasked with, which is balancing the
5 needs of the producers, the processors and the public.

6 In conclusion I would like to thank you for your
7 time and implore the Department to raise our milk price to
8 reflect the full value of the whey price. As I said
9 earlier, I am not asking this to be selfish but rather
10 because this is an emergency and we need it immediately to
11 save our industry. Thank you.

12 MS. GATES: I just have one quick question.

13 MR. R. ADAMS: Yes.

14 MS. GATES: Where do you ship your milk to?

15 MR. R. ADAMS: Land O'Lakes.

16 MS. GATES: Thank you.

17 MR. R. ADAMS: Thank you.

18 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you for your
19 testimony, Mr. Adams.

20 MR. R. ADAMS: Would you like me to submit what I
21 -- what I said.

22 MR. R. ADAMS: Yes, a post-hearing brief.

23 MR. R. ADAMS: Okay, thank you very much.

24 MS. GATES: Great, thank you.

25 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you.

1 cream and cottage cheese under the Knudsen brand. This
2 facility also produces dry whey powder. We employ 265
3 people at this facility and process several million pounds
4 of milk a day; this milk is purchased from farmer
5 cooperatives in California. The Tulare plant is one of
6 Kraft's 40 manufacturing facilities in North America, 11 of
7 which are cheese plants.

8 I am here today to testify in opposition to any
9 increase in California milk prices, whether in the form of
10 the proposed changes to the temporary price relief that was
11 implemented July 1, 2013, or the proposed change to the
12 sliding scale whey factor that is part of the Class 4b
13 formula. While we agree that the financial struggles
14 related to the drought of 2012 had an unfavorable impact in
15 farm economics, this year's crops are reported to be in much
16 better condition and are predicted to be available in much
17 larger quantities than last year, thereby providing ongoing
18 relief to farm input costs and a corresponding improvement
19 of farm economics.

20 With improved grain harvest conditions and reduced
21 price pressures related to feed, California farm economics
22 are expected to improve significantly during 2013. Recent
23 cost of production total feed cost data published by CDFA
24 paints a compelling picture of improving conditions in
25 California. The cost of feed is over one-half the total

1 cost of producing milk, and corn is a large component of
2 feed, so it stands to reason that movements in the corn
3 market can impact on-farm economics. With higher grain
4 markets beginning mid-2012, feed costs not surprisingly
5 climbed to very high levels. However, these costs have
6 already started to ease, probably due both to lower grain
7 markets and changing rations at the producer level, with
8 more downside likely as a function of the new corn and
9 soybean crops which are beginning to be harvested. Of
10 course, it's difficult to say whether year-over-year milk
11 production changes have been just a function of weather
12 conditions or the result of deeper, more fundamental on-farm
13 cost struggles. However, drawing conclusions regarding the
14 favorable economic impacts of corn prices and their relation
15 to feed costs is certainly warranted.

16 From mid-2011 to mid-2012, corn prices averaged
17 about \$5.50/bushel and average total feed costs rose by less
18 than \$0.30/cwt of milk. Then, from the mid-2012 to early
19 2013 period, corn prices averaged about \$6.00-\$6.50/bushel.

20 During this period average total feed costs rose by
21 \$0.93/cwt. The late 2013 and early 2014 corn futures as of
22 today would suggest that corn prices are predicted to be
23 below \$5.00 through September of 2014, and this price level
24 should lead to corresponding decreases and result in average
25 total feed costs that are comparable to or even less than

1 those of the 2011 crop year. Additionally, the 4b price
2 through August of 2013 is \$1.70/cwt higher than 2012.

3 Therefore, in light of this improving situation in
4 feed costs, and coupled with the \$0.15/cwt of temporary
5 price relief that began July 1, and the \$0.30/cwt temporary
6 price relief that spanned February through May of 2013,
7 there is no need to further temporary price relief.
8 Declining feed costs should be providing additional income
9 to farmers, versus adding on to the prices paid for milk by
10 cheese manufacturers. The duration of the current temporary
11 price relief of \$0.15/cwt on 4b should allow time for the
12 Secretary's Dairy Future Task Force to fulfill the purpose
13 for which it was created, namely to create a pricing system
14 in California that is viable for the long-term and allows
15 producers and processors to maintain and grow their
16 businesses, while securing the California dairy industry's
17 position as a leader within both the United States and the
18 expanding global dairy marketplace.

19 Regarding the proposal to increase the whey
20 factor, we do not feel that this request is supportable.
21 Efficient whey processing requires the manufacturer to have
22 enough scale to justify making a large investment in the
23 asset base required to further process whey into a commodity
24 dry whey product. Many of the California cheesemakers
25 either can't afford the tens of millions of dollars required

1 to buy and outfit a drying operation, or they don't have the
2 floor space in their manufacturing facilities to support a
3 drying operation, or they simply don't generate enough whey
4 to process in order to have a reasonable return on invested
5 capital. In the case of value-added whey products like whey
6 protein concentrate or whey protein isolate, lack of scale
7 becomes an even bigger impediment as the cost of assets to
8 manufacture these value-added ingredients are even higher
9 than for the assets used to process commodity dry whey. As
10 a result, many California cheesemakers are forced to dispose
11 of their whey, often incurring a cost for doing so.

12 Any increase in the whey factor will have a
13 negative impact on Kraft's operations and business decision
14 making. Cheese processor margins are small, as retail
15 cheese is a commodity business. And by this statement I
16 mean that on-shelf prices for branded products need to be
17 close to prices for store brand products in order to be
18 attractive to consumers and drive them to choose the branded
19 product. The cost of manufacturing, storage,
20 transportation, sales and marketing are inflationary, and
21 when combined with the increasing costs of raw materials
22 like milk in California, there's only one place that
23 additional costs like temporary price relief and adjustments
24 to the whey factor in the 4b formula can come from: the
25 margin. Our shelf prices are based on our input costs. We

1 can't charge the customer more just become some percentage
2 of our cheese is made in a particular region, like
3 California, for a higher cost. We also can't just pull back
4 on trade spending because some percentage of our cheese is
5 made in a particular region for a higher cost. If we did
6 that, retailers would choose to promote private label
7 products over our branded products because private label
8 products don't carry the heavy marketing expenses that
9 branded products do. We would lose volume and share and
10 eventually become delisted from retailers' refrigerated
11 cases. After that, the business would eventually have a
12 lack of viability. The continued squeeze on margins that
13 will be caused by recurrent temporary price relief and other
14 short-term fixes instead of addressing the issue of the
15 current California dairy pricing system will eventually
16 result in cheese manufacturers leaving California for other
17 regions. California's labor rates are higher than other
18 regions and the cost of transportation to other areas in the
19 US of product produced in California is prohibitive -
20 therefore something has to give to return the California
21 milk industry's balance to equilibrium.

22 The California Milk Advisory Board's website say
23 that "cheese is California's fastest growing dairy product
24 and 43 percent of the state's milk supply goes to cheese
25 production. In the period between 1990 and 2012, California

1 cheese production grew from 702 million pounds to 2.25
2 billion pounds. California's more than 50 cheesemakers make
3 250 different varieties and styles of cheese. Operations
4 range from small producers famous for their handmade
5 cheeses, to some of the country's largest cheese plants."
6 That mix of growing manufacturing scale and the ability of
7 the California cheese manufacturers to utilize 43 percent of
8 the state's milk supply provides a mechanism that California
9 dairy farmers can leverage to grow their businesses and make
10 more money through volume and efficiency; but without this
11 infrastructure, farmers will struggle to find economically
12 feasible outlets for their milk.

13 The current California milk pricing system is no
14 longer useful. The purpose of the Dairy Future Task Force
15 is to create a pricing system in California to replace the
16 current pricing system. The Task Force must create a
17 pricing system that is viable for the long-term and allow
18 producers and processors to maintain and grow their
19 businesses, while securing the California dairy industry's
20 position as a leading source of supply both within the
21 United States and within the expanding global marketplace.

22 The impacts of the 2012 drought were real and
23 California farmers weathered the storm. Milk production is
24 improving, grain prices have fallen and on-farm economics
25 are improving. This should continue to be the case going

1 forward into 2014 and therefore additional increases to
2 California milk prices are not required for farmers to
3 thrive and be profitable.

4 The California dairy pricing system has outlived
5 its useful life and it needs to be replaced with a system
6 that provides a sustainable and fair economic state that can
7 withstand good and bad production years, years with droughts
8 and others with floods, years with large margins and years
9 with much smaller margins. The way to resolve the current
10 pricing situation is to let the Dairy Future Task Force
11 fulfill its purpose and bring all the parties together to
12 construct a system that works for producers and processors
13 alike.

14 Kraft is supportive of the work of the Dairy
15 Future Task Force and we are hopeful that 2013 will continue
16 to enjoy lower feed costs, better year-over-year weather
17 conditions, improved farmer profitability and an opportunity
18 for the Dairy Future Task Force to create a pricing system
19 that works for all parties, and most of all provides a long-
20 term benefit to the California dairy industry. We look
21 forward to a more permanent solution to the current pricing
22 situation versus continued attempts to tweak the formulas to
23 result in more income to farmers and more cost creep to
24 cheese manufacturers.

25 This concludes my testimony. Thank you for your

1 time. I would like to have the opportunity to file a post-
2 hearing brief if necessary.

3 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request is granted
4 for a post-hearing brief.

5 MS. PEETS: Thank you.

6 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Any questions?

7 MR. EASTMAN: I do have a couple of questions.

8 Earlier today we heard testimony by some witnesses
9 that have stated that if the Department were to implement
10 the co-petitioners' proposal it would still allow a margin
11 between the California Class 4b and the price of milk in
12 other areas of the country so that margin would still exist.
13 Do you agree with that?

14 MS. PEETS: I do not.

15 MR. EASTMAN: And why not?

16 MS. PEETS: Because our pricing systems with
17 retailers, which is our predominant channel that we sell
18 into, is very static. In order to change those you would
19 need a significant -- you would incur a significant expense
20 as well as push-back from the retailers on the amount of
21 promotion that they'll do with your business. I would say
22 that our shelf prices can't budget. So when our input costs
23 go up it comes out of the margin, period.

24 MR. EASTMAN: So would that apply only to your in-
25 state competitors compared to those that are outside of the

1 state of California?

2 MS. PEETS: No, I wouldn't say that. California
3 is our only manufacturing facility of Parmesan and hard
4 Italian cheeses, so we have to take that product and get it
5 to all of the other regions of the country.

6 MR. EASTMAN: And the other question I have is, in
7 California, Kraft is one of the few plants that actually
8 manufactures dry whey powder.

9 MS. PEETS: Yes.

10 MR. EASTMAN: And as we know, dry whey is one of
11 the commodity prices that determine Class 4b prices, it's
12 also one of the commodities that determine Federal Order
13 Class III prices. So because of the fact that you actually
14 manufacture and sell the product that the formula is based
15 on, doesn't that give you an advantage because your
16 operation more closely reflects the formula itself?

17 MS. PEETS: I would say it might give us an
18 advantage over folks who don't process their own whey and
19 who actually pay to dispose of it. But I would also say
20 that whey processing itself, particularly just dry whey
21 powder and not some of the more value-added whey protein
22 concentrates and isolates, is a very challenging business.
23 The assets are super-expensive and the amount of product
24 that you make that is food grade versus feed grade sells for
25 a very different price as well as you have to pay somebody

1 to market it. So I would say that it's a penny margin
2 business for whatever advantage that is.

3 MR. EASTMAN: And then you mentioned how you
4 support the Dairy Future Task Force and finding some other
5 pricing system. Do you then -- are you not supportive of
6 the current system of end product pricing and structure?

7 MS. PEETS: No.

8 MR. EASTMAN: Although it seems that that has
9 served the industry for a number of years and in California
10 for quite a few years, what has changed over the years that
11 would lead you to feel that the system of pricing needs to
12 be changed to something different?

13 MS. PEETS: Because I -- my own personal opinion,
14 I feel that we're constantly searching for short-term fixes.
15 And pulling out pieces of the pricing formulas to change,
16 increase in this case, doesn't help the overall situation.
17 If we need to create a new pricing system we should create
18 one. We should go back to the grassroots and determine what
19 each party's needs are and then create a system that can
20 work for everyone. Forty-three percent of the state's milk
21 goes to making cheese. If both parties were at the table
22 together I'm sure we could come up with a way that pricing
23 could work for everybody, versus having these hearings every
24 few months and coming up with a piece of a temporary price
25 increase that goes into effect for three months or one month

1 or six months. It doesn't fix the overall problem.

2 MS. GATES: I just have a quick follow-up question
3 to one that Hyrum asked because you are one of the dry whey
4 processors. You were talking about the difference between
5 animal grade and food grade and I'm sure there is a
6 difference in price there. What percentage maybe of your
7 production kind of goes either way or is it just the heat
8 issue that dumps it over?

9 MS. PEETS: Honestly, it depends. We have a party
10 who markets all of our whey for us because we are not in the
11 ingredients business so we have a contract with that person
12 that says that we will produce a set percentage of food
13 grade whey and feed grade whey. And when our system doesn't
14 cooperate and we produce more feed grade, that party takes a
15 loss on that product and it then gets charged back to us.
16 So we have to live up to our contract and when our equipment
17 doesn't cooperate we have to make up that difference.

18 MS. GATES: Thank you.

19 MS. PEETS: Sure.

20 MR. MASUHARA: Ms. Peets, similar to what I asked
21 Mr. Dryer. Were you part of any of the negotiations that
22 have been spoken about today?

23 MS. PEETS: Like Mr. Dryer I was not directly
24 involved but we are members of the Dairy Institute, they
25 acted on our behalf.

1 MR. MASUHARA: And I didn't ask Mr. Dryer this but
2 I'll ask you and I'll assume that you speak similarly for
3 all the other processors. Was there any other level that is
4 not represented in the numbers that have been presented by
5 the co-petitioners that you feel economic conditions do
6 warrant at this time? I know it's kind of a complicated
7 question to try to answer on the fly.

8 MS. PEETS: It is complicated to answer on the
9 fly. I am not sure I could answer that right now. I don't
10 think so.

11 MR. MASUHARA: Okay.

12 MS. PEETS: From what I understood the
13 negotiations broke down, the proposal was not accepted by
14 the other side.

15 MR. MASUHARA: Okay, thank you.

16 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you for your
17 testimony, Ms. Peets.

18 MS. PEETS: Thank you.

19 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Before we adjourn for
20 lunch for one hour is there anybody that is going to testify
21 this afternoon that has a computer-aided program that they
22 want to present?

23 All right, thank you, I'll see you at one o'clock.

24 (Off the record at 12:00 p.m.)

25 (On the record at 1:02 p.m.)

1 A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N

2 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Okay, ladies and
3 gentlemen, we will now go back on the record.

4 Ms. Duarte. Ms. Duarte.

5 Mr. Paris. Mr. Paris, could you please state your
6 full name and spell your last name.

7 MR. PARIS: My name is Joe E. Paris, the last name
8 P-A-R-I-S

9 Whereupon,

10 JOE E. PARIS

11 Was duly sworn.

12 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: And would you like your
13 written statement marked as an exhibit?

14 MR. PARIS: Yes, sir.

15 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: It will be Exhibit number
16 53.

17 (Exhibit 53 was entered into the record.)

18 MR. PARIS: Thank you.

19 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed.

20 MR. PARIS: Mr. Hearing Officer and Members of the
21 Hearing Panel:

22 My name is Joe E. Paris and I am a consultant
23 representing Gallo Cattle Company LP, d.b.a. Joseph Gallo
24 Farms. We are grateful for this opportunity given to us by
25 the Secretary and the hearing panel to express our position

1 on the proposal that is being heard today. This testimony
2 is based on discussions that I have had with Mr. Michael D.
3 Gallo, CEO of Joseph Gallo Farms and Mr. Gallo fully
4 endorses this testimony. Michael D. Gallo has been a leader
5 in his community as well as agriculture and the dairy
6 industry. Mr. Gallo currently serves on the California
7 State Board of Agriculture and is a member of the dairy task
8 force created by Secretary Karen Ross.

9 Joseph Gallo Farms is a family-owned dairy and
10 cheese plant with its principal offices located at 10561
11 West Highway 140, Atwater, California. Joseph Gallo Farms
12 has approximately 10,000 milk cows. We currently operate
13 two milking facilities in Merced County and most of our milk
14 goes into our family-owned cheese plant. The Gallo cheese
15 plant also purchases milk from two local cooperatives and
16 processes almost 45,000,000 pounds of milk per month into a
17 variety of different cheeses.

18 Joseph Gallo Farms supports the current whey
19 factors and the current temporary price relief as outlined
20 in Section 300.00 of the Northern and Southern Milk
21 Stabilization Plans under order numbers 59 and 74. Gallo
22 specifically supports the language found in Section 300.0,
23 Paragraph E(1)(c) and Paragraph H(1-8).

24 The petitioners have requested that the current
25 whey factor be capped at \$1.00 rather than at the current

1 \$0.75. The petitioners have requested that the current
2 temporary price increases on all classes of milk be
3 eliminated except for the 4b price which they propose to
4 increase to \$0.0528 per pound of solids-not-fat or a little
5 over \$0.46 per hundredweight. That increase will result in
6 an increase in the cheese price of over \$0.045 per pound in
7 a very competitive market. Joseph Gallo Farms opposes these
8 proposed changes.

9 We continue to hear that the 4b price needs to
10 mimic the Federal Order Class III price. California cheese
11 plants do not compete with Midwest plants as much but from
12 unregulated plants in Idaho and Utah. We also compete with
13 a plant in the West Texas-New Mexico area. New Mexico
14 mailbox prices run very close to California prices. It is
15 difficult to get verifiable producer information from the
16 Idaho-Northern Utah area, but anecdotal information reports
17 that the producer prices run much below the federal order
18 prices.

19 The idea of having only one class of milk, 4b, pay
20 for a temporary price relief to California dairymen is
21 arbitrary, capricious and is patently unfair. Joseph Gallo
22 Farms would support a continuation of the current temporary
23 prices as currently outlined in the Milk Stabilization and
24 Marketing plans until the California dairy task force has
25 completed its work and published a plan to change dairy

1 pricing in the state of California. We adamantly oppose the
2 petition being heard today.

3 Again, I thank the Secretary and the hearing panel
4 for allowing us to give this testimony and we also request
5 the right to submit a post-hearing brief.

6 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request to submit a
7 brief is accepted.

8 MR. PARIS: Thank you.

9 MR. EASTMAN: I have a question. You mentioned
10 that it's difficult to find published information in the
11 unregulated area of Idaho and Utah but you do mention that
12 there is anecdotal information reports. Is that some sort
13 of written report or market commentary by analysts?

14 MR. PARIS: No.

15 MR. EASTMAN: What do you mean by that?

16 MR. PARIS: I have a client in Utah, a small dairy
17 co-op that I work with. And where I have that information
18 is from them who are in that marketplace and work in that
19 marketplace. And I have been in that marketplace. But I
20 can't get any flat numbers that tell me what it is.

21 Now I have heard that -- and it's an unregulated
22 area. Since they have had a couple of powder plants go in
23 up there, unregulated and the price of nonfat has come up,
24 that there has been more competition in the cheese places
25 for milk in that area and that some of those prices have

1 come up. At one time they were -- most of that milk was
2 bought on some type of a cheese-yield formula that actually
3 set the price somewhere below the Class III price.

4 MR. EASTMAN: Okay, so that is based more on sort
5 of the sense of -- sort of economic conditions, what you
6 could sort of observe, they are not going to necessarily be
7 verifiable.

8 MR. PARIS: If I could have found the numbers
9 they'd have been in the testimony.

10 MR. EASTMAN: Sure. No, that's understandable.

11 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you for your
12 testimony, Mr. Paris.

13 Ms. Duarte?

14 Mr. Sanchez. Mr. Sanchez, could you please state
15 your full name and spell your last name for the record.

16 MR. SANCHEZ: Adolfo Sanchez, S-A-N-C-H-E-Z.

17 Whereupon,

18 ADOLFO SANCHEZ

19 Was duly sworn.

20 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Would you like your
21 written testimony here to be marked as an exhibit?

22 MR. SANCHEZ: Yes.

23 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: It will be Exhibit number
24 54.

25 (Exhibit 54 was entered into the record.)

1 MR. SANCHEZ: I just have a brief statement.

2 I represent Los Altos Foods, which is a very small
3 family-owned business just like many of the dairy farmers
4 say they are. We employ about 200 employees. That's the
5 total company including salesmen and drivers, everybody.

6 We are also being hurt by the economic structure
7 in today's country, today's facilities. Our pricing for not
8 only milk but freight, packaging, ingredients, energy have
9 all gone up. Our margins have greatly been reduced to where
10 they were almost non-existent last year.

11 If we don't continue -- if we continue with higher
12 prices maybe the 200 employees, which represent 200
13 families, they are also in danger of losing their jobs.

14 The additional cost of whey would be prohibitive
15 for us. We do not process dry whey, we don't have the
16 capacity or the volume to process it or to buy the highly
17 expensive equipment that is required. It costs us about
18 \$288,000 a year to ship our whey out of the plant to dispose
19 of it and it looks like this year is going to be a little
20 higher.

21 The only thing I can say is that maybe a more
22 reasonable approach to what the farmers are suffering, and
23 we are all suffering the same, is to maybe alleviate the
24 regulatory burden that is placed on all of us. Thank you.

25 MR. EASTMAN: I do have a question. Your verbal

1 testimony today mostly looks like it has deviated somewhat
2 from the text of your exhibit.

3 MR. SANCHEZ: Right, right.

4 MR. EASTMAN: Is there any emphasis or any focus
5 or points you would like to make regarding any of the points
6 that are found in your written testimony or are you just --
7 they are part of the record.

8 MR. SANCHEZ: They are part of the record.

9 MR. EASTMAN: Okay.

10 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you for your
11 testimony, Mr. Sanchez.

12 MR. SANCHEZ: You're welcome.

13 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Ms. Duarte.

14 MS. DUARTE: Thank you.

15 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Ms. Duarte, could you
16 please state your full name and spell your last name for the
17 record, please.

18 MS. DUARTE: Antoinette Duarte, A-N-T-O-I-N-E-T-T-
19 E, D-U-A-R-T-E.

20 Whereupon,

21 ANTOINETTE DUARTE

22 Was duly sworn.

23 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Do you have any written
24 statements or anything else you would like to be entered
25 into the record?

1 MS. DUARTE: Yes, and I will do it after, thank
2 you.

3 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Go ahead.

4 MS. DUARTE: Good afternoon, Hearing Officer, my
5 name is Antoinette Duarte. My son, who will turn 40 next
6 week, and I operate our dairy in Elk Grove. Our dairy is in
7 its forty-sixth year of operation.

8 I have had the opportunity to attend many of these
9 hearings and have given testimony of what has happened in
10 the last three and a half years. I was honored to present
11 testimony to the Ag Assembly Committee on May the 1st, 2013.

12 The financial devastation since then has gotten
13 worse and has caused many of the dairies to close or be
14 forced to be sold by the creditors and in many cases leaving
15 no monies to buy a home and then no place to find a job.
16 The qualifications of running a dairy do not guarantee a job
17 in the job market.

18 The question I would like to ask of this hearing
19 panel is, have you asked the men and women who visit the
20 dairies that participate in the Cost Analysis Program about
21 how the dairymen and -women are doing? How the cost
22 production and lack of dairy income to cover the costs is
23 affecting the dairies. I am confident that the response you
24 are going to get is that it is very difficult, each and
25 every time they visit the dairies. Many of the cost

1 analysis people have gone to participate on these dairies
2 for years and they see the stress that we are going through.
3 To try to keep our operations going is causing health issues
4 and difficult family situations. The inadequate milk income
5 to the California dairies in the three and a half years has
6 cost us millions of dollars in equity that is lost forever.

7 Yesterday my son and I met with our loan officer
8 for our biannual review. Each and every time we do this it
9 is difficult to stay positive about our industry. We do not
10 know what the feed prices will be this year until the grains
11 are in, the grains are harvested. Our corn stillage is
12 about to be harvested and the cost of having it chopped and
13 put in the pit is rising due to the fuel costs.

14 Where is all this money going to come from to pay
15 for the feeds that we desperately need for our cows? As we
16 were talking to our loan officer she went on to tell us 80
17 percent of the dairies that they financially carry are
18 feeding their cows with hay month to month, nobody is
19 stocking any hay this fall.

20 Our priority in operations is to keep the cows and
21 livestock well-fed, maintain our trucks, tractors and of
22 course the milk barn, so that we have no major breakdowns.
23 Anything else that has to be fixed or replaced is put on a
24 list. When it breaks we hope that it can be fixed without
25 having to be replacing. There is no monies available after

1 the feeds, labors and utilities, insurance and supplies are
2 paid. In our operation we can no longer afford any major
3 breakdowns.

4 My husband and I have always worked and saved to
5 try to make the right decisions so that we can pass on the
6 dairy to our son. Yes, we experienced the volatility like
7 so many others and, again, the last three years have been
8 brutal. Never did I ever think that we would be in so much
9 debt after all these years.

10 As I stated in the beginning of my testimony that
11 my son is going to be 40 years old next week. At one and a
12 half years old he was out helping me feed the calves. He
13 has chosen to work 16 hours a day now because he does not
14 want to hire any hired help. He is inheriting a larger debt
15 than when we started 46 years ago. The size of our
16 operation is the same. Yes, we are milking more cows but
17 what we have is all homegrown.

18 Each month I ask my son, well, are you ready to
19 put up the "for sale" sign? And his response is, not yet,
20 mom, let's keep going. I can manage the monthly decisions
21 of who is getting paid and how much. But the stress and the
22 toll that I see on my son every month is very difficult.

23 In our area three dairies have been sold since
24 March and those dairies are being torn down as of today and
25 grapes are being put in. We will not see any cows on those

1 operations ever.

2 I want to thank you very much for allowing me the
3 opportunity to give my personal testimony of our operation
4 and I believe I am speaking on behalf of many dairymen and
5 -women who have not taken the time to come today, not
6 because they -- because don't have the time, they have to
7 stay home and maintain their operations. Thank you.

8 MR. EASTMAN: I just have a couple of questions
9 regarding the dairy itself. About how many cows do you milk
10 and who do you ship to?

11 MS. DUARTE: We are now feeding 560 cows and we're
12 shipping to DFA.

13 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you, Ms. Duarte.

14 MS. DUARTE: Thank you.

15 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Ms. Duarte, do you have
16 that exhibit you'd like entered into the record?

17 MS. DUARTE: Post, I'll submit it post.

18 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Okay, thank you.

19 Mr. Hofferber. Mr. Hofferber, could you please
20 state your full name and spell your last name for the
21 record.

22 MR. HOFFERBER: Yes, I am Scott Hofferber, H-O-F-
23 F-E-R-B-E-R.

24 Whereupon,

25 SCOTT HOFFERBER

1 Was duly sworn.

2 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: And do you have any
3 written statements or anything else you would like entered
4 into the record?

5 MR. HOFFERBER: Nothing else, just that.

6 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: This will be marked as
7 Exhibit 55.

8 (Exhibit 55 was entered into the record.)

9 MR. HOFFERBER: Good morning, Hearing Officer and
10 members of the Hearing Panel. I am Scott Hofferber, the
11 Chief Financial Officer at Farmdale Creamery, and I am here
12 at the direction and on the authority of our Board of
13 Directors. Farmdale is a third-generation family-owned and
14 operated dairy processing facility in Southern California.
15 With about 86 employees, Farmdale is processing an average
16 24.2 million pounds of milk and cream per month, that's
17 about 100 loads a week, into cheese, sour cream, whey
18 protein concentrate-80 percent powder and buttermilk. We
19 are grateful for this opportunity to provide Farmdale's
20 perspective on the matters before the panel.

21 In accordance with the call of the hearing, I will
22 provide our testimony in response to each of the three
23 proposed amendments.

24 With respect to temporary price adjustment.
25 Article III, Section 300, Paragraph H, in its current form,

1 resulted from a hearing held just four months ago on May
2 20th. In the letter announcing the Department's decision,
3 Secretary Ross explained that, quote: "While the testimony
4 on the hearing record failed to provide economic data to
5 justify the industry's positions, the uncertainty of the
6 2013 corn crop, and questions about the stability of the
7 market recovery indicate this adjustment is appropriate."

8 Well the "uncertainty of the 2013 corn crop" has
9 certainly been alleviated with current and future corn
10 prices down to under \$5.00 a bushel. The market recovery
11 questions are also answered. Removal of Paragraph H is
12 appropriate and we support such action by the Department.
13 To leave Paragraph H in effect shifts its purpose away from
14 "emergency price relief" toward a recapitalization effect,
15 which we do not support.

16 Whey Valuation

17 We oppose the petition's adjustments to the whey
18 factor. The resulting increase in raw product costs will
19 cripple our ability to meet the covenants under the
20 financing arrangement developed to facilitate creation of
21 our WPC-80 powder plant.

22 With respect to Article III, Section 300,
23 Paragraphs E(1)(c), E(6) and E(9) of the Plans: What more
24 can we provide with respect to this topic that isn't already
25 included in our cumulative testimony to date, which we

1 incorporate herein by reference. And I mean cumulative, in
2 the last, say, eight hearings. At least certainly back to
3 2007. The petition takes yet another stab at unreasonably
4 extracting revenue from higher-valued-whey processing plants
5 without concern or regard for the consequences of this
6 approach on the smaller cheese plants in California, which
7 represent about 80 percent of all cheese plants and about 15
8 percent of the cheese milk.

9 The annual results of Farmdale's animal feed
10 popcorn whey processing over the last three years has gone
11 from break-even to a loss of nearly half a million dollars;
12 almost entirely resulting from the ever-increasing cost of
13 whey in cheese milk. It is unreasonable to expect small
14 cheese plants, unable to justify the investment in a higher-
15 valued whey processing facility, to suffer the consequences
16 of a perverted end-product pricing model that is based on a
17 higher-valued product.

18 Additionally, as a processor who has now risked
19 investment in a higher-valued-whey processing plant, we
20 cannot understand how producers imagine they're entitled to
21 extract most of the profit from such an enterprise, one for
22 which they have done nothing different than what they have
23 always been doing as long as cows' milk has been on the
24 menu.

25 A sliding scale construct would infer that the

1 strata of the scale would be represented over time, all
2 strata of the scale would be represented over time. But
3 only the top two tiers have been represented in the last
4 three years. If you're going to talk about the sliding
5 scale, which I don't think should be in there at all anyway,
6 it seems to me you need to extend the top of it instead of
7 just changing it to \$1.00 at the \$0.60 level. You need to
8 go up to \$1.00 instead of \$0.60 and put the \$1.00 in there.
9 I don't know, you need to expand the scale such that you're
10 representing an average tier rather than the top tiers all
11 the time. That's not in my written testimony but there you
12 have it.

13 We suggest the whey factor be restored to the
14 \$0.25/cwt as was implemented on December 1st, 2007 and let
15 negotiations between individual plants and their shippers
16 determine a price reflective of that plant's ability to move
17 the whey stream someplace; maybe into a marketplace or maybe
18 to a landfill.

19 And then we saw -- let's see. We heard testimony
20 earlier that the \$0.25 factor disconnected the price from
21 the market. I would suggest that a minimum price is never
22 disconnected from a market when a premium can be charged for
23 the milk. Sellers must take up this responsibility, not
24 expect the Department to do it for them.

25 Evidentiary Support and Legal Compliance

1 Smarter minds than ours will have to tackle the
2 issue relating to the legality of the whey factor. However,
3 it seems intuitively obvious that, with as many end-products
4 that exist in the whey processing arena, no cost study or
5 make allowance analysis can result in a fair and equitable
6 methodology.

7 And then the Task Force

8 Meanwhile, back at the ranch, the Dairy Future
9 Task Force continues to be our best hope for true reform to
10 our now ridiculously contentious business partnership. We
11 remain committed to the DFTF and encourage all stakeholders
12 to get on board with this process as soon as possible.

13 And then I had just a couple more comments. We
14 saw a slide earlier of the 2012 profitability indicating
15 Idaho being probably twice as profitable as any other market
16 in that presentation. It's worthy of note that Idaho is
17 unregulated.

18 And then last, the question came up earlier,
19 aren't there a lot of factors causing plant expansion not to
20 occur in California right now? And I liked the answer that
21 was given but I'll kind of restate it. And that is, if 4b
22 is sufficiently profitable, plants would be built. So to
23 negatively impact 4b now certainly cannot be an
24 encouragement to growth.

25 And that, with a request for a post-hearing brief,

1 if necessary.

2 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request for a post-
3 hearing brief is granted.

4 MR. HOFFERBER: Thank you. Yes, Hyrum?

5 MR. EASTMAN: I don't think I looked your way.

6 (Laughter.)

7 MR. HOFFERBER: That was a dead giveaway.

8 MR. EASTMAN: Oh I see, okay. In that case I'll
9 guess I'll ask you a question so you feel --

10 MR. HOFFERBER: So I feel --

11 MR. EASTMAN: -- like everybody else.

12 MR. HOFFERBER: So I feel complete.

13 MR. EASTMAN: Yeah, exactly. What do you -- I was
14 going to ask you to clarify your statement with regards to
15 -- I suppose you're making a statement about the construct
16 of the 4b formula. You mentioned that when it comes to whey
17 processing, no cost study or make allowance analysis would
18 be fair and equitable. Can you expand on that? What
19 exactly do you mean by that?

20 MR. HOFFERBER: Well, currently we've picked dry
21 -- dry sweet whey as the base product. But there's lots of
22 base products, including just taking it to the dump, that
23 exist, that don't return any value to the cheesemaker. So
24 what's saying that here with these kinds of increases in the
25 4b formula is they are actually trying to elevate it to,

1 say, the 80 powder product that we are now making. Or if
2 you make that the reference price it's going to even make
3 life much worse for the people who aren't making that.

4 We have long testified at these hearings that we
5 are like the biggest of the smalls, kind of a notion. Where
6 we have been forced into making the decision to do an 80
7 powder plant now just to stay in the cheese business.

8 That's my comment earlier about the loss on the animal feed.

9 The popcorn whey business going from a basically break even
10 in the year that we went from the \$0.25 factor to the \$0.65
11 factor, which was an average that year for us of about
12 \$0.39. Then we went to the \$0.65 cap to the \$0.75 cap. In
13 2013 we would lose \$477,000 if we continued into that -- in
14 that popcorn whey mode.

15 Seeing that coming we made the decision last
16 August to build this plant and try to stay in the cheese
17 business. And so then you get to my comment, now you're
18 going to -- with this you're going to suck everything out of
19 that and we're going to have to go to the bank now and say,
20 well, the rules changed. Now we get the 10 year payback or
21 a 12 year payback, whatever the numbers turn out to be. You
22 know, too bad. I mean, it's a business decision and we're
23 willing to live with it but we are certainly going to
24 advocate, you know, for something that stratifies the cost
25 of whey to more fit the product that's being made.

1 MR. MASUHARA: Scott, similar to the questions I
2 asked of a couple of the other processors. As far as the
3 negotiated agreement, did you actively participate?

4 MR. HOFFERBER: Only in receiving output. We
5 never directly spoke with producer lobbyists or
6 representatives or whatever. We, of course, testified at
7 the May 1 hearing with respect to the legislation that went
8 through. We were kept abreast all through time as to how
9 the progress was going. And what we understood at the end
10 of that was we had reached an agreeable set of language but
11 there was a piece of that language that dealt with economic
12 justification that the producer representatives removed from
13 the language and walked away from the negotiation.

14 MR. MASUHARA: So you never worked up a set of
15 numbers that you considered a range of numbers that --

16 MR. HOFFERBER: This was strictly a political
17 negotiation, as far as I was concerned. I wasn't part of
18 any kind of number crunching.

19 MR. MASUHARA: Okay, that's all I had.

20 MR. HOFFERBER: All right.

21 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you for your
22 testimony, Mr. Hofferber.

23 Mr. Ahlem. Mr. Ahlem, will you please state your
24 full name, and spell your last name for the record.

25 MR. AHLEM: David Ahlem, A-H-L-E-M.

1 Whereupon,

2 DAVID AHLEM

3 Was duly sworn.

4 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Do you have anything else
5 other than this written testimony you would like --

6 MR. AHLEM: That's plenty.

7 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Yours will be Exhibit
8 number 56.

9 (Exhibit 56 was received into evidence.)

10 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed.

11 MR. AHLEM: Thank you. Mr. Hearing Officer and
12 Members of the Panel.

13 My name is David Ahlem. I am the Vice President
14 and, General Manager for Hilmar Cheese Company. Hilmar
15 Cheese Company is a cheese and whey products manufacturer
16 with locations in California and Texas. In California,
17 Hilmar Cheese Company processes over 12 million pounds of
18 milk per day, more than 10 percent of the milk produced in
19 California, and purchases milk directly from over 200
20 dairies. Finished products are sold to over 50 countries
21 around the world.

22 Hilmar Cheese Company was formed by an innovative,
23 market-oriented group of Jersey dairymen who sought to
24 capture the full value of their high quality milk. They
25 founded the company on the ideal that producers should

1 receive a competitive market-driven price for their milk.

2 I am here today to represent Hilmar Cheese Company
3 and our dairy producer owners. Hilmar Cheese Company
4 opposes the petition from California Dairies, California
5 Dairy Campaign, Milk Producers Council and Western United
6 Dairymen. Hilmar Cheese Company supports a low regulated
7 minimum price that allows the market to efficiently set high
8 market-driven prices.

9 Economic Conditions Do Not Support Further
10 Emergency Price Relief

11 California milk supply and demand appear to be in
12 balance. Milk production has seasonally exceeded the
13 state's processing capacity the past several years. When
14 capacity was not available milk had to be shipped out of
15 state, sold to calf ranches or dumped. Milk buyers imposed
16 caps and base programs to help throttle supply. Recently,
17 milk production reports indicate that milk supply has
18 decreased 2.6 percent year over year. this decline has
19 brought us into better balance with the state's processing
20 capacity.

21 Our experience, as a company that pays producers
22 significant premiums over the regulated price, is that the
23 milk supply is reasonably stable and additional supplies are
24 available to those who are looking to grow and pay premiums.
25 Year-to-date, our same farm production is up more than one

1 percent year-over-year. We continue to have many more
2 producers on a wait list for permanent growth, and some milk
3 has been available on the spot market even through the warm
4 summer months.

5 The story in California and much of the country
6 the past several years is about consolidation, not
7 contraction. Although undoubtedly painful for those
8 affected, milk supply is transferring ownership with no
9 significant loss in production and cow numbers. This trend
10 is not unique in California. According to the Wisconsin
11 State Farmer, Wisconsin lost well over 600 operations in the
12 last year and typically loses an average of 400 farms
13 annually. Unfortunately, high feed costs have accelerated
14 the rate of consolidation across the nation in recent years.

15 Milk supply is expected to grow as producer
16 margins improve further. Crippling high feed costs are
17 finally on the decline, as indicated by corn's current and
18 futures market trends. Corn prices have fallen several
19 dollars a bushel and forecast to continue around the
20 \$5.00/bushel mark into 2014. As feed costs fall, producer
21 economics are improving; CDFA data shows income over feed
22 margins trending upwards, with the first quarter of 2013 at
23 \$6.17. Producer margins are expected to strengthen further
24 in the fourth quarter of 2013 and into 2014.

25 Unfortunately, California plant capacity has not

1 kept pace with supply. Although demand for cheese is
2 growing domestically and abroad, processing capacity in
3 California continues to decline amidst stable milk supplies.

4 California's latest plant closure is slated for this month
5 as Lactalis American Group relocates production from
6 Mozzarella Fresca in Tipton to their plant in the
7 unregulated state of Idaho. Lactalis has testified in past
8 years that future investment in California was unlikely due
9 to the state's regulatory atmosphere. This sentiment has
10 been echoed by many processor representatives over the past
11 several CDFA pricing hearings. California does not have
12 additional production capacity available to handle any
13 surplus milk. It is imperative that minimum regulated
14 prices are not set above market prices such that they
15 artificially encourage increases in supply.

16 Emergency Price Relief is Not Required to Address
17 Changes in Market Conditions.

18 The market can and will respond to changing market
19 conditions much more effectively than any intrusive
20 increases in the minimum regulated price. Nothing prevents
21 milk buyers from increasing their pay price when supplies
22 tighten. There have been several examples of milk buyers
23 increasing their pay price in the past year as a response to
24 changing market conditions. In October of 2012, Hilmar
25 Cheese Company increased our pay prices in anticipation of

1 the milk supply tightening. We have also heard of another
2 cheese processor doing the same. This summer there were
3 reports of one large cooperative offering significant over
4 order premiums for milk to fill seasonal gaps in supply.
5 These illustrations demonstrate that the market can and will
6 change if supply conditions are threatened. Price
7 corrections through market-driven premiums are more
8 effective than regulated price increases because they are
9 supported by market demand and therefore sustainable.

10 Eighty percent of the milk in California is
11 controlled by cooperatives that regularly negotiate supply
12 agreements with buyers of 4b milk. This is the proper place
13 for price discussions to take place. Instead of going to
14 the marketplace and asking their customers, cheese
15 processors and others, for a higher price, these
16 cooperatives have chosen to delegate this responsibility to
17 the California Department of Food and Agriculture. This is
18 not the intended function of the regulatory system. The
19 regulated minimum price should be a market clearing price,
20 not a market making price. If allowed to function, the
21 marketplace will drive premiums and establish a value for
22 milk above and beyond the regulated price.

23 Minimum Price Increases Redistribute Revenue and
24 Disconnect Producers from the Marketplace

25 Not all dairy producers benefit when the minimum

1 price is increased. Increases in the minimum price do not
2 mean increases in take-home pay for all dairy processors --
3 dairy producers, excuse me. In fact, those who received
4 over order premiums will actually see a decrease in their
5 pay when minimum price increases as the premiums are
6 redistributed through the pool. Increases in the minimum
7 price redistribute revenue and disconnect producers from the
8 marketplace. So that is our example, as the minimum price
9 goes up the premiums that we have paid, which we have paid
10 significant premiums since our inception, become
11 redistributed through the pool.

12 Comparing Class III to 4b Is Like Comparing Apples
13 to Oranges

14 For over seven years, California has debated the
15 whey valuation in the 4b formula. At the heart of this
16 debate is an inappropriate 4b/Class III comparison.
17 Producer organizations have led their constituents to
18 believe that these two pricing mechanisms should be equal.
19 As a processor that operates in both California and federal
20 order environments, I can tell you that they are wrong.
21 Class 4b and Class III are not the same, nor should they be
22 the same.

23 First, California market conditions are different.
24 Our supply and demand structure is such that California is
25 chasing plant capacity while Wisconsin plants are chasing

1 milk. This fundamental economic situation contributes
2 greatly to the premiums paid to Midwest producers.

3 Secondly, California processors' costs are greater
4 and must move product further to market. California plants
5 cost more to build and operate. We are also at a cost
6 disadvantage to our Midwestern competitors as it relates to
7 proximity to domestic markets. Hilmar Cheese Company
8 regularly moves -- moves the majority of our cheese
9 production east. It currently costs about \$0.08-\$0.11/lb
10 cheese to move it into the Midwest. That equates to about
11 -- around \$1/cwt. It's really \$0.80 to \$1.00/cwt. We must
12 be able to price this cheese competitively to remain in
13 these markets.

14 The third and most significant difference is that
15 paying the regulated minimum price is optional for
16 cheesemakers in Federal Milk Marketing Orders. The Federal
17 Milk Marketing Orders have a mechanism for pricing pool milk
18 below regulated minimums to clear the market when needed.
19 Through diversions to non-pool plants, all of our primary
20 competitors either operate outside of the regulated
21 environment, Idaho/Oceania, or have the opportunity to opt
22 out of the pool, like New Mexico and Wisconsin. This means
23 that cheese milk is oftentimes sold for less or purchased
24 for less than Class III in order to move milk during periods
25 of oversupply. Hilmar Cheese Company regularly buys milk at

1 below Class III prices.

2 Fourth, the debate assumes that Class III is a
3 good, sound way to value cheese milk and value whey. But
4 processors in Federal Orders have also expressed concern
5 with the nature of the Class III formula. As evidenced by
6 the recent closing of Penn Cheese Corporation in
7 Pennsylvania, cheese plants in regulated systems without
8 whey concentration equipment struggle regardless of the
9 state in which they operate. This is also true in
10 Wisconsin, where several years ago it was said that one-
11 third of the cheese plants were swimming in red ink on the
12 other solids price. That was a statement by John Umhoefer
13 of the Wisconsin Cheese Makers Association.

14 In the end, formulas do not generate revenue.
15 They simply determine how revenue is divided up. The
16 solution to our problems is not to move to Class III or to
17 the Federal Order because the Federal Order does not
18 guarantee producers additional revenue. One only has to
19 compare the California mailbox price with mailbox prices in
20 other regions with Federal Orders. There are regions of the
21 country like New Mexico, which have a much higher percentage
22 of Class 1 milk than California, where mailbox prices are
23 very similar to California. At the end of the day, supply
24 and demand conditions drive mailbox milk values even in
25 Federal Orders. Quite frankly, our industry is asking the

1 wrong question. Instead of asking which of the two existing
2 regulatory systems are best, we should ask what environment
3 creates the most opportunity for all industry participants
4 to thrive. Our industry needs to focus on answering that
5 question. Until we do this we will continue to get the same
6 poor results.

7 The Current Construct of the 4b Whey Formula is
8 Insufficient and unsustainable

9 While there are many differences between the
10 Federal Order Class III and the California Class 4b prices,
11 there is one major defect they share, they both have
12 deficient means for valuing dry whey. Dry whey does not
13 have a liquid cash market for price discovery. Its quoted
14 market is based on a phone survey, which lacks transparency
15 and tends to lend itself to the potential for misreporting.

16 Whey valuation is problematic because the cost of
17 production information is not available and auditable. As
18 the industry continues to consolidate and diversify, there
19 are not a sufficient number of plants that cost of
20 production can be publicly reported without reaching --
21 without risking breaches in confidentiality. Out of the
22 dozens of whey plants in California, we believe only two
23 actually produce dry whey and their costs are not available.

24 The state, therefore, does not have adequate information to
25 properly construct end-product pricing formulas.

1 Further, a disparity exists for most processors
2 because they do not make dry whey. There are multiple
3 categories of value-added whey and valuing based upon dry
4 whey is inapplicable to most processors. For example, a
5 comparison of whey markets over the past five years shows
6 that the income stream for whey protein concentrate based
7 products is not keeping up with the benchmark milk fueled by
8 escalating dry whey markets. Whey products are not all the
9 same and do not move in tandem. Processors are required to
10 pay a minimum price that is not tied to the products which
11 they produce.

12 Processors agree that the data available for dry
13 whey is lacking, but selecting another whey product is not
14 without flaws. Hilmar Cheese Company produces over half a
15 dozen different whey products. In addition, we make
16 specific products for specific customers, which require
17 large investments in equipment and personnel. But even the
18 most basic form of processed whey requires considerable
19 funds that some smaller processors cannot afford.

20 Moreover, the use of value-added products should
21 not be attempted in minimum pricing formulas. As John
22 Umhoefer described in his Cheese Market editorial on January
23 6, 2012. The baseline product we should be using is skimmed
24 wet whey. "Whey that has been skimmed, cooled, transported
25 and run through a million-dollar dryer is not a base

1 commodity and has no place in a basic milk price formula."

2 Pooling and End Product Pricing Do Not Benefit

3 Dairy Producers

4 Pooling and end product pricing formulas
5 disconnect producers from the marketplace signals.
6 Increasing the regulated price will effectively pool premium
7 dollars being paid by handlers, putting further distance
8 between the marketplace and the price signals a producer
9 receives. This inhibits our ability to send price signals
10 directly to dairymen to produce the type of milk the
11 marketplace demands. It also slows down a producer's
12 response to demand changes, thereby increasing periods of
13 low prices. At its extreme, over-inflated minimum prices
14 could tell a Jersey dairyman there is no difference in
15 shipping his milk to a bottler or a powder plant or a cheese
16 plant, yet we all know the best and highest use for this
17 type of milk is in cheese.

18 End product pricing formulas force producers to
19 bear all the market risk while making it more difficult to
20 hedge that risk. With make allowances imbedded in pricing
21 formulas generating high minimum prices, risk-averse
22 processors have learned to operate within that set margin,
23 regardless of market direction. Producers are not afforded
24 that same luxury and are vulnerable to price volatility.

25 End product pricing formulas are already a

1 hindrance to innovation and new product development.
2 Increasing minimum prices will stifle innovation and new
3 product development even further, resulting in missed
4 opportunities for demand growth. These formulas discourage
5 processors from producing new products by introducing
6 considerable risk when the price of the products a processor
7 makes deviate from the products used to set the regulated
8 price.

9 End-product prices are unable to keep up with our
10 ever-changing global marketplace. As soon as these formulas
11 are put into place they are outdated. Export customers
12 expect to negotiate contracts for set periods into the
13 future. By the time prices are calculated using historical
14 numbers, they are no longer applicable and this can be
15 extremely detrimental.

16 End-product price formulas also lead to
17 contentious debates over value sharing that do not
18 contribute to sustainable increases in the value of milk.
19 Any change creates winners and losers. It directs the
20 industry's focus to formulas, not customers. In the end we
21 simply fight about how to divide up the pie, rather than
22 grow the pie for all.

23 Pooling subsidizes the purchase of milk for low
24 value dairy products and does not force all market
25 participants to compete. As long as we have pooling and

1 classified pricing in California those who process milk will
2 not have to compete for milk based on the value they create,
3 they can use the revenue from others via the pool to pay for
4 their milk. And that is bad for dairymen. The solution is
5 not to make others pay more into the pool, the solution is
6 to deconstruct the system and force all processors or buyers
7 of milk to compete for that milk.

8 Hilmar Cheese Company is not asking the system for
9 financial support, as some are. We are ready and willing to
10 compete for milk in a market-driven environment, but today
11 that is not an option in California. In the end, the dairy
12 industry needs to reform our pricing system and force all
13 milk buyers to focus on growing the value of milk, not work
14 the system. This is the only way to sustainably grow the
15 value of milk and increase producer pay prices.

16 Regulatory Uncertainty Impedes Investment

17 In the past ten years, we have had 20 milk price
18 hearings, not including the hearing we are in the middle of
19 today. Each of those hearings have significantly impacted
20 the margins and the returns for all processors and
21 producers. As individual companies consider long-term
22 investments that require massive amounts of capital, these
23 frequently changing regulatory environments discourage
24 investment by creating uncertainty. I would say this for
25 both parties, producers and processors. This regulatory

1 uncertainty paralyzes the industry and increases the risk of
2 new investment and continues to drive investment to other
3 regions. It's time we introduce some stability into our
4 pricing environment and allow market signals to drive
5 investment decisions.

6 The Solution

7 As a producer-owned company, Hilmar Cheese Company
8 supports the efforts to increase the value of milk. We
9 believe this requires moving to a more market-oriented
10 approach. This strategy has also been suggested by producer
11 funded, third-party studies. Both the McKinsey Report and
12 the Innovation Center Report on Globalization concluded that
13 there is tremendous opportunity for California and the US in
14 the global marketplace. However, they both suggested that
15 the industry adopt market-oriented policy initiatives and
16 pricing reform. Both warned that failure to do so might
17 compromise our competitive position long-term.

18 Our problem is not that our industry has been
19 focused -- our problem is that our industry has been focused
20 on the system, not the customer. As a result, many of the
21 state's production assets are not configured to take
22 advantage of high value global opportunities that exist. We
23 must turn our focus away from the system and focus on the
24 customer. If we do not, we will get more of the same poor
25 results. The whey factor debate is a symptom of a much

1 larger problem and a simple adjustment in the whey factor
2 will not solve our problems long-term. As long as we remain
3 entrenched in formula pricing, we will continue to have
4 contentious debates around value sharing, producers will
5 continue to bear all the market risk and our industry focus
6 will be on the system, not the customer. Let us redirect
7 our efforts in support of the California dairy task force as
8 they collaborate towards long-term, sustainable solutions.

9 Our global competitors are moving in that
10 direction. In order to take advantage of international
11 growth opportunities we must follow the lead of other
12 countries such as New Zealand and the European Union.
13 Dairy men in New Zealand operate in an unregulated market,
14 yet they are often paid more than those in regulated areas.

15 Just last month, Fonterra announced another increase to its
16 Forecast Farmgate Milk Prices for the 2014 season in
17 response to strong international dairy prices. In the
18 European Union, processors are expanding capacity in lower
19 cost regions in expectations of increased milk production
20 when the restrictive quota system is eliminated. These
21 processors are likely to emerge as formidable international
22 competitors, according to USCED. We too must change or risk
23 being left behind.

24 On behalf of Hilmar Cheese and its producer-owners
25 I urge the state to reject the petition from California

1 Dairies, Inc., California Dairy Campaign, Milk Producers
2 Council and Western United Dairymen. In view of the very
3 recent changes to the whey factor, the misplaced comparison
4 of 4b with Class III, and the serious insufficiencies in the
5 whey calculation, and improving economic conditions, now is
6 not the time to further distort market signals by increasing
7 the minimum regulated price. The proposed increase in the
8 regulated minimum 4b price is a step in the wrong direction
9 for both processors and producers. Now is the time to
10 embrace a more market-oriented approach and work together to
11 capture the opportunity that exists in our global
12 marketplace.

13 Thank you for your time and consideration and I
14 would like to request the opportunity to file a post-hearing
15 brief, if necessary. I would be happy to answer questions.

16 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request to file a
17 post-hearing brief is granted.

18 We'll take questions from the panel.

19 MR. EASTMAN: I have a couple of questions on the
20 appendices of your testimony.

21 MR. AHLEM: Yes. Yes.

22 MR. EASTMAN: Graph number 2, I assume the source
23 of that information, is that the CDFA Cost of Production
24 Survey or is that some other source?

25 MR. AHLEM: No, that's the CDFA, yes.

1 MR. EASTMAN: When it comes to Graph 3.

2 MR. AHLEM: Yes, the capacity.

3 MR. EASTMAN: I see that the milk production is
4 pretty straightforward. How did -- I'm sorry.

5 How did you construct the effective plant capacity
6 type line there?

7 MR. AHLEM: That's been -- that's been a -- this
8 is a chart we've used and it's been used in past testimony,
9 actually between both us and Dairy Institute, and Bill
10 Schiek can speak to this as well when he's here. But
11 generally at a point in time where there was kind of a known
12 balance in the state of capacity and milk supply, we kind of
13 tracked all the closures from there. So it is our
14 estimation of where the effective capacity is that we have
15 been tracking over the years, compared against daily milk
16 production as reported by the state.

17 MR. EASTMAN: So in essence its just a comparison
18 of the amount of milk at one point in time the state was
19 able to handle.

20 MR. AHLEM: That is correct.

21 MR. EASTMAN: From there it either went up or down
22 based on closures.

23 MR. AHLEM: And it's our best guess at a
24 reflection of capacity based on what has been publicly
25 reported in terms of plant closures or openings.

1 MR. EASTMAN: I may have another question, I need
2 to look here for a second.

3 MR. MASUHARA: David, much as I have asked
4 everybody before, as far as any negotiated numbers that came
5 up with -- the petitioners' numbers, did you participate in
6 that? And if you did, was there any analysis on your part
7 to support those numbers or any level other than those
8 numbers?

9 MR. AHLEM: Like some of the others have said, I'm
10 a Dairy Institute member. I wasn't directly involved in the
11 negotiation. There was a negotiation but there was no deal.
12 But there was -- I wouldn't say, to my knowledge, any
13 quantitative analysis or rationale behind some of the
14 formulations, I think it was -- it was in a political
15 context.

16 MR. MASUHARA: Okay. And I had another question.
17 On page four you make mention of a comparison to the
18 difference in increases fueled by dry whey markets versus
19 WPC. Do you know of any reliable source of WPC sales
20 information that's traded widely enough to be reportable or
21 is it purely anecdotal?

22 MR. AHLEM: That was just -- that was gathering
23 data from the survey prices reported by the USDA.

24 MR. MASUHARA: That's the USDA survey price?

25 MR. AHLEM: Yes, yes.

1 MR. MASUHARA: So it captures --

2 MR. AHLEM: They have a broad category. I think
3 it's 34 to 79 percent or 34 to 50. Some others could
4 probably correct me on that.

5 MR. MASUHARA: Okay. But it reflects sales in
6 that category fairly accurately then?

7 MR. AHLEM: It's a survey.

8 MR. MASUHARA: Well, I mean, as accurately as a
9 survey can capture it then, leave it at that.

10 MR. AHLEM: It's probably the only public number
11 I'm aware of, but that's where that data was driven.

12 MR. MASUHARA: Okay, thanks. That's all I have.

13 MS. GATES: David, I just have one question. On
14 page four of your testimony you had spoken to at your Texas
15 plant you, on a regular basis, purchase milk below minimum
16 Class III prices. Could you kind of further define what
17 regular basis means.

18 MR. AHLEM: I mean, that could be ongoing.
19 There's been -- at times there have been annual agreements
20 that are on that basis, sometimes a spot. There are years
21 and market conditions where it could be above and it can be
22 below, it can be both, but it's not unheard of. So it can
23 -- and it can transpire on more than just a spot basis.

24 MS. GATES: Okay, thank you.

25 MR. EASTMAN: I have a couple of other questions,

1 piggy-backing on what Candace just asked. Are there other
2 handlers or plants around your Texas plant that also operate
3 in a similar fashion where they're taking in minimum price
4 milk?

5 MR. AHLEM: I wouldn't know what they're
6 purchasing milk for.

7 MR. EASTMAN: Say that again.

8 MR. AHLEM: There are other handlers and buyers of
9 milk but I am not aware of what they are buying milk for.

10 MR. EASTMAN: And then on page three of your
11 testimony you talk about transportation costs to move cheese
12 to the Midwest.

13 MR. AHLEM: Yes.

14 MR. EASTMAN: That can vary, I assume, The range
15 in cost, is that based on diesel prices or is it based on
16 the location where you're shipping?

17 MR. AHLEM: Correct.

18 MR. EASTMAN: We know you have a plant in
19 California and one in Texas.

20 MR. AHLEM: That's based on -- so that's a current
21 snapshot of reflective diesel costs of transportation to get
22 cheese from Hilmar to the Midwest specifically. So it's
23 more -- if we go east to the East Coast it's a larger
24 number, if we go, you know, to the mountain range that's a
25 smaller number. And that number has grown over time. I

1 probably -- if I were to report that seven or eight years
2 ago it was probably half of that. The transportation
3 numbers have grown over time.

4 MR. EASTMAN: And so the shipping point, though,
5 is that in California, is it in Texas --

6 MR. AHLEM: No.

7 MR. EASTMAN: -- is it a storage facility?

8 MR. AHLEM: The number I used here was in
9 California. So it's less shipping from Texas to the
10 Midwest, which means we have more available milk.

11 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you for your
12 testimony, Mr. Ahlem.

13 MR. AHLEM: Thank you.

14 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: We are going to now
15 deviate off our normal script. Senator Galgiani is here to
16 make a statement.

17 SENATOR GALGIANI: Thank you, Mr. Chair, and
18 members; I am here as the Chair of the Senate Agriculture
19 Committee. And I wanted to make clear that after months and
20 months of discussion between dairy farmers and milk
21 processors they reached a historic agreement on the last day
22 before we were leaving for break.

23 I called an emergency hearing of the Senate
24 Agriculture Committee. That emergency hearing required rule
25 waivers from the entire body to be able to hold the hearing

1 after the deadline; and we did so because of the agreement
2 that was reached between the producers and the processors.
3 We had that bill held in our Agriculture Committee that day.

4 I had two members from the Agriculture Committee flown back
5 from Southern California to be present to vote on the deal,
6 which was contained in AB 1038.

7 As part of this deal there was a short-term fix
8 that included \$110 million in new money that cheese
9 processors would pay into the milk pool to be shared by
10 dairy farmers. This additional money would come from
11 increasing the price of 4b milk by \$0.46 cents and by
12 modification of the whey formula.

13 Furthermore, in the legislation there was
14 contained an element that allowed for the task force to
15 continue working. Being sensitive to this issue and both
16 sides of the issue it was important, in our view, that the
17 agreement that was reached be a temporary agreement and that
18 both sides be allowed to continue with the Secretary and
19 others within this task force process to come up with
20 recommendations to be given to the Legislature for further
21 consideration for some permanent future changes to the milk
22 pricing structure.

23 I will be submitting my comments in writing to
24 this body and I thank you for considering this. And once
25 again, the purpose of my being here today is to set the

1 record straight and make it clear that the purpose of our
2 hearing and the purpose of the legislation was to codify the
3 fact that a deal had been reached. Thank you.

4 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you.

5 Now folks from the Dairy Institute. Mr. Schiek,
6 could you please state your full name and spell your last
7 name for the record.

8 DR. SCHIEK: Yes, my name is William Schiek, S-C-
9 H-I-E-K.

10 Whereupon,

11 WILLIAM SCHIEK

12 Was duly sworn.

13 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You have six documents
14 here that we will mark as Exhibit 57.

15 (Exhibit 57 was entered into the record.)

16 MR. SCHIEK: Okay.

17 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Mr. Lemmon.

18 MR. LEMMON: Yes.

19 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Could you state your full
20 name and spell your last name for the record.

21 MR. LEMMON: Sure. John Lemmon, the last name is
22 L-E-M-M-O-N.

23 Whereupon,

24 JOHN LEMMON

25 Was duly sworn.

1 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: And you have one document
2 that will be marked as Exhibit number 58.

3 (Exhibit 58 was entered into the record.)

4 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Mr. Schiek, you may
5 proceed.

6 DR. SCHIEK: Mr. Hearing Officer and members of
7 the Hearing Panel:

8 My name is William Schiek and I am Economist for
9 Dairy Institute of California and I am testifying on the
10 Institute's behalf. With me today is John Lemmon, General
11 Counsel for Dairy Institute, who will address the legal
12 foundation for the whey factor as noticed in the call of the
13 hearing.

14 Dairy Institute is a trade association
15 representing 30 dairy companies which process approximately
16 75 percent of the fluid milk, cultured and frozen dairy
17 products, over 85 percent of the cheese products and a small
18 percentage of the butter in the state. Member firms operate
19 in both marketing areas and the position presented at this
20 hearing was approved and adopted unanimously by Dairy
21 Institute's Board of Directors.

22 Dairy Institute appreciates the opportunity to
23 testify at this hearing where proposed changes to both the
24 temporary price increases that were implemented on January
25 (sic) 1st, 2013 and the sliding scale whey factor that is a

1 part of the Class 4b formula will be considered. While
2 prices for milk and some dairy commodities have decreased
3 from their spring highs seen in April and May, they are now
4 rebounding. And in the first seven months of 2013, dairymen
5 received \$420 million more in the pool than last year. At
6 the same time the price of corn is beginning to decline from
7 levels seen last year and earlier in 2013, and this trend is
8 expected to continue and intensify in the coming months. As
9 a result of these changes, dairy farm margins are expected
10 to improve substantially. At present, the state's milk
11 supply is in fairly good balance relative to demand. During
12 this summer's heat spells, there have been periods where one
13 or more buyers have been short of procuring all the milk
14 components that they would like and have responded by going
15 into the market and offering premiums to secure additional
16 supplies. However, as the heat abated, no chronic shortage
17 of milk or milk components has been reported. Milk
18 processing capacity is not being stressed at present and
19 milk supplies are being handled adequately within the state,
20 a far cry from the situation seen during the first half of
21 2012. Based on the current economic conditions in the dairy
22 industry, and the prospect for continued improvement in
23 dairy farm margins, we do not believe additional price
24 increases or changes to temporary price relief such as those
25 proposed by the petitioners are warranted.

1 In the state's Food and Agricultural Code, the
2 legislature has declared that the production and marketing
3 of milk is a business affected with a public interest. In
4 defining how the public interest is to be served, the
5 legislature has made numerous declarations as to its intent.

6 Section 61802(e) of the Food and Ag Code reads: "It is the
7 policy of the state to foster the intelligent production and
8 orderly marketing of milk." Therefore, pricing decisions by
9 the Secretary that seek to discourage disorder marketing are
10 reasonable, even if they result in prices for milk used in
11 manufactured products that appear to be out of synch with
12 regulated prices that exist in other parts of the country.

13 The bottom line here is that regulated prices must
14 be set low enough to ensure that markets clear in order to
15 maintain orderly marketing for milk. Setting regulated
16 prices in the state at levels that are too high for
17 California markets to clear locally, that is within the
18 state, are contrary to the legislature's stated policy of
19 fostering intelligent production and orderly marketing. A
20 more detailed discussion of these issues is presented in
21 Appendix A.

22 Additional Price Increases are Not Warranted by
23 Economic Conditions

24 The producers' petition would result in a net
25 increase in pool prices from levels generated by the current

1 formulas. Economic conditions simply do not support
2 additional price increases at this time. Futures prices
3 suggest that dairy farm margins will be better than those
4 seen in the first half of 2013 for at least the next six
5 months. For this reason, it is not advisable for CDFA to
6 raise minimum price levels further. Stronger farm level
7 margins are expected to lead to increased milk output and
8 some testing of the state's plant capacity limitations.
9 Current marketing conditions are discussed in more detail in
10 our Appendix B.

11 Redirecting Temporary Price Relief Solely to Class
12 4b is Without Economic Justification

13 The Petitioners' proposal to place all temporary
14 price relief solely on Class 4b is without justifiable
15 economic foundation and is not warranted by current economic
16 conditions. The rationale for the petitioners' proposal is
17 built on the notion that Class 4b is underpaying relative to
18 other classes or in comparison to other regions of the
19 country. This notion is incorrect. Class 4b prices are
20 lower than Class III prices for the reason that milk for
21 making cheese has an inherent lower economic value in
22 California than milk on other areas. This topic is
23 discussed in more detail in Appendix C.

24 But the factors that lead to a lower California
25 cheese milk value are as follows:

1 First, milk for cheese making has a lower location
2 value in California when compared to other regions. In
3 order to market all of the products made from the milk that
4 dairymen produce, products must be sold in markets that are
5 increasingly more distant from the state. To be
6 competitive, California plants must ship product across the
7 country at a landed cost that is competitive with the order
8 prices that are paid by plants in the distant market. When
9 the cost of moving product to more distant markets is
10 considered, the current 4b pricing formula does not appear
11 to be undervaluing milk for cheese making.

12 California is a more expensive place to do
13 business than other states. This business cost difference
14 lowers what a plant is willing to pay for milk in order to
15 profitably make and market dairy products.

16 Third, farm level costs of production are
17 generally lower in California than the rest of the country.

18 And lower milk production cost leads to dairy farm
19 expansions and more abundant supplies, which lowers the
20 value of milk in the state over time.

21 California's expanding milk supply has collided
22 with inadequate processing capacity in the state on numerous
23 occasions, leading to disorderly marketing conditions and
24 diminishing the value of milk even further.

25 Differences in the applicability of minimum

1 pricing between California and the Federal Milk Marketing
2 Orders necessitate that the California regulated prices be
3 true minimum prices, while the same is not as crucial under
4 federal regulations. In the federal orders, milk that is
5 not pooled is not subject to minimum pricing under -- in
6 other words, under the Order. In other words, the regulated
7 price is optional. In California, on the other hand, all
8 Grade A milk must be paid the established state minimum
9 price regardless of its pool status. In other words, the
10 regulated price is mandatory. If the price is set too high,
11 plants will be put out of business and dairymen lose markets
12 for their milk. When milk supply exceeds demand, milk must
13 move out of the state to find processing homes instead of
14 being able to clear locally. To ensure orderly marketing,
15 California regulated prices for manufactured milk must be
16 set at levels that clear the market.

17 Additional Changes to the Whey Scale Are Not
18 Supportable

19 The inclusion of the whey factor in the Class 4b
20 price formula has been problematic from its inception.
21 These problems stem chiefly from the inherent difficulty,
22 even the impossibility, of fairly attributing whey revenue
23 and margins that are representative of what is achieved by
24 all cheesemakers. It has been noted at prior hearings that
25 the variety of whey products produced, the lack of a

1 reference product that accurately represents whey revenues
2 and costs achieved by all plants in the state, and the
3 stubborn fact that the majority of cheese plants in the
4 state do not have the ability to process their whey into
5 revenue-generating products creates an intractable policy
6 dilemma with respect to whey. This issue is discussed in
7 full detail in Appendix D.

8 At past hearings, some have tried to argue that
9 the dry whey price represents a minimum that is achievable
10 by cheese plants and therefore it can be used in the pricing
11 formula as plants making other products are undoubtedly
12 earning even more than for dry whey. The problem with this
13 argument is that it has been unsupported by any credible
14 evidence and was actually refuted by an analysis done by
15 CDFA as part of the Whey Review Committee in 2008 that
16 examined the relative values of dry and whey protein
17 concentrate-34 percent over time. The problem of
18 representing whey in a milk pricing formula is further
19 compounded by the large number of products that are
20 produced. One California cheesemaker notes that it has over
21 150 whey protein formulations available for customers,
22 illustrating that trying to capture the value of whey to a
23 cheesemaker in a pricing formula is a practical
24 impossibility.

25 The preceding discussion, of course, fails to

1 identify the obvious problem that no reference product can
2 accurately represent whey revenues to cheesemakers that do
3 not process their whey. According to CDFA data presented at
4 the prehearing workshop in advance of the May 31-June 1,
5 2012 hearing, only 11 of the state's 57 cheese plants
6 actually process whey. The other 46 plants do not process
7 whey and that number includes some of the state's larger
8 plants. For plants that do not obtain revenue from the whey
9 they produce as a byproduct of cheesemaking, any product
10 that imputes a positive revenue contribution from whey would
11 not accurately represent the situation of those plants.

12 But what are the policy implications? First, if
13 regulators impose a whey end-product formula on cheese
14 plants, it will over-value milk to some cheesemakers, drive
15 them out of business and lead to disorderly marketing
16 conditions, especially if there is inadequate plant
17 capacity. Second, even in federal orders where the ability
18 exists for plants to pay less than the minimum price,
19 overvaluation leads to financial stress on plants. Finally,
20 any valuation of whey in a regulated milk pricing formula
21 runs the risk of overvaluing milk in the market and leading
22 to disorderly marketing conditions if it results in cheese
23 plants being unable to operate profitably. Ad hoc formulas,
24 such as the whey scale currently employed, are as flawed as
25 end-product ones because they are constructed arbitrarily

1 without reference to the revenues that regulated plants
2 actually achieve from whey.

3 Consolidation of plants has led to less publicly
4 available data with which to design or amend end-product
5 pricing formulas under the current system. In 2003 there
6 were four dry whey plants in the state that CDFA could use
7 in its dry whey manufacturing cost survey. Today there is
8 only one plant in the state that consistently produces dry
9 whey and the data cannot be reported for confidentiality
10 reasons. From the perspective of generating representative
11 information, the Department currently has no rational basis
12 for determining manufacturing costs for dry whey in
13 California or for relating them to the broader spectrum of
14 whey processing in the state.

15 The same problem plagues the determination of whey
16 revenues. The Department does not have an ongoing, public,
17 California-based whey price series. It is not known how
18 closely the Dairy Market News western dry whey prices that
19 are currently used relate to prices received for dry whey by
20 California cheese plants. A similar problem would exist
21 when attempting to use data for other whey products in light
22 of the diversity of the industry's product mix, the lack of
23 a representative reference product and the dearth of public
24 price and cost data. CDFA would be unable to establish a
25 rational basis for a whey factor derived from alternative

1 whey products.

2 The lack of California data might led some to
3 suggest that CDFA simply adapt or modify cost, price and
4 yield data or other factors from the federal formulas or
5 from federal plants as a substitute. In order for such an
6 approach to even be considered there would need to be
7 substantive evidence to show that the federal data is or can
8 reasonably be adapted so that it is broadly representative
9 of plant operations and product prices in California. The
10 Department's attempts in the past to use federal Class III
11 prices as a basis from which to extrapolate the whey factor
12 and incorporate it into the California 4b prices has been
13 both inaccurate and unreliable.

14 In 2003, the Department added a whey factor to the
15 Class 4b price formula. Since an audited manufacturing cost
16 study for whey powder was not available at the time, CDFA
17 relied on testimony from the hearing in 2003 to set
18 manufacturing cost allowances. The evidence and testimony
19 presented at the hearing was largely based on materials
20 presented during previous federal hearings or drawn from
21 budgeted financial information. Though the use of such data
22 caused the hearing panel great concern, the Department
23 nevertheless set the dry whey manufacturing cost allowance
24 at \$0.02 higher than the allowance for nonfat dry milk.
25 This was the methodology employed initially by USDA in

1 establishing the dry whey make allowance used in the federal
2 orders. In 2004, when the results of CDFA's skim whey
3 powder processing cost survey became available, they showed
4 that the 2003 manufacturing cost allowance was actually
5 \$0.09 below the average costs incurred by California plants
6 that were processing dry skim whey. California handlers
7 were massively overpaying for Class 4b milk.

8 Due to the lack of credible and representative
9 means to accurately represent the value of whey to
10 cheesemakers across the state, and for all the other
11 aforementioned reasons in this testimony, Dairy Institute
12 does not believe that additional changes to the whey scale
13 as proposed by the petitioners are advisable or warranted by
14 current industry or economic and structural conditions. We
15 do not support their adoption.

16 Rather, in our view, it is essential that the
17 California dairy industry transition to a new method of
18 determining milk prices that will enable both processors and
19 producers to realize greater profitability. Dairy Institute
20 believes that the work of the Dairy Future Task Force is
21 crucial and we continue to support its efforts. Finally,
22 there have been several newspaper articles in statements
23 today about the industry negotiations surround AB 1038. We
24 have set forth the facts surrounding those negotiations in
25 Appendix E. Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

1 Mr. John Lemmon will now address the legal foundation of the
2 whey factor in the Class 4b formula. After his testimony we
3 will be happy to answer questions from the panel and we will
4 also be requesting an opportunity to file a post-hearing
5 brief.

6 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request for a post-
7 hearing brief is granted.

8 Mr. Lemmon, will you continue.

9 MR. LEMMON: Yes, thank you. Good afternoon,
10 Mr. Hearing Officer and members of the Hearing Panel.

11 My name is John Lemmon, I serve as General Counsel
12 to Dairy Institute of California.

13 As the testimony by Dr. Schiek has shown, the
14 evidentiary record in this hearing will not support an
15 increase in Class 4b milk pricing based on an adjustment to
16 the whey factor. As a matter of both law and common sense,
17 the record fails to support even the continuation of the
18 current whey factor in Class 4b pricing.

19 Dr. Schiek's testimony highlights five important
20 issues:

21 First, the adoption of a whey factor based on the
22 pricing, make allowance and yield of dry skimmed whey is
23 irrational in light of the many other end uses for whey in
24 today's market.

25 Second, the inclusion of a whey factor in the

1 price paid by all handlers purchasing Class 4b milk is
2 irrational in light of the fact that the majority of
3 handlers in California do not produce whey products for sale
4 as a byproduct of cheese manufacturing.

5 Third, there is no evidence in the record of this
6 hearing reflecting current pricing, make allowance and yield
7 in California for what appears to be the sole California
8 handler that consistently produces dry skimmed whey for
9 sale, nor will there be any such evidence. That information
10 is proprietary, and because there is only one such
11 California handler, it cannot be aggregated with information
12 from other California handlers to preserve its
13 confidentiality.

14 Next, the adoption of a Class 4b price based only
15 on the Federal Milk Marketing Order Class III price is
16 irrational owing to several key differences between
17 California market conditions and out-of-state market
18 conditions. These include the fact that, in the federal
19 system, non-pooled milk is not subject to the minimum price,
20 while in California the established 4b price is a true
21 minimum; secondly, manufacturing and business costs in
22 California are higher; and thirdly, producer costs in
23 California are lower.

24 The last point in Dr. Schiek's testimony is that
25 the last time the Secretary implemented a whey factor in

1 California based on data relating to the Federal Milk
2 Marketing Orders that effort misfired badly resulting in
3 overpriced Class 4b milk.

4 The Secretary appears to have anticipated these
5 issues in the Notice of Hearing regarding this hearing.

6 With that as a background I want to make four points:

7 First, the Notice of Hearings shows the
8 Secretary's justified concern that any adjustment to the
9 whey factor with resulting changes in the Class 4b prices be
10 supported by evidence relating specifically to California
11 handlers.

12 The notice of this hearing specifies the legally
13 appropriate framework for analyzing whether there is any
14 role for the use of the whey factor in setting the Class 4b
15 milk price. That notice asked the petitioners to address
16 the sufficiency of the calculation of the whey factor by
17 reference to quantifiable economic data and methodologies,
18 such as but not limited to manufacturing cost data, market
19 and sales data and the whey stream valuation directly
20 applicable to California plants.

21 The notice also describes the Department's
22 concerns about the lack of transparent data that is readily
23 available, data that cannot be published due to
24 confidentiality, and data that are directly related to the
25 manufacturing and marketing of California whey products.

1 Lastly, the notice asks witnesses to address the
2 extent to which the factor can be transparently calculated
3 as a component of the Class 4b price and fairly imposed on
4 processors.

5 So far as any adjustment to the whey factor and
6 resulting increases in Class 4b milk price is concerned,
7 then, the Department is obviously concerned with
8 transparency, as it should be. But as the record in this
9 hearing today has shown, the whey factor in California
10 cannot be transparently calculated and it would therefore be
11 unfair to impose it on processors.

12 The Secretary's Decision must be supported by
13 evidence specifically related to California handlers and
14 included in the record of these hearings.

15 Transparency is not merely desirable, it is a
16 legal requirement. Under the law established by several
17 California cases cited in the written version of this
18 testimony, it is axiomatic that any pricing decision made by
19 the Secretary in connection with this hearing must be based
20 on evidence in the record. As the Court in the Golden
21 Cheese case has stated: "Factual matters are reviewed to
22 determine if the director's action was arbitrary,
23 capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support."
24 That evidence must be included in the record of the hearings
25 out of consideration for fairness and the law.

1 These cases also establish that, as a matter of
2 fairness, all parties are entitled to review, comment on and
3 rebut any evidence on which the Department may rely for its
4 decision to set prices. As one appellate court has already
5 noted, an administrative agency directed to fix prices or
6 price levels after a hearing, may not base its decision on
7 evidence outside the record and not made available for
8 rebuttal by the affected parties.

9 As a matter of law, therefore, the Department must
10 create an evidentiary record on which a reviewing court can
11 rely to determine whether the Department's action is
12 arbitrary, capricious or lacking in evidentiary support. A
13 court reviewing order by the Secretary in this proceeding
14 will scrutinize the record and determine that the order
15 lacks evidentiary support if there is no reasonable basis to
16 support the decision. The California Supreme Court has
17 delineated the scope of the reviewing court's inquiry into
18 whether there was a "reasonable basis" as follows:

19 "A court must ensure that an agency has
20 adequately considered all relevant factors, and
21 has demonstrated a rational connection between
22 those factors, the choice made, and the purposes
23 of the enabling statute."

24 I see that I am out of time. Would you prefer me
25 to continue this after all the other witnesses have

1 testified?

2 (The Panel conferred.)

3 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Please continue.

4 MR. LEMMON: Thank you, Mr. Hearing Officer.

5 The Secretary is, of course, bound to apply the
6 very same standards in adopting or implementing a milk
7 pricing formula if she is to be confident that her decision
8 will avoid being overturned by a reviewing court.

9 The third point I wish to make is that the record
10 in this proceeding does not contain evidence sufficient to
11 support the current or prospective use of a whey factor to
12 calculate Class 4b milk prices.

13 The only data regarding the whey factor available
14 in this hearing so far relates to pricing, cost and yield
15 information underpinning the Federal Milk Marketing Orders
16 and related to out-of-state handlers. That data does not
17 pertain to California handlers because information regarding
18 California handlers is, for reasons of confidentiality of
19 handlers, unavailable for introduction into the record.

20 This evidence therefore falls well short of the
21 call in the Notice of Hearing that seeks data "directly
22 applicable to California plants" and "directly related to
23 the manufacturing and marketing California whey products."

24 The evidence pertaining to out-of-state handlers
25 subject to the federal orders is unreliable, for all of the

1 reasons identified in Dr. Schiek's testimony and David
2 Ahlem's testimony. Nor are they alone in their skepticism,
3 which is based on the differences between the California
4 milk market and the federal orders. In the Panel's report
5 released after the June 30 and July 1, 2011 Class 4a-4b
6 hearings the Hearing Panel once again reviewed and discussed
7 all of these key differences.

8 The Department's efforts in the past to use
9 Federal Order Class III prices as a basis from which to
10 extrapolate the whey factor in California and California's
11 Class 4b prices have been woefully inaccurate and
12 unreliable. As Dr. Schiek noted, in 2003 the Department
13 added a whey factor to the Class 4b formula. Since an
14 audited manufacturing cost study for skim whey powder was
15 not then available, the department relied on testimony from
16 the 2003 hearing. Most of that was drawn from federal order
17 hearings or from budgeted financial information. The
18 Department then set the manufacturing cost allowance at
19 \$0.02 higher than the manufacturing cost allowance for
20 nonfat dry milk.

21 In making that decision the Department missed by a
22 mile. In 2004, when the results of the Department's skim
23 whey powder processing cost survey became available, that
24 survey showed that the 2003 manufacturing cost allowance was
25 actually \$0.09 below the average costs incurred by

1 California plants then processing dry skim whey. Since
2 2003, in other words, California handlers had overpaid for
3 Class 4b milk, as the Secretary recognized implicitly when
4 she increased the manufacturing cost allowance and the
5 resulting Class 4b price in 2005.

6 The demonstrated unreliability of Federal Milk
7 Marketing Order data as applied to California handlers,
8 coupled with the unavailability of California-specific
9 evidence, compels the conclusion that there is no reasonable
10 basis in this administrative record on which the Secretary
11 may adjust or even continue the whey factor as an element of
12 Class 4b pricing. If "reasonable basis" means anything, it
13 requires that the Secretary inquire whether there is any
14 reliable evidence in the record to support the whey factor
15 as an element of the Class 4b price. In the face of the
16 proven unreliability of Federal Milk Marketing Order data in
17 the application to California and the unavailability of data
18 directly related to California handlers, this question must
19 be answered in the negative.

20 The last point is, Food and Agricultural Code
21 Section 62062 does not permit the Secretary to use Federal
22 Milk Marketing Class III prices as a substitute for
23 California-specific data.

24 Section 62062 of the Agricultural Code identifies
25 a number of factors the Secretary must take into

1 consideration in setting minimum prices. Petitioners want
2 us to single out one of those factors for special emphasis
3 in their argument that the whey scale in the Class 4b
4 formula should be modified, resulting in an increase in 4b
5 prices. They focus on the requirement that California
6 prices bear a "reasonable and sound economic relationship
7 with the national value of manufactured milk products."
8 Petitioners argue that Class III prices exceed the
9 California Class 4b prices and that the California Class 4b
10 prices must therefore be increased.

11 But that argument is misguided.

12 Section 62062 lists other pricing factors
13 manifesting the legislative intent that the Secretary also
14 take into account, among other things, the "cost of
15 producing and marketing milk for all purposes, including
16 manufacturing purposes." The inclusion or application of a
17 whey factor in Class 4b prices must accordingly be supported
18 in the record by evidence showing, first, why dry skimmed
19 whey is a suitable proxy for all whey end uses; second, why
20 the inclusion of a whey factor boosting the Class 4b price
21 is appropriate as applied to handlers for whom whey is a
22 cost center, not a profit center; and thirdly, if in spite
23 of the foregoing a whey factor is nevertheless to be used,
24 the actual prices charged by California handlers for the
25 finished product, manufacturing costs incurred by California

1 handlers and yield for California handlers.

2 In the absence of evidence in the record regarding
3 any of these items, the Secretary is obligated under the law
4 to reject any proposal regarding the whey factor. Moreover,
5 using Federal Order prices as a proxy for California
6 pricing, cost and yield data does not satisfy the reasonable
7 basis test that the courts will apply to the Secretary's
8 decision in this case. The requirement that the Secretary's
9 pricing decisions have a reasonable evidentiary basis and
10 have a "ration connection" to the pricing factors listed in
11 the statute is grounded in two considerations: participants
12 in hearings like these must be allowed to comment on and
13 contest evidence introduced by other parties; and the court
14 must have the basis for reviewing the agency's decisions.

15 Viewed against that backdrop, there is no
16 dissonance between the statutory requirement that California
17 prices bear a "reasonable and sound economic relationship"
18 with national prices and the statutory requirement that the
19 Secretary base her pricing decision on cost, price and yield
20 data specific to California handlers. The Secretary's
21 pricing decisions must be driven by such cost, price and
22 yield data specific to California handlers as is included in
23 the administrative record; national prices, based on other
24 data, provide a reference point but not a target.

25 In conclusion, considerations of both fairness and

1 the law require a conclusion -- excuse me.

2 Considerations of both fairness and the law
3 require a conclusion that the Department cannot continue to
4 use the current whey factor in calculating Class 4b prices.

5 As a matter of fairness, the use of a single end-
6 product, dry skimmed whey, as a proxy for all whey uses is
7 insupportable. Further, most handlers purchasing Class 4b
8 milk have not made, and may not have the ability to make,
9 the capital outlay necessary to convert whey from a cost
10 center to a profit center in their production.

11 As a matter of law, the use or application of any
12 whey factor without inclusion in the administrative record
13 of evidence showing prices, costs and yields of California
14 handlers would flout the statutory and decisional authority
15 carefully developed by California courts to balance agency
16 discretion with judicial oversight.

17 I thank the Panel for the opportunity to testify
18 and I echo Dr. Schiek's request that we be permitted to file
19 a post-hearing brief.

20 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request for a post-
21 hearing brief is granted.

22 MR. EASTMAN: Where to begin. Actually because of
23 the mere volume of things it might take a little bit. I
24 wanted to go to the appendices of your testimony,
25 Dr. Schiek, just to clarify a few things.

1 So in Appendix A it appears that Figure A-1 sort
2 of mimics, according to what I see, something else presented
3 by the witness -- by Hilmar. I assume that's kind of -- is
4 that the same graph?

5 DR. SCHIEK: Probably it's pretty close. Did you
6 -- A question to you.

7 MR. EASTMAN: Okay.

8 DR. SCHIEK: Did you want to expound on the
9 methodology, because I can --

10 MR. EASTMAN: Yes. Was his description of how you
11 came up with the effective plant capacity accurate?

12 DR. SCHIEK: Yes.

13 MR. EASTMAN: Or would you agree with that?

14 DR. SCHIEK: I would agree with that. It was
15 based on -- since I came to work in the California dairy
16 industry, plant capacity was always adequate. When I first
17 saw that it wasn't was in the spring of 2006. And the
18 particular month, I believe, was March and that was when we
19 first started getting the reports of milk being distressed
20 and moving out of state. And so basically I benchmarked to
21 that daily average milk production in March of 2006 as a
22 sort of high water mark of what we could handle, it was
23 somewhere around that.

24 Since then, as Mr. Ahlem testified, we have been
25 tracking, as best we can, plants that are closing, plants

1 that are expanding, new plants, and looking at the sort of
2 announced capacities in the press reports and everything on
3 those facilities and trying to keep track on sort of where
4 that top line might be. It, you know, can't be accurate to
5 the pound but it's in the ballpark.

6 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. So you would agree there is
7 probably some measure, some margin of error there. Because
8 if a plant is running a certain product that takes longer
9 to, say, manufacture, move through the plant --

10 DR. SCHIEK: Sure.

11 MR. EASTMAN: They could switch products then.
12 There could be some -- a margin of gray area.

13 DR. SCHIEK: Yeah, sure. And I guess you would
14 say we're trying to -- trying to estimate maximum effective
15 capacity. The actual effective capacity may be less if the
16 economic incentives aren't right for plants to take on all
17 the milk that they could possibly process.

18 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. When I look at Appendix B, it
19 lists a number of what appear to be economic conditions.
20 And one of the themes so far of what we have heard today are
21 economic conditions that would warrant price increases or
22 those that would not warrant them and so in Appendix B
23 you're going to list some of these things. I know you
24 already -- you mentioned milk production plant capacity or
25 the supply of milk in relation to demand as a factor. What

1 other types of economic factors do you believe would be
2 important in determining whether or not minimum price
3 increases would be warranted?

4 DR. SCHIEK: I think it's important to look at
5 what is happening in terms of -- we talked about milk
6 production, but in terms of what happening in the future
7 direction of our margins and what the trends are. And so
8 we're looking first at what is going on with feed costs, and
9 there is a chart there, Figure B-6, which tries to look at
10 at least three feedstuffs and illustrates, really, that corn
11 is the one that is changing greatly, it's falling. And I
12 tried to make some adjustment here.

13 I was using the California Grain and Feed Report
14 data, looking at the first week of the month just as a
15 reference point. So the first week of September, the first
16 week of August, so on and so forth. I then projected
17 forward with the CME futures prices with an adjustment for
18 the California basis, in terms of looking at what those
19 prices might be on a tonnage basis. You know. if you went
20 out and bought corn today, what the CME futures price was.
21 You know, what kind of price that would translate to in
22 dollars per ton. So feed cost.

23 Milk prices was another, another one, what's
24 happening with milk prices and what the futures market
25 suggests. Futures milk prices will be in the commodity

1 prices.

2 Also looked at the issue of consolidation because
3 we have had some testimony today about consolidation, which
4 is -- which is a painful and just devastating change in the
5 industry. But I think some of the charts show that
6 consolidation has been kind of a constant in our industry.
7 At times it's greater, at times it's not as great, but I had
8 a chart in here that kind of compared consolidation in
9 California with some other major dairy states and the US
10 average. And the issue there is that's kind of a feature of
11 the landscape. It's not unique to California nor is
12 California experiencing it in a greater degree than other,
13 other states. You read reports from places like Dairy
14 Australia, reports out of Europe on milk marketing and
15 you're finding it's happening everywhere. Feed cost is
16 pretty universal in terms of the way it impacts dairy
17 farming.

18 I also mentioned -- the last chart in there is on
19 the dispersion of the milk production cost estimates.

20 MR. EASTMAN: I'm sorry, which figure are you
21 referring to?

22 DR. SCHIEK: That would be Figure B-8. which has
23 taken the cost of production feedback data from the
24 Department for the first quarter of 2013 and just plotted it
25 for every farm that's in the sample and it shows the

1 dispersion of those costs.

2 And one of the issues that drives consolidation is
3 our current pricing system and the fact that it basically
4 channels all the sort of competitive effort for dairymen
5 into the cost arena. You see you've got some dairymen who
6 were high cost, some were a lower cost. I think the spread
7 here in the sample is something like around \$11/cwt
8 difference between the high and low cost farms in the
9 sample. And when you have that kind of spread there is an
10 average that kind of helps determine where the milk supply
11 comes, you know, on average.

12 But the low cost farms are making more money and
13 so they're -- they have money to expand and take advantage
14 of scale economies and lower their costs even further, which
15 tends to bring prices down. And that, obviously, makes it
16 really tough on the higher cost farms and they eventually
17 exit. So when you have a system where people are competing
18 on cost, that's the only way they really can improve their
19 profitability, it drives consolidation.

20 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. So moving on to Appendix C.
21 Okay, on Figure C-3, I was -- I understand the Federal Class
22 III price and the current 4b price. What exactly does that
23 third price mean? What is that?

24 DR. SCHIEK: It represents essentially that
25 federal Class III price less the cost of shipping from

1 California to that market. I think this is the East Coast,
2 actually it's Boston. So the cost of moving cheese from
3 California to Boston, expressed on a per hundredweight
4 basis. Subtract that from the local Class III price.
5 That's representative of what a California plant, all other
6 things being equal, would have to be paying for milk in
7 order to have a landed cost that is competitive with the
8 local plant.

9 And the point I was making there is that, you
10 know, where that -- obviously there are some differences in
11 timing of ups and downs, but where that line lies is pretty
12 close to the current 4b.

13 MR. EASTMAN: So can you repeat again exactly how
14 you're getting the transportation cost exactly?

15 DR. SCHIEK: That was from surveying. You know,
16 informally surveying members who ship cheese those
17 distances.

18 MR. EASTMAN: Your California Dairy Institute
19 members?

20 DR. SCHIEK: Yes, yes.

21 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. And I think Exhibit C-1 is
22 something that's been -- and this is sort of a cost of doing
23 business, business climate-type index, right?

24 DR. SCHIEK: Right. Right. That's this year's
25 data.

1 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. And then in Appendix D, D-1.
2 It looks like you're just taking a per pound protein basis
3 comparison.

4 DR. SCHIEK: Right.

5 MR. EASTMAN: And what percentage were you using
6 for dry whey as a protein?

7 DR. SCHIEK: Well, let's see. We were multiplying
8 -- multiplying the WPC-34 price by .38, which is -- the data
9 in that table actually came from the CDFA analysis from 2008
10 so whatever assumption was used there. I think it was .38
11 times the WPC-34 price, to make an equivalent dry whey
12 protein.

13 MR. EASTMAN: Right. Okay.

14 DR. SCHIEK: I think that number is 13 --

15 MR. EASTMAN: Like 13 or 14 percent.

16 DR. SCHIEK: -- 14, somewhere in there, yeah,
17 protein. And then I just -- in Figure D-2 just extended it
18 with that same methodology with the more recent data. And
19 what it shows is that there's some times WPC-34 is the more
20 valuable product, sometimes dry whey is the more valuable
21 product. There is no consistency there in terms of which
22 one is the lowest value product.

23 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. And so on D-2, if I -- just
24 refresh my memory. I think Dairy Marketing News, they
25 report a range, don't they?

1 DR. SCHIEK: Yes, so this is --

2 MR. EASTMAN: And so you were taking the midpoint?

3 DR. SCHIEK: The midpoint, yeah.

4 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. Okay. I'm glad there's only
5 five appendices.

6 (Laughter.)

7 MR. EASTMAN: And then in Appendix E it looks like
8 you're highlighting a little bit of commentary regarding the
9 negotiations that happened between the producer and
10 processor sides of the industry as it related to the state
11 legislature and the legislative activities of this year so
12 far. And so from what I see then you just have a few
13 different versions of AB 1031 (sic) language that have, I
14 guess, changed at certain points.

15 DR. SCHIEK: Yeah, there's two versions of the AB
16 1038 language. One was what was in print, I think July
17 10th, and then the final version that was published on
18 August 13th. And that really reflected what could be agreed
19 to in terms of language in the bill. And it has no
20 reference to pricing, it's all task force language.

21 MR. EASTMAN: So you have two copies. So are you
22 stating that the July 10th is something that was being
23 accepted or considered by the Dairy Institute or the
24 processing community and then it switched? Is that -- and
25 the second copy is something that you didn't support?

1 DR. SCHIEK: July 10th was the version that was
2 sort of drawn from the letter that folks have referenced
3 from Joe Lang of Lang Hansen to Dr. Pan. And that bill was
4 amended two hours, probably, before it was heard in
5 committee that Ms. Galgiani, Senator Galgiani talked about.

6 So the final version is the August 13 version.

7 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. All right, so those were some
8 of my questions regarding the appendices I have. I may have
9 a couple other --

10 MR. MASUHARA: Can I jump in real quick, Hyrum?

11 MR. EASTMAN: Sure, go ahead.

12 MR. MASUHARA: My never-ending quest to find out
13 where these numbers came from. Obviously, with numbers,
14 somebody pushed a pencil around somewhere. Can you offer
15 any insight on this, Dr. Schiek, on the \$0.46 and raising
16 the cap from \$0.75 to \$1.00?

17 DR. SCHIEK: I think it's fair to say that those
18 numbers were more political calculations than economic ones.

19 MR. MASUHARA: So it was just a, what can you live
20 with?

21 DR. SCHIEK: Yeah. I think some of the -- some of
22 the driving folks behind the bill had certain numbers in
23 mind, the big, top line numbers as far as total relief. So
24 there were different proposals discussed but there was no
25 economic analysis done.

1 MR. MASUHARA: So it was pretty much a political
2 calculus that occurred here?

3 DR. SCHIEK: Yeah.

4 MR. MASUHARA: Okay, thank you

5 MS. GATES: You covered everything I had, you did
6 a great job.

7 MR. EASTMAN: I have one more question, actually.

8 One thing that you mentioned, Dr. Schiek, in your
9 testimony is that on the producer side there is a
10 consolidation going on in the industry. And it has been
11 happening for awhile where we have fewer dairy farms that,
12 on average, are larger. Do you not see that's going to have
13 to happen on the processing side as well? In California we
14 have, say, cheese plants of different sizes that have
15 different economies of scale based on size. Do you not
16 believe at some point that is going to happen to the cheese
17 plant? To really compete they're going to have to get big
18 enough to develop those efficiencies or find the manner in
19 which to invest in whey processing to be able to balance
20 their product supply and compete in the marketplace, whether
21 it be domestic or global or wherever?

22 DR. SCHIEK: That's a, that's a good question.
23 You know, from a policy perspective I think you're right,
24 that's certainly a possibility. I think the balancing
25 point, though, is where is the milk supply? If the milk

1 supply is long enough to keep so that we need the -- so the
2 smaller plants, plant capacity in the system to market all
3 the milk, you know, they may hang around for awhile because
4 that's where the milk supply is.

5 So it's kind of a where is that market clearing
6 price? And, you know, currently and historically the issue
7 has been we have been pushing plant capacity in the state.
8 I don't see any, any evidence yet that that won't be an
9 issue going forward in the next few years.

10 MR. EASTMAN: Just to make sure I heard that
11 correctly. So you don't think that is not going to be an
12 issue? Did you use a double negative? I'm sorry, it's
13 getting into the afternoon.

14 DR. SCHIEK: I'm sorry, a double negative.

15 MR. EASTMAN: Do you think plant capacity is never
16 -- not going to be an issue?

17 DR. SCHIEK: So the issue of plant capacity I
18 think is going to. Pushing up against plant capacity is
19 going to be an issue in the coming years.

20 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you for your
21 testimony, Dr. Schiek and Mr. Lemmon.

22 MR. LEMMON: Thank you.

23 Mr. Garbani. Mr. Garbani, could you please state
24 your full name and spell your last name.

25 MR. GARBANI: Pete Garbani, spelled G-A-R-B-A-N-I.

1 Whereupon,

2 PETE GARBANI

3 Was duly sworn.

4 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: And do you have anything
5 else other than this written testimony that you would like
6 marked as an exhibit?

7 MR. GARBANI: No.

8 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your exhibit will be
9 marked number 59.

10 (Exhibit 59 was entered into the record.)

11 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed.

12 MR. GARBANI: Mr. Hearing Officer and Members of
13 the Panel:

14 My name is Pete Garbani. I am here to testify on
15 behalf of Land O'Lakes, Incorporated. My business address
16 is 400 South M Street, Tulare, California, 93274. My
17 current title is Vice President of Member Relations. Land
18 O'Lakes thanks the Department for calling this hearing to
19 consider amendments to the Marketing Plans. This hearing
20 will address issues of critical importance to the future of
21 both our California dairy producer members and the entire
22 California dairy industry.

23 Land O'Lakes is a dairy cooperative with 3,000
24 dairy farmer member-owners. Land O'Lakes has a national
25 membership base, whose members are pooled on the California

1 State Program and five different federal orders. Land
2 O'Lakes members own and operate several cheese, butter-
3 powder and value-added plants in the Upper Midwest, East and
4 California. Currently, our 210 California member-owners
5 supply us with over 16 million pounds of milk per day that
6 are primarily processed at our Tulare and Orland plants.

7 Land O'Lakes fully supports the proposal submitted
8 by California Dairies, Inc., California Dairy Campaign, Milk
9 Producers Council and Western United Dairymen.

10 We agree with the petitioners that the 4b price
11 remains the primary issue. The 4b price has averaged \$15.96
12 in the three month period June through August 2013,
13 representing a decrease of \$1.24 from the May 4b price of
14 \$17.20. Future prospects for the 4b price presently look
15 bearish in light of the large volume of cheese in storage
16 and projections for another year of strong milk growth in
17 New Zealand. Some market analysts project the 4b price to
18 drop below \$14.00 in the first half of 2014.

19 We remain concerned about the persistent gap
20 between the California 4b and the Federal Order Class III
21 prices. Since May, the difference has averaged \$1.69 for
22 the four month period May through August 2013. The 4b
23 discount has averaged \$1.60 per hundredweight lower than the
24 Class III price for the seven month period February through
25 August 2013.

1 It is important to note that the monthly Western
2 dry whey price used by the Department in the whey portion of
3 the Class 4b formula has continued to exhibit significant
4 market strength in 2013. The Dairy Market News dry whey
5 western mostly has averaged slightly over \$0.58 for the
6 first eight months of 2013. Recall that when the whey
7 trades at \$0.58 the whey factor in the 4b formula
8 contributes \$0.6875 to the 4b price; by comparison, at a
9 whey price of \$0.58, the whey factor in the Class III
10 Federal Order formula contributes roughly \$2.31 to the Class
11 III price - a difference of \$1.62 per hundredweight.

12 Equally important, dairy market analysts project
13 that whey prices will remain at levels exceeding \$0.50 for
14 the rest of 2013 and 2014, which will continue to ensure
15 that the large California cheese plants will return
16 significant margins on their processed whey operations. In
17 light of the continued strength forecasted for the whey
18 market and the administrative price constraints under which
19 the 4b price is presently calculated, the gap between the 4b
20 and Class III will very likely persist into the immediate
21 future.

22 In sum, without the proposed changes to the whey
23 factor in the 4b formula and the temporary increase in the
24 4b price, California's dairy farmers will feel the full
25 force of a decrease in cheese prices while receiving only a

1 portion of the benefits of a strong whey market.

2 The petitioners' proposals would have the
3 potential to add much needed revenue to California's dairy
4 farmers' accounts over a 12 month period. This additional
5 revenue would have a significant positive financial impact
6 on California's dairy farmer families and would send an
7 important message to California dairy farmers that the CDFA
8 Secretary understands the seriousness of the financial
9 pressure that California dairy farmers have experienced in
10 recent years.

11 By contrast, cheese processors have continued to
12 enjoy the benefits of a discounted 4b price even with the
13 four month, \$0.30 increase and the current six month \$0.15
14 increase in 4b. Recall that in 2012 the 4b price averaged
15 \$1.91 lower than the Federal Order Class III. Even after
16 taking into account both of the recent administrative price
17 increases, the 4b price has still offered a significant
18 discount of \$1.60 to cheese processors.

19 Financial Conditions Continue to Challenge
20 California Dairy Farmers

21 As we noted in our testimony last December,
22 California's dairy farmers experienced negative margins in
23 the first three quarters of 2012. Recall that when
24 comparing the Department's statewide cost of production
25 estimates, before any allowance for returns on investment or

1 management, with the Department's statewide blend price, we
2 identified how California dairy farmers absorbed a loss of
3 \$0.70 per hundredweight in the first quarter of 2012, a loss
4 of \$2.22 per hundredweight in the second quarter of 2012 and
5 a loss of \$1.97 per hundredweight in the third quarter of
6 2012.

7 While the Department's data indicated that
8 California dairy farmers received a blend price above their
9 cost of production during the fourth quarter of 2012, the
10 situation has changed drastically since then. During the
11 first quarter of 2013, the statewide blend price averaged
12 only \$0.02 above the cost of production, reducing margins to
13 break-even levels.

14 Milk prices have continued to steadily decrease
15 since the peak levels of November 2012. For example, the
16 Department has reported that the overbase price decreased by
17 \$1.64 per hundredweight to \$16.85 in July, down from the
18 November peak of \$18.49. The California all-milk price
19 decreased \$2.41 over the same eight month period and the
20 statewide blend decreased by \$2.35 per hundredweight.

21 On a quarterly basis, the Department reported that
22 the statewide blend decreased \$1.73 from the fourth quarter
23 of 2012 to the first quarter of 2013. During the second
24 quarter of 2013, the statewide blend lagged behind the blend
25 price in the fourth quarter of 2012 by \$1.31. Margins on

1 the farm have followed milk price down as the margin over
2 feed decreased by \$1.42 in Q1 of 2013 compared to Q4 of
3 2012. Clearly, California's dairy farm families have been
4 experiencing another period of tightening margins.

5 Many market analysts have written about the
6 opportunity offered to California dairy farmers from corn
7 futures trading at lower levels due to the projections of an
8 abundant harvest this fall. The fact of the matter is that
9 the fixed whey factor severely hinders a California dairy
10 farmer's ability to make an effective use of dairy futures
11 to hedge their milk and take advantage of the projected corn
12 prices to lock in their margins. The fixed whey factor
13 exposes California dairy farmers, who attempt to lock-in
14 their margins using a Class III futures contract, to a huge
15 amount of basis risk.

16 For example, the Class III futures contract
17 offered by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange is the most
18 heavily used of the dairy product futures contracts. Price
19 movements in the Class III futures market may not be offset
20 on a one-to-one basis in the cash 4b market. This
21 difference between the cash 4b and the Class III futures
22 price, the basis, drastically increases the risk that a
23 California dairy farmer takes on when entering a Class III
24 futures contract to hedge their milk.

25 The size of the basis can be quite volatile, even

1 from month to month, due to the stark differences between
2 whey values in each of the formulas. For example, the Class
3 4b basis, the Class 4b price less the Federal Order Class
4 III, in April 2013 was $-\$0.67$; in May 2013 it rose to $-\$1.32$
5 and by June 2013 it had risen to $-\$2.11$. This gross
6 mismatch between the Class III futures price and the 4b cash
7 price coupled with the high level of volatility of the Class
8 4b basis prevents the California dairy farmers from making
9 effective use of Class III futures as a hedging tool.

10 We fully realize that the proposal does not
11 address this basis problem arising from the fixed whey
12 factor. We offer this information to shed light on the
13 challenges that California dairy farmers face in taking
14 positions on Class III futures to protect margins over feed
15 costs.

16 We acknowledge that both cash and futures
17 contracts on corn have decreased and that dairy farmers may
18 benefit from more price decreases this fall. Despite these
19 potential benefits on the cost side, California dairy
20 farmers' equity position has eroded so drastically in the
21 last several years that we believe a permanent change in the
22 whey scale as well as a short-term increase in the Class 4b
23 price, as proposed by the petitioners, is essential. Our
24 opinion is that market conditions do warrant the changes
25 proposed.

1 The financial stress I speak of has impacted our
2 cooperative members. Over the past 20 months, 55 dairy
3 farmer members of Land O'Lakes have discontinued milking, 43
4 dairy farmers in 2012 and 11 dairy farmers in 2013.

5 We again want to thank the Secretary of
6 Agriculture and the Department for calling this hearing.
7 Cooperative producer-owners request a response from the
8 Department that benefits all California dairy farmers
9 equally. There is no question that our proposed increase in
10 the 4b price will have a positive, financial impact on all
11 California dairy farmers at a time when they could really
12 use it.

13 In conclusion, we thank the panel for your
14 considerations and we would like to request the opportunity
15 to file a post-hearing brief.

16 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request for a post-
17 hearing brief is granted.

18 MR. EASTMAN: I have two questions. The first
19 question is a similar question that's been asked of other
20 members -- I mean other witnesses today. And that is, we
21 have seen that when different organizations will compare
22 dairy margins they'll use cost of production. And then it
23 appears that they choose different forms of income, whether
24 it be the overbase price, whether it be quota, mailbox
25 prices, in this case you used the statewide blend. Is there

1 any particular reason for that? Do your members tend to --
2 do you feel your members are paid something closer to that
3 or is there some other reason why you would choose that form
4 of an income measure?

5 MR. GARBANI: Well we believe that the statewide
6 blend factors in the concepts of having higher fat and
7 solids in the price that is paid as well as a proportionate
8 share of the quota that's paid throughout the state. So it
9 is really the average price across, you know, that factors
10 in both components and quota.

11 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. And then my second question
12 has to do -- towards the end of your testimony you would
13 request that if a change is made that the benefits would
14 benefit all California dairy farmers equally. And I wonder,
15 we have heard other testimony that might suggest that might
16 not be possible in the sense that we know that processing
17 cooperatives, those producers have invested in processing
18 facilities that any increase in that class price would
19 affect them compared to producers who haven't. We have
20 heard testimony that some producers are paid premiums based
21 on market factors or quality of milk. And that if prices
22 are increased for them their premiums would go down. Is
23 there really a true way to treat all producers equally?

24 MR. GARBANI: I'm not sure I can completely answer
25 the question, I would offer you this scenario. If the

1 increase is in the class price it is guaranteed to all
2 producers. And it is not up to the whim of the manufacturer
3 on whether they had a good month or a bad month or they feel
4 like their milk might be threatened. It is their right
5 under law to have that price and it is not left up to the
6 discretion of the manufacturer whether they get it or not.

7 MR. EASTMAN: Okay.

8 MR. GARBANI: I think it puts a little bit of
9 security in their business as producers.

10 MR. EASTMAN: Okay.

11 MS. GATES: I have one question. On page two of
12 your testimony you speak to that when the dry whey levels
13 are exceeding \$0.50 that that continues to ensure that the
14 large California cheese plants will return significant
15 margins on their processed whey operations. Do you have any
16 data or information to support that or is that strictly
17 anecdotal?

18 MR. GARBANI: I would tell you that we have a
19 small cheese plant in Orland. We do not dry our whey, we
20 sell our whey liquid. And that plant, which is relatively
21 small in the size and scheme of things, has a very handsome
22 return in relationship to the other assets that we have in
23 California. So although it's proprietary and I can't share
24 the raw data with you, it does quite well.

25 MS. GATES: Okay, thank you

1 MR. MASUHARA: Related to what Candace just asked
2 you. It actually begs the question, if that plant is doing
3 quite well, has there been discussions in your organization
4 about expanding your operations and increasing your assets
5 that can generate income from a whey stream?

6 MR. GARBANI: You know our company is a butter
7 company, That's where we built our brand recognition. And
8 I will tell you that we continually evaluate all kinds of
9 different alternatives around investment and opportunities
10 within our marketplaces.

11 MR. MASUHARA: And then similarly to what I asked
12 CDI earlier. You're a butter and a powder manufacturer.
13 Are you guys manufacturing certain powders that are not
14 reflected in the current 4a formula? And this is purely
15 from the standpoint of us evaluating basically the
16 sufficiency of the formulas and making relative comparisons
17 between them.

18 MR. GARBANI: Yeah. I would also point out,
19 though, that what we pay for the solids that go into that
20 product is a very large percentage of the end-value of that
21 product that we sell. If you were to do the same comparison
22 on cheese and whey products, their discount is significantly
23 larger than what 4a -- how it trends against Class IV as
24 well as Class III.

25 MR. MASUHARA: But then you would generally agree

1 with the notion, though, that it is very difficult in
2 product pricing to find certain products that serve as very
3 good, suitable indexes for coming up with the prices
4 reflective of everything that potentially comes from these
5 components?

6 MR. GARBANI: Sure. In fact I would offer that we
7 have heard testimony here today from mozzarella cheese
8 manufacturers who don't make cheddar cheese. We have powder
9 products that are part and part of, you know, the market
10 discovery price and in pricing that product. There are
11 probably butter products as well and fat price -- fat
12 products that don't go into that CME butter price. So it
13 seems to me that there are many products that are made
14 throughout the dairy industry in California that are not
15 specific to the market discovery factor that we use to price
16 milk, CME butter, CME cheese, nonfat dry milk. Correct?

17 MR. MASUHARA: Yes.

18 MR. GARBANI: So I would --

19 MR. MASUHARA: Yes, I am not disagreeing with you
20 there.

21 MR. GARBANI: Okay.

22 MR. MASUHARA: Thanks, that's all I have.

23 MR. EASTMAN: I just have one more follow-up
24 question. I just wanted to make sure I understood your
25 response. And just to clarify Candace's question. You

1 responded that you don't dry your whey but you are selling
2 some sort of wet whey from your Orland plant. So you
3 mentioned that it does turn a profit. So what you're
4 stating is that all those proprietary whatever revenue you
5 get from that, minus whatever the cost of transportation,
6 disposal, whatever, is that greater than the whey factor
7 contribution in the Class 4b formula? Is that what you were
8 implying?

9 MR. GARBANI: Yes.

10 I feel prejudiced in that I haven't been asked the
11 question about the deal.

12 (Laughter.)

13 MR. MASUHARA: Okay, I'm going to ask you the
14 question about the deal. Did you participate in any
15 negotiations? And if you did, can you shed some light on
16 where these numbers came from?

17 MR. GARBANI: I did not personally participate in
18 the negotiations; indirectly we were represented by a trade
19 group in the negotiations. And it was our understanding as
20 we came out of the legislative piece of the process that we
21 did have a deal that was going to be supported by the entire
22 industry and were very disappointed to find out that we
23 didn't. So as far as the calculations go and so forth, I
24 wasn't there to see them, Kevin, I can't speak any further
25 to them.

1 MR. MASUHARA: Okay, thanks.

2 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you for your
3 testimony.

4 Mr. Vandenneuvel. Mr. Vandenneuvel, could you
5 please state your full name and spell your last name for the
6 record.

7 MR. VANDENHEUVEL: Absolutely. Vandenneuvel, V-A-
8 N-D-E-N-H-E-U-V-E-L, first name, Robert.
9 Whereupon,

10 ROB VANDENHEUVEL

11 Was duly sworn.

12 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: So the exhibit that's
13 here, your written testimony that you're going to provide
14 and the flyers that you provided, is there any other
15 information you would like to have marked as an exhibit?

16 MR. VANDENHEUVEL: No, that's my exhibit.

17 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Okay, these will be
18 Exhibit 60.

19 (Exhibit 60 was received into evidence.)

20 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed.

21 MR. VANDENHEUVEL: Thank you. Mr. Hearing Officer
22 and Members of the Panel, my name is Rob Vandenneuvel. And
23 while I am the General Manager of Milk Producers Council I
24 am testifying here as an individual; I was not prepared to
25 give my testimony when Milk Producers Council's turn came up

1 earlier this morning.

2 Before going into the issues of the hearing, it's
3 important to remember one of the reasons why CDFA is
4 involved in the business of establishing minimum milk
5 prices. As stated in California law, one specific purpose
6 is to, quote:

7 "Enable the dairy industry, with the aid of
8 the state, to develop and maintain satisfactory
9 marketing conditions, bring about and maintain a
10 reasonable amount of stability and prosperity in
11 the production of market milk, and provide a means
12 for carrying on essential educational activities."
13 Section 61805(d).

14 Obviously we are here today, because among other
15 things, that particular goal is not being achieved.

16 As for the details of this particular hearing, I
17 want to express my strong support for the proposal before
18 the panel today. While the proposal certainly represents a
19 significant concession on the part of California's dairy
20 families, when compared to the pricing reform we have been
21 seeking in recent years, it is nonetheless an important
22 modification to the Class 4b formula.

23 This is certainly not the first hearing on Class
24 4b prices or on temporary price relief, and since all the
25 testimony from previous hearings is already submitted into

1 the record by reference, and in order to keep today's
2 testimony focused, let me go through the specific items
3 outlined by the Notice of Hearing published by CDFA staff.

4 The Notice of Hearing requests that witnesses
5 address, at a minimum, "economic conditions that have
6 changed that would warrant adjustments to the current
7 temporary price established as a result of the May 20, 2013
8 hearing."

9 At the time of the May 20, 2013 hearing, the most
10 recent publicly available data from CDFA on the cost of
11 producing milk in California was from the fourth quarter of
12 2012. Included in the Panel Report from the hearing was
13 commentary that "by the end of 2012, the estimated average
14 margins were positive, suggesting improved conditions." The
15 report went on to state that improved margins were due to
16 "increased mailbox milk prices at levels sufficient to cover
17 production costs, including allowances for return on
18 investment and return on management." That's from page 10
19 of the Panel Report.

20 The Report continued that "Since the hearing
21 record is void of any concrete data indicating the level of
22 estimated margins on dairies for 2013, the most current data
23 available indicates that estimated margins were positive
24 again and that the income received by dairies in relation to
25 the cost of production of market milk appeared adequate."

1 It is unfortunate that CDFA's data on the first
2 quarter's Cost of Production was unable to be used in the
3 previous hearing. In the case of this current hearing, I
4 have spoken with CDFA staff who have indicated that the
5 second quarter's report will be publicly released on or
6 around September 20th. Since that will likely be after the
7 close of the hearing record, I would officially request that
8 information be shared by CDFA's Cost of Production unit,
9 even in a preliminary format, in order to provide the Panel
10 with the most current data possible on the cost of producing
11 milk in California.

12 In the meantime, I have no choice but to focus
13 this portion of my testimony on the most recent data that is
14 publicly available. Before addressing the first quarter of
15 2013, there is actually some question as to whether or not
16 the data for the fourth quarter of 2012 truly indicates what
17 CDFA staff wrote in the Panel Report.

18 Included in Appendix A of this testimony is the
19 "Statewide Cost Comparison Summary" published by CDFA for
20 the fourth quarter of 2012. The average reported cost of
21 production, including allowances for return on investment
22 and return on management, was \$20.08 per hundredweight in
23 that quarter, this is the fourth quarter of 2012. During
24 that same quarter, the announced mailbox milk prices were
25 \$19.40 in October, \$19.71 in November and \$18.48 per

1 hundredweight in December. A simple average of those three
2 months provides an average mailbox price of \$19.20, or \$0.88
3 below the reported cost of production. So it is unclear why
4 the Panel Report states that mailbox milk prices were "at
5 levels sufficient to cover production costs, including
6 allowances for return on investment and return on
7 management.

8 Moving forward, we now have the CDFA-generated
9 data from the first quarter of 2013. The average statewide
10 cost of production for the quarter was announced to be
11 \$19.16 per hundredweight. Compare that to the average
12 mailbox milk price of \$17.45 per hundredweight, an estimated
13 loss of \$1.71 per hundredweight. Clearly, any assumptions
14 that were made in the May 20, 2013 hearing about the
15 California dairy farmers being profitable in the first
16 quarter of 2013 are not supported by this data.

17 In addition, the continued barrage of dispersal
18 sales being conducted on California dairy farms is evidence
19 that we are far from out of the woods financially. I submit
20 for the record, and I have already handed to you, a stack of
21 fliers for dispersal sales conducted just over the past
22 year. This is not an all-inclusive list but rather just the
23 fliers I was able to find on the Internet or received
24 through email.

25 And before I move on to the next item. There has

1 been quite a bit of talk about feed costs and projections.
2 And I do find it interesting to hear our friends on the
3 processing side making claims about the future of feed costs
4 on the dairy. I don't think that they would take too kindly
5 to me making projections about their future utility costs,
6 natural gas costs at their plants ahead of CDFA's
7 manufacturing cost surveys that are announced every fall.
8 And so what I am basing my testimony on is the reported
9 information coming from CDFA, the Cost of Production Unit,
10 despite what you may have heard possibly might happen going
11 forward. If that's true we'll see it in the reports in the
12 future.

13 The Notice of Hearing requests that witnesses
14 address "the sufficiency of the calculation of the whey
15 factor by reference to quantifiable economic data and
16 methodologies; such as but not limited to: manufacturing
17 cost data, marketing and sales data, and whey stream
18 valuation directly applicable to California plants.

19 The modifying "sliding scale" being proposed for
20 inclusion in the 4b formula is based on a letter sent by
21 Joseph Lang, a representative of the Dairy Institute of
22 California, to Assemblyman Richard Pan during discussions
23 about milk price changes in California. And I would note
24 that that letter is not part of my exhibit as it was already
25 included as part of CDI's exhibit. Dairy farmers have

1 indicates in the past that we see a fundamental weakness in
2 the sliding scale methodology, in that it inherently creates
3 a floor and a ceiling for one particular piece of the
4 formula, resulting in a Class 4b price that is not in a
5 reasonable and sound economic relationship with the Federal
6 Milk Marketing Order Class III price that serves as a
7 benchmark price for milk sold to cheese manufacturers around
8 the country.

9 However, dairy farmers and their organizations
10 have stepped up to support this modification in the interest
11 of providing much-needed revenue for dairy farmers in a form
12 that our processor representatives can support.

13 The process of coming to this proposal was an
14 exercise in balance, with political concessions made on both
15 sides of the industry.

16 And just jumping in right there, I really
17 appreciated that Chairwoman Galgiani came and testified
18 before this group. After hearing several witnesses testify
19 that there was no deal I started thinking maybe I was just
20 dreaming all these things because I in my other role, not as
21 an individual but with Milk Producers council, was directly
22 involved in these negotiations through our lobbyist. And I
23 can tell you that the time line was very simple. A letter
24 was sent on July 8, you've seen the letter, it's in your
25 record. July 11th there was a hearing held that Chairwoman

1 Galgiani talked about. Both parties testified in support of
2 the agreement and the agreement was certainly capturing the
3 contents of that July 8 letter.

4 And on July 22nd this petition was submitted. So
5 through this whole process we have been consistent. There
6 was indication that maybe there was, you know, some
7 backtracking on the part of producers. And certainly there
8 is no evidence of that when you lay out the time line on how
9 we got here today and the content of our proposal.

10 All right, talking about balance. It is with that
11 same level of balance that we ask CDFA to accept this
12 proposal. The standards outlined in the Notice of Hearing
13 for determining the "sufficiency" of the whey factor
14 calculation are exclusively focused on the manufacturing
15 side of the equation. Those items are part of CDFA's
16 consideration to be sure, Section 62076 specifically
17 references those. However, of equal weight is the
18 consideration CDFA must make with regard to the dairy farmer
19 profitability, Section 62062. It is not an accident that
20 both of those sections of the California Food and Ag Code
21 use identical language, "shall take into consideration."

22 In addition, part of the challenge that CDFA staff
23 has addressed in the past, and we have heard some of this
24 today, with regard to the dry whey component of the Class 4b
25 price is a lack of available data. That same concern is

1 also beginning to impact the cheddar cheese component of the
2 Class 4b formula. It is worth pointing out that under our
3 formulas, as well as under the formulas used by the Federal
4 Order system, they both use basic commodity dairy products
5 to drive the end-product pricing formulas. Forty pound
6 blocks of cheddar cheese are not the most prominently
7 produced cheese in the state. You heard testimony about
8 that earlier. But yet it is used to establish our regulated
9 milk price. The same goes for dry whey, which is also not
10 the most prominently produced whey product in the state.
11 That is intentionally done, as it provides an incentive for
12 manufacturers to move up the value chain, thereby giving
13 them an opportunity to enhance their margins by selling
14 higher value products, even though their regulated milk
15 prices are based on lower value dairy products. And that
16 really goes to some of the questions that Mr. Masuhara has
17 asked the 4a witnesses as well. They pay a 4a price based
18 on surveys of nonfat dry milk. There are other powdered
19 products that garner a higher value in the marketplace. By
20 basing it on nonfat dry milk it provides opportunities to
21 enhance your markets by going up the value chain.

22 There is a fundamental unfairness when you
23 consider the fact that the system incentivizes value-added
24 production. And when that system appears to work, and in
25 this case we're seeing it work because most cheese

1 manufacturers do not make those specific products in the
2 formula but instead make higher value products, producers
3 are then punished with a further limitation on the regulated
4 formula with the expressed reason that there is a lack of
5 data on manufacturing costs and marketing sales data for
6 those lower value products. Dairy farmers seem to lose on
7 both ends.

8 The Notice of Hearing requests that witnesses
9 "include the factual basis, economic and other evidence and
10 legal authority in support of the whey factor, any temporary
11 adjustment and any proposed amendments to the Plans."

12 There has already been testimony about the facts
13 that led to the development and submittal of this proposal.

14 The economic evidence that relief is needed is also
15 included in earlier parts of this testimony.

16 As for the legal authority, the Secretary has been
17 granted broad discretion by California law to implement the
18 proposal before the panel today.

19 And I would go on that there has been some legal
20 discussion this afternoon about some of the Secretary's
21 requirements. And we have found out -- the industry has
22 found out that the Secretary does have broad discretion.
23 The whey factor is not mentioned in the law. The cheese
24 factor or the end-product pricing structure in general is
25 not mentioned in law. The law gives the Secretary broad

1 discretion to establish prices either by selecting a price
2 or by coming up with some sort of a formula or method. In
3 the case of California, for many, many years, the method of
4 end-product pricing has been used. That doesn't mean that
5 the whey factor has to meet some sort of a legal standard.
6 That was insinuated earlier that there is some legal
7 standard for how to set the whey factor. The Secretary has
8 broad discretion to use the whey factor, to not use the whey
9 factor, to pick a price, to not use a formula, however. So
10 I think there was a little bit of a misunderstanding earlier
11 on exactly what the legal requirements are of the Secretary.

12 While additional discussions toward long-term
13 reforms will continue to be needed, this proposal does move
14 us in the right direction toward a more reasonable
15 relationship with the national value of manufactured milk
16 products, that's Section 62062. And a more reasonable
17 relationship between the various classes, Section 62062(c).
18 Also, given the documented financial condition of the
19 California dairy producing sector, the proposal also
20 addresses, in an admittedly modest way, the consideration of
21 the cost of producing milk relative to the combined income
22 from all the classes of milk, Section 62062(a).

23 The Notice of Hearing requests that witnesses
24 "address the extent to which the whey factor can be
25 transparently calculated as a component of the Class 4b

1 price and fairly imposed on processors."

2 Before getting into the transparency that
3 certainly exists in this proposal, must dispute the
4 contention that somehow we are "imposing" something on
5 processors.

6 Our dairy farmers work tirelessly every day to
7 produce a product that our manufacturers desperately need.
8 Those dairymen even pay the hauling costs to get the milk to
9 the manufacturer on the plant's schedule and in the quantity
10 and quality they need. And all those dairymen have asked in
11 recent years is to receive a milk price that is in a closer
12 relationship to what our out-of-state colleagues already
13 receive for the same quality of milk. To characterize our
14 request for a fair price as some sort of imposition is an
15 offensive notion and it truly lacks the balance that is
16 often referenced by CDFA in terms of considering the needs
17 of producers, processors and consumers.

18 As for the specifics of the proposal, the modified
19 sliding scale is certainly just as transparent as the
20 current sliding scale, with a clear and defined relationship
21 between the market value of dry whey and the resulting
22 impact on the Class 4b minimum price.

23 Other Consideration

24 In addition to the items listed in the Notice of
25 Hearing I want to bring up one additional item that was

1 mentioned in the May 20, 2013 Panel Report, which struck me
2 as odd. In the conclusion of the report, page 11, a
3 statement about the Panel's concerns for being -- there was
4 a statement about the Panel's concerns for being cautious
5 with temporary relief. Rather than characterize the
6 paragraph I've included it below. I'm going to quote it
7 here.

8 "As a result of the uncertainty regarding the
9 current condition of the dairy industry because of
10 the lack of concrete data, the Panel is concerned
11 and needs to be cautious in recommending temporary
12 price relief, so that the normal marketing
13 conditions of the state's milk supplies or
14 finished dairy products are not disrupted. If,
15 for example, during a period when temporary price
16 relief was in place, dairy markets were to
17 increase significantly, the competitive balance of
18 marketing dairy products could be disrupted.
19 Because dairy markets are dynamic and volatile,
20 these markets can change significantly in a matter
21 of days or weeks depending on changes in such
22 market factors as domestic and global milk
23 supplies, international demand and production
24 costs such as feed corn. Therefore, the Panel is
25 concerned with the uncertain impact that these

1 relevant economic factors may exert on dairy
2 markets when potential temporary relief would be
3 in effect."

4 The reason this strikes me as odd is because we
5 operate in an end-product pricing structure that is very
6 similar to the structure used around the country in the
7 Federal Milk Marketing Orders. Under those similar
8 structures it is all about "relative position," whether
9 that's relative position to your fellow in-state
10 manufacturers or relative position to your out-of-state
11 colleagues. In other words, if the dairy product prices
12 escalate or fall during the time when we have temporary
13 relief, a plant's relative position in the marketplace
14 remains the same as the prices paid by all plants are rising
15 and falling as well. So it's unclear how the "competitive
16 balance of marketing dairy products could be disrupted."

17 Conclusion.

18 The proposal before the panel today meets the
19 political, economic and legal standards being sought by
20 CDFA. Very rarely have we had the opportunity to present a
21 proposal to CDFA that was drafted in writing by the
22 processors and supported by the producers. Economically,
23 there is ample evidence that California's dairy farmers are
24 in much need of this pricing change. And the Secretary
25 holds all the legal discretion needed to implement this

1 proposal as soon as possible. While it's too late for the
2 dairies that have already sold their herds, the dairy
3 families that remain are desperately counting on it.

4 And that would be the conclusion of my testimony.
5 I would request the opportunity to file a post-hearing
6 brief.

7 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request for a post-
8 hearing brief is granted.

9 Questions from the panel?

10 MR. EASTMAN: I have a question. On the first
11 page of your testimony you mention that -- right up front
12 you talk about stability and prosperity in the production of
13 market milk and you state that that goal is not being
14 achieved. We have heard testimony that -- people have taken
15 the other side of that argument that it is. And so just to
16 make sure I am seeing your, looking at this correctly, you
17 sort of -- you touch on aspects of the hearing notice after.
18 When it comes to the goal of that, the prosperity and
19 stability in milk production not being met, what are the
20 factors, what are the -- what is driving your view that they
21 are not being achieved, so to speak?

22 MR. VANDENHEUVEL: The facts. The facts that are
23 outlined in the first section there talking about the
24 demonstrated losses being seen by dairy farmers. The facts
25 of the stack of dispersal notices. Dairy farmers selling

1 their herds. Not because they have made a business decision
2 that they want to move because while things are good they
3 want to go somewhere else but rather some of those are my
4 members who I know directly they're moving because they
5 cannot afford to stay in California; they cannot afford to
6 continue accruing losses.

7 So my statement that the stability and prosperity
8 of producing market milk in California is based on those
9 facts as well as testimony from previous hearings, which is
10 submitted by reference about historical. I only talked
11 about two quarters so, you know, I'm going back to previous
12 quarters. This has been a theme over the last several
13 years.

14 MR. EASTMAN: I think I have another question, I
15 need to look for it here. Do you have a --

16 MR. MASUHARA: I have a question, Rob.

17 MR. VANDENHEUVEL: Okay.

18 MR. MASUHARA: On page three you make the
19 statement when we were talking about sufficiency and you
20 addressed some of those issues that had been brought up
21 earlier in the hearing. And you made the statement that
22 it's intentionally done to use these basic commodities so
23 that it provides that incentive to move up the value chain,
24 yet only have to pay out at those basic levels. Why is that
25 intentionally done? Can you cite a reference to which body

1 states that that's an intention of the formula constructs?

2 MR. VANDENHEUVEL: Well, one of the things that
3 often gets stated at hearings, which I vehemently disagree
4 with but it is a reality of what's talked about is that
5 these formulas are established at market-clearing levels.
6 That's something that I have often seen in hearing panel
7 reports and other statements. That market-clearing concept
8 could also be applied to the types of products that you're
9 pointing to. Obviously, trying to set a market-clearing
10 price for using a product that is not a basic commodity but
11 a higher-value more niche product, those two ideas would
12 conflict. So that's one I could think of.

13 The other is my general observations as to why
14 would we have an end-product pricing structure that in
15 California uses cheddar cheese when Mozzarella is a much
16 larger piece of our market portfolio. And so my own
17 inference is that there is a reason we do that. My history
18 goes back seven years. Maybe if I went back further than
19 that I could find some specific reference. But it's some of
20 my belief and some of the statements.

21 MR. MASUHARA: So it's just an interpretation
22 based on your observations?

23 MR. VANDENHEUVEL: An interpretation based on what
24 I've heard in previous testimony, the market-clearing
25 aspects as well as my observations on how the system works,

1 yes.

2 MR. MASUHARA: How would you react to the
3 statement that -- an opinion that this is where we have
4 ended up, not a place that was set out to be a destination
5 many years ago?. You know, as far as end-product pricings
6 and formula constructs and what goes into them.

7 MR. VANDENHEUVEL: Well, I would -- there is no
8 doubt that there have been changes since the '30s when these
9 formulas were first established. However, the reason that
10 changes are made through hearing processes, administrative
11 hearing processes, considerations, legal analyses, is
12 because there's got to be some specific focus of where these
13 changes are taking us.

14 You've heard some testimony today that maybe end-
15 product pricing needs to be relooked at. And you would not
16 expect that decision to be made willy-nilly, just go do it
17 without any thought behind it and strategy. So while you're
18 right, this is where we've ended up, not necessarily where
19 we started, I would still point out that there was some
20 strategy behind it. And I think that what I have laid out
21 here is a reasonable justification for why we structure it
22 the way we do.

23 MR. MASUHARA: Okay. That's all I have.

24 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you for your
25 testimony, Mr. Vandenheuvel.

1 Ms. Taylor. Ms. Taylor, will you please state
2 your full name and spell your last name for the record.

3 MS. TAYLOR: Certainly. It's Sue Taylor, T-A-Y-L-
4 O-R.

5 Whereupon,

6 SUE TAYLOR

7 Was duly sworn.

8 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: And your statement here,
9 would you like this marked as an exhibit?

10 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, please.

11 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: It will be marked as
12 Exhibit 61.

13 (Exhibit 61 was entered into the record.)

14 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: You may proceed.

15 MS. TAYLOR: I am Sue Taylor, Vice President of
16 Dairy Policy and Procurement for Leprino Foods Company.
17 I'll condense some of my early testimony in the interest of
18 efficiency and time.

19 In the notice of today's hearing the Secretary
20 asked proponents of change to:

21 Address the economic conditions that have changed
22 since the May 20th hearing.

23 Regarding to the whey valuation, address the
24 sufficiency of the calculation of the whey factor by
25 reference to quantifiable economic data and methodologies.

1 And also include reference to issues and concerns
2 with the serviceability of end-product pricing components.

3 Relative to these issues, my belief is that:

4 Economic conditions have improved since the May
5 20th hearing and lower corn prices related to this year's
6 crop will result in an improved competitive position for
7 California dairy producers vis à vis dairy farmers in
8 regions dominated by homegrown feed. Milk prices are rising
9 seasonally and are expected to soften modestly over the next
10 12 months as the result of greater milk supplies generated
11 by greater farm level profitability nationally. However,
12 strong international dairy demand is expected to keep milk
13 prices from dropping in parallel with the reduction in cost
14 of production, leaving an improvement in dairy farm margins.

15 With respect to the second factor: The current
16 whey factor cannot be substantiated by California-specific
17 data, given the inability of cheese plants below a certain
18 size to extract full whey value. Given the binding nature
19 of California's minimum regulated milk pricing system on all
20 Grade A milk produced and processed in California, it is
21 difficult to construct a sound whey factor in the minimum
22 milk pricing formula that extracts greater value than that
23 attainable from the sale of liquid whey. Incremental value
24 extracted from the further processing of whey can and is
25 being shared with producers through competitive premiums

1 outside of the regulated milk pricing system.

2 With respect to the third issue: The broader lack
3 of data that can be published to provide the basis of an
4 informed debate around end-product price formulas begs for a
5 broader discussion and adoption of an alternative approach
6 to milk price regulations in California. We endorse the
7 efforts of the California Dairy Future Task force in that
8 regard.

9 Although these conclusions may appear to drive
10 toward the elimination of the \$0.15 per cwt emergency price
11 relief that is in place through September 2013 and
12 significantly change the structure of the current Class 4b
13 formula, I urge the Department to determine that no change
14 is warranted as a result of this hearing and urge the
15 industry and the Department to move forward with broader
16 reform discussions in earnest and with urgency.

17 Economic Conditions

18 Economic Conditions have improved since the May 20
19 hearing. USDA's AMS estimates of corn prices in the San
20 Joaquin Valley show a decline of 12.7 percent in corn prices
21 relative to the year to date May average and also a 12.3
22 percent versus the May 18th quote.

23 Although this year's corn crop is not in the bin
24 it is past the highest risk stages of the growing season.
25 The futures prices on corn reflect the improvement in this

1 year's crop. This improvement is reflected in the
2 settlement prices for the December 2013 corn futures
3 contract. At the time of the May 20th hearing, December
4 corn was trading in the \$5.50 per bushel range and it was
5 trading this morning at \$4.70.

6 While this doesn't capture the California basis,
7 the trend is what is relevant. The expectation for new crop
8 corn prices is that they will be \$0.80 per bushel lower than
9 the expectations that existed at the time of the 5/20
10 hearing.

11 Milk prices are rising seasonally but are expected
12 to soften modestly over the next 12 months as the result of
13 the greater milk supplies generated by greater farm level
14 profitability, nationally. However, strong international
15 dairy demand is expected to keep milk prices from dropping
16 in parallel with the reduction in cost of production,
17 leaving an improvement in dairy farm margins.

18 This commentary is responsive to the question of
19 the economic conditions trend and is not intended to argue
20 that I believe that dairy farming is overly profitable at
21 this time. We recognize that many dairymen suffered
22 financial losses over the last couple of years and some will
23 continue to struggle under their increased debt burden. The
24 prices derived from the supply and demand balance for dairy
25 commodities nationally will, over time, generate a level of

1 dairy farm profitability sufficient to generate the needed
2 supply to satisfy demand nationally. Some regions may be
3 more challenged than others due to region-specific issues.
4 Those issues can be best addressed outside of the regulated
5 milk pricing system. Leprino has a long history of paying
6 competitive premiums above the regulated minimum prices and
7 substantially increased its milk payments outside of the
8 minimum regulated milk pricing system a year ago out of
9 concern for the health of the dairy farmers supplying us in
10 our California plants.

11 Whey Factor

12 The current whey factor cannot be substantiated by
13 California-specific data given the inability of smaller
14 cheese plants to extract full whey value, even under best
15 management practices. We have testified regarding this
16 issues in numerous prior hearings.

17 Much testimony has been incorporated into prior
18 hearing records regarding the inability to economically
19 process whey in smaller cheese plants. Whey processing is
20 highly capital intensive. The extraordinarily high capital
21 cost creates a barrier to entry for small cheese plants. In
22 its raw form, dilute whey from a cheese vat has limited
23 value in the marketplace. Skim whey, prior to condensing,
24 is typically 6.1 to 6.5 percent solids. At this low level
25 of concentration, transportation costs quickly consume the

1 historic market value above costs of processing. Some
2 intermediate size plants can condense their whey for more
3 economic transport for further processing at larger plants.

4 However, the returns achieved for any products short of the
5 finished whey that is used in the milk price formulas fall
6 short of finished product value.

7 The diversity of whey products also creates
8 challenges relative to explicit inclusion of a whey factor
9 in the regulated pricing system. Sweet whey was
10 historically viewed as the lowest common denominator amongst
11 all whey products. This was because it is the most generic
12 whey product requiring the least advanced technology and
13 returns were generally lower than those for the more highly
14 refined whey proteins. It was thought that so long as the
15 milk price was based upon sweet whey prices, the whey
16 contribution to the milk price would not be overstated for
17 those who process whey. This long-held assumption was
18 proved to be incorrect in 2007. As more processors invested
19 in whey fractionation technology, the increased production
20 of whey protein concentrates depressed those prices.
21 Simultaneously, as older plants producing sweet whey were
22 mothballed, the supply and demand balance pushed sweet whey
23 prices up. Consequently, the portion of the milk price
24 attributable to the sweet whey value outstripped the returns
25 from whey protein concentrate, particularly in operations

1 that did not also produce lactose. It was one contributing
2 factor to replacing the explicit whey factor with the \$0.25
3 fixed factor in 2007. This issue was also a problem for
4 cheesemakers buying milk in Federal Milk Marketing Orders.
5 However, cheesemakers operating in Federal Orders had the
6 opportunity to negotiate a lower milk price in that period
7 and many were rumored to have done so. The same flexibility
8 is not afforded manufacturers operating under the California
9 State Order.

10 Leprino Foods processes its whey protein stream
11 into WPC-35 and WPC-80 and some specialized whey proteins
12 within the state of California. As part of this production,
13 lactose is produced and delactose permeate is generated. In
14 California, we produced 41 WPC product codes and 25 lactose
15 product codes. Many of these products have been developed
16 by our R&D staff to address specific applications requiring
17 such attributes as high gelling properties or high heat
18 stability applications for retort applications. Our
19 production of "generic" WPC-35 or -80 is only a portion of
20 the volume that CDFA would have categorized as WPC-35 and
21 -80 and will likely diminish over time as we expand into
22 those more specialized markets.

23 The bottom line is that there is not a common whey
24 product produced within California and the nature of supply
25 and demand in the various whey products, both domestically

1 and abroad, make it nearly impossible to identify a whey
2 product that will accurately reflect market clearing returns
3 generated by the whey complex on an ongoing basis.

4 Shifting Emergency Price Relief to Class 4b

5 The proposal to shift the emergency price relief
6 from other classes of milk to 4b should be rejected. This
7 proposal is a back-door way of extracting additional revenue
8 from cheesemakers, premised on the erroneous assumptions
9 that all cheesemakers have the additional revenue stream
10 from whey, which have already discussed as being false.

11 Alignment with Federal Milk Marketing Orders

12 Although the proposals being considered at this
13 hearing do not all for a matching of whey value in the 4b
14 formula to that in the Federal Order Class III value,
15 several witnesses have indicated that is their ultimate
16 objective. This one again ignores that manufacturers in
17 California must pay the minimum regulated price for all
18 Grade A milk processed, whereas manufacturers outside of
19 California can choose whether to participate in minimum milk
20 price regulations. The only entities upon which the minimum
21 regulated price is fully binding in the Federal Milk
22 Marketing Order system are bottlers. Manufacturers of all
23 other dairy products make an economic decision regarding
24 participation. Even if they opt to buy milk pooled under
25 the Federal Order System, they can purchase milk at below

1 minimum prices.

2 We appreciate the Department's interest in
3 evaluating the health of the dairy production sector and the
4 potential need for emergency price relief through the
5 regulated system. However, we believe that the marketplace
6 is the better venue for such price relief and we have acted
7 accordingly.

8 Need for Regulatory Reform

9 The structure of the minimum milk pricing system
10 in California needs to be reevaluated for both structural
11 and market reasons. The Department's concerns about the
12 lack of publishable cost data upon which to have an informed
13 discussion related to factors in the milk price formula in
14 the public hearing process are valid and should propel the
15 industry to develop an alternative approach.

16 Additionally, the evolution of US dairy markets
17 from largely domestic with a governmental support outlet to
18 increasingly international markets warrant another look at
19 the milk pricing system and its implications. In its study
20 commissioned by the Innovation Center for US Dairy of the
21 implications of globalization of the US dairy industry, Bain
22 Consulting ranked "Reform regulated milk pricing systems,
23 both federal and state, and price supports" as the top two
24 priorities to make the US a "consistent supplier" to export
25 markets. The broader conclusion of both the study and the

1 Innovation Center Board representing dairy farm cooperatives
2 and processors across the country was that the US dairy
3 industry will benefit by the demand created by participation
4 on a consistent basis in the international markets.

5 It is critical that the industry review and reform
6 the broader milk pricing system to achieve an end-state in
7 which all sectors of the dairy industry thrive.

8 I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and
9 request the opportunity to file a post-hearing brief.

10 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Your request to file a
11 post-hearing brief is granted.

12 Questions from the panel?

13 MR. EASTMAN: I have a few questions. On page two
14 there's a chart and the units of the vertical axis says
15 \$/cwt of corn. Is that right? I've never -- I guess I
16 haven't -- I'm not used to seeing that, normally it's
17 expressed in bushels or tons.

18 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. That chart was pulled from the
19 University of Wisconsin website. It does dairy product risk
20 management. And they're quoting the USDA price quote. But
21 it was directly pulled from their website, the website that
22 is maintained by Brian Gould.

23 MR. EASTMAN: Is that -- do you know whether or
24 not they are trying to express the price of corn in terms of
25 its value to milk, so to speak? How does that --

1 MS. TAYLOR: No, I believe that that's per 100
2 pounds. I think a bushel of corn is what, 52 pounds, so
3 this would be almost double what you're used to seeing.

4 MR. EASTMAN: Gotcha.

5 MS. TAYLOR: Fifty-six, okay.

6 MR. EASTMAN: Okay, that makes sense. I just --
7 normally --

8 MS. TAYLOR: I didn't run the conversions myself
9 but I believe it -- my belief is it's still 100 pounds of
10 corn, not a 100 pounds milk equivalent.

11 MR. EASTMAN: Right, okay. Now based on the
12 number that seems to -- that would seem to make sense based
13 on the number.

14 On page three you have a chart there that the
15 print is a little too small for me to determine exactly what
16 that is. Can you just give me a title?

17 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. That is the settlement prices
18 for the December corn futures contract as that contract
19 closed between the 1st of January of this year and as it was
20 trading this morning about ten o'clock.

21 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. So it's a settlement price
22 for December corn through year-to-date, more or less.

23 MS. TAYLOR: Yes.

24 MR. EASTMAN: Okay. And then you mentioned in a
25 couple places that it's expected that strong dairy demand

1 will -- expected to keep milk prices from dropping and
2 parallel to the reduction in the cost of production so it's
3 sort of an estimate that margins should improve. Is that
4 based on some sort of specific calculation or a publication
5 or paper or is that just an anecdotal sort of estimation of
6 what's coming?

7 MS. TAYLOR: The futures market if you line up the
8 milk prices. And of course, there has been some testimony
9 at this hearing that you can't use futures to estimate
10 California milk prices but in fact you have cheese futures
11 that help you calculate an expected price and then you
12 also have, of course, the butter and nonfat futures. If you
13 line those up against a projection of feed costs, that would
14 imply increased margins.

15 That also is a pretty widely held belief, I
16 believe, across the industry. I do receive some
17 publications from some of the dairy farm co-ops that
18 highlighted over the last few months that producers can lock
19 in higher margins at this point because of that improved
20 relationship.

21 MR. EASTMAN: And then the cost of production
22 would just assume a similar type thing using grain future
23 prices?

24 MS. TAYLOR: Right, since those are the highest
25 volatile factors that contribute to farm level cost of

1 production.

2 MR. EASTMAN: That's all I have.

3 MR. MASUHARA: Just a clarification. I think I
4 know the answer to this but the way I'm reading it, I just
5 wanted to make sure. On page four you give a little bit of
6 the history of sweet whey, on its way out basically, and
7 WPC's starting to ramp up. You make the statement that this
8 long held assumption was proved to be incorrect in 2007. As
9 more processors invested in whey fractionation technology,
10 the increased production of whey protein concentrates
11 depressed those prices. "Those" meaning WPC prices started
12 to come down as they moved away from being a novelty item to
13 being more mainstream?

14 MS. TAYLOR: Yes.

15 MR. MASUHARA: That's what I thought you meant but
16 I wasn't sure because the paragraph starts off talking about
17 sweet whey and then you just use the word "those."

18 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. Particularly WPC-35 or -34
19 prices became more commoditized.

20 MR. MASUHARA: Okay. That's what I thought you
21 meant but I just wanted to clarify it. Thanks.

22 MS. TAYLOR: Yes, thank you.

23 MR. MASUHARA: That's all I have.

24 HEARING OFFICER SUTHER: Thank you for your
25 testimony, Ms. Taylor.

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, RAMONA COTA, an Electronic Reporter, do hereby certify that I am a disinterested person herein; that I recorded the foregoing California Department of Food and Agriculture consolidated public hearing and I thereafter transcribed it.

I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for any of the parties to said public hearing, or in any way interested in the outcome of said matter.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 17th day of September, 2013.

RAMONA COTA, CERT**478